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“TERMS LATER” CONTRACTING: BAD
ECONOMICS, BAD MORALS, AND A BAD
IDEA FOR A UNIFORM LAW, JUDGE
EASTERBROOK NOTWITHSTANDING
Roger C. Bern*
INTRODUCTION
“Terms later”1 contracting is bad economics, bad morals, and a
bad idea for a uniform law. The Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) expressly embraces it, as do the
proposed revisions of sections 2-204 and 2-211 of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The proposed revisions of
section 2-207 of the UCC eliminate the existing statutory
provisions that protect against imposition of adverse “terms later,”
and introduce new provisions that invite courts to give effect to
that contracting stratagem. Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion in
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg2 was the first judicial affirmation of the
“terms later” principle that industry groups were vigorously
pressing in the drafting process of UCC Article 2B and that
ultimately came to be the free-standing UCITA. It, for the first
time, gave the appearance of legal legitimacy to that method of
transacting business, and thenceforth provided the “legal” authority
* Roger C. Bern, Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. I am
grateful for the excellent work of Bryan D. Smith, who served as my research
assistant while I was teaching at the Thomas Goode Jones School of Law.
1
“Terms later” is the shorthand reference used in this article to describe
those terms that a seller first discloses to the buyer after the buyer has ordered
and paid for the goods, and typically after the buyer has been given possession
of the goods by the seller.
2
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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argument for its proponents.3 It and its initial progeny, Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc.,4 however, have been deservedly and widely
criticized,5 variously described as a “swashbuckling tour de force
3

See Andre R. Jaglom, Internet Distribution and Other Computer Related
Issues: Current Developments in Liability On-Line, Business Methods Patents
and Software Distribution, Licensing and Copyright Protection Questions, SF74
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 727, 752 (2001) (demonstrating “well-reasoned economic
analysis”); Joseph C. Wang, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and Article 2B:
Finally, The Validation of Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 439, 456 (1997) (as being a “sound decision”); Carey R. Ramos &
Joseph P. Verdon, Shrinkwrap and Click-On Licenses after ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1996 at 1 (reflecting a “healthy pragmatism
and appreciation of the commercial realities”); Mary Jo Dively, The Use of
Standard Form Contracts in the Information Industry, 697 PLI/PAT 573, 579
(2002) (as showing a depth of understanding of American commerce and
reasoning that is “illuminating”). Similarly, proponents have been strong in their
efforts to reflect that principle in UCC 2B and the UCITA. See discussion infra
Parts V., VI.
4
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
5
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure In Consumer E-Commerce
As An Unfair And Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805 (2000); Michael
H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes in Cyberspace Under E-Sign: “There’s a New
Sheriff in Town!”, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 943 (2002); Shubha Ghosh, Where’s the
Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000: Reflections on the Visible Hand of Norm
Creation, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1125 (2000); Robert A. Hillman, “Rolling
Contracts”, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002); Beverly Horsburgh & Andrew
Cappel, Cognition and Common Sense in Contract Law, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1091
(2000); Lenora Ledwon, Common Sense, Contracts, and Law and Literature:
Why Lawyers Should Read Henry James, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1065 (2000); David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
241 (2001); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of
Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869 (2002); Deborah W. Post, Dismantling
Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank
Easterbrook, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1205 (2000); Lawrence M. Solan, The Written
Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87
(2001); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Mark A.
French, Note, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 811,
813 (2000); Jody Storm Gale, Note, Service Over the “Net”: Principles of
Contract Law in Conflict, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567 (1999); Batya
Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap
Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319 (1999); Kristin
Johnson Hazelwood, Note, Let The Buyer Beware: The Seventh Circuit’s
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that dangerously misinterprets legislation and precedent,”6 a “real
howler” that is “dead wrong”7 on its interpretation of section 2-207
of the UCC, a decision that “flies in the face of UCC policy and
precedent,” a “detour from traditional U.C.C. analysis”8 “contrary
to public policy,”9 with analysis that “gets an ‘F’ as a law exam.”10
ProCD and Hill provided the foundational “legal” authority in
support of “terms later” contracting in the revision process for
Article 2 of the UCC. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate
that Judge Easterbrook’s imposition of the “terms later”
contracting rule in ProCD and Hill was itself devoid of legal,
economic, and moral sanction. Thus his opinions in those cases
provide no legitimate support for other court decisions or for any
uniform law that would validate “terms later” contracting.
Following a brief introduction, Part I of this article critiques
Easterbrook’s purported legal analysis in ProCD and Hill. It
demonstrates that, notwithstanding the cleverness of his opinions
designed to suggest legal support for his “terms later” rule, there is
in fact none. It also explores some jurisprudential implications
suggested by Easterbrook’s ex ante methodology. Part II
demonstrates that notwithstanding Easterbrook’s window dressing
of economics, a rule sanctioning “terms later” contracting
increases information asymmetry, increases transaction costs,
enhances hold-up and opportunistic behavior by vendors, and
Approach to Accept-or-Return Offers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (1998);
Jason Kuchmay, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: Section 301 Copyright
Preemption of Shrinkwrap Licenses—A Real Bargain for Consumers?, 29 U.
TOL. L. REV. 117 (1997); Christopher L. Pitet, Note, The Problem With “Money
Now, Terms Later”: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of
“Shrinkwrap” Software Licenses, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325 (1997).
6
Murray, supra note 5, at 905.
7
Listserve Comment by Professor Mark Gergen, University of Texas
School of Law, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium: The Gateway Thread
AALS Contracts Listserve, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1154 (2000).
8
Gale, supra note 5, at 585.
9
Id.
10
Listserve Comment by Professor Stewart Macaulay, University of
Wisconsin School of Law, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium: The
Gateway Thread - AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1148
(2000) [hereinafter Macaulay, Common Sense].
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results in inefficiencies and distributional unfairness by
systematically redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors.
Part III demonstrates that a “terms later” contracting rule fails to
protect the reasonable expectations of buyers while at the same
time protecting the unreasonable expectations of vendors, thus
abandoning the only moral justification for courts to enforce
promises. Additionally, it demonstrates that Easterbrook’s “terms
later” rule also abandons the principle of impartial treatment of the
parties (vendors are favored) and abandons achieving justice
between the parties in order to achieve some perceived greater
societal good.
Part IV examines several cases that have followed in lemminglike fashion ProCD/Hill’s “terms later” rule in both sale of goods
and services settings. Part V addresses the provisions of the
UCITA that reflect the “terms later” contracting rule and traces
some of the history of that uniform law, including the support it
garnered from Easterbrook’s ProCD and Hill opinions and its
ultimate demise. Part VI addresses the proposed revisions of
Article 2 that embrace or invite courts to recognize “terms later”
contracting and demonstrates the impact of Judge Easterbrook’s
ProCD and Hill opinions in the revision process. Part VII
describes the course of action the author proposes with respect to
legislative responses to UCITA and the referenced proposed
revisions of UCC Article 2. Part VIII is a brief jurisprudential
assessment of Easterbrook’s ProCD and Hill opinions and their
broader implications for society.
I. BAD LAW
ProCD confirms the adage that bad seed produces bad fruit.
Both ProCD and its initial bad fruit in the form of Hill continue to
nurture and produce additional bad fruit with respect to contract
formation and the enforcement of “terms later.” Its fruit includes
several cases that follow the distorted legal analysis of UCC and
common law principles exhibited in ProCD/Hill.11
11

Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002); I.
Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass
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A. ProCD v. Zeidenberg
ProCD spent millions of dollars creating in CD-ROM format a
comprehensive national directory of residential and business
listings in a product it sold as Select PhoneTM.12 That product
included over 95,000,000 residential and commercial listings that
ProCD had obtained from approximately 3,000 publicly available
telephone books.13 Such information (the data) was not
copyrightable,14 but copyright protection attached to the software
component.15 ProCD sought to block the competitive use of the
data by purchasers of Select PhoneTM through a restrictive use
contract, which it styled a “license.”16 It did not, however, describe
the competitive restrictions to purchasers prior to their purchase of
the product.17 Rather, it encased the restrictions in shrink-wrapped
boxes containing a user guide and the discs.18 The user guide
contained the terms of a Single User License Agreement,
prohibiting copying of the data for other than personal use; and the
discs were programmed so that upon installation the purchaser was
alerted that the use of the product and the data was subject to the
Single User License Agreement.19 One of the terms of the
agreement provided that by using the discs and the listings the

2002); Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d
519 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Kaczmarek v. Microsoft Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D.
Ill. 1999); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54 (2000);
1-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., 2003 Mass. App. Div. 30 (Mass. App. Div. 2003);
Scott v. Bell Atl. Corp., 282 A.D.2d 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc. 246 A.D. 2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); M.A. Mortenson
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. App. 1999).
12
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
13
Id.
14
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S.
340 (1991).
15
ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 647.
16
Id. at 644.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 644-45.
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purchaser agreed to be bound by the terms of the license.20 If the
purchaser did not agree to the terms, he was to promptly return the
discs and the user guide, along with all copies of the software and
listings that had been exported, to the place he had obtained the
product.21
According to the district court’s findings in ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, “[t]he Select PhoneTM box mentions the agreement in
one place in small print . . . . The box does not detail the specific
terms of the license.”22 Zeidenberg had purchased an earlier
version of Select Phone at a local retail store and presumably had
observed the screen warnings on that version.23 Some months later
he purchased an updated version with the purpose of downloading
telephone listings from it for use in assembling his own larger
telephone listings database to be marketed through his newly
formed corporation.24 He was aware from the computer screen
warnings that Select PhoneTM was subject to the agreement
contained in the user guide, but disregarded them because he did
not believe the license was binding.25 ProCD sought to enjoin that
competitive commercial use, asserting that such use constituted
copyright infringement and breach of the license agreement.26

20

Id. at 644.
ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 644.
22
Id. at 645. With respect to the size and placement of the notice, one
commentator has stated:
When we look at a ProCD box, Judge Easterbrook’s ‘offer’ becomes
pure fantasy. The notice is printed on the bottom flap of the box,
flanked by a statement in large type that there are 250 million telephone
numbers on 11 CD-Roms and the bar code for the scanner. The notice
is printed in 6-point type in a space 2 3/4th inches by 1 inch.
Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating On a Sea of Custom?
Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. L. REV.
775, 779 n.25 (2000) [hereinafter Macaulay, Relational Contracts].
23
ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 646.
21
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1. The District Court’s Approach
The district court rejected ProCD’s copyright challenge,
finding use of the software to access the non-copyrighted listings
and then subsequently making copies of the listings without further
use of the ProCD software did not constitute a copyright
infringement.27 In a well-reasoned opinion resting upon established
principles of statutory and common law, it rejected the breach of
contract challenge, concluding that Zeidenberg and his wholly
owned corporation were not bound by the terms of the license
agreement, access to which they did not have until after purchase
of the product.28
In particular, the district court, relying upon the express
language of UCC section 2-206 (1),29 found that Zeidenberg’s
payment for the software constituted acceptance of the retailer’s
offer to sell by placing the software on the shelf, thus forming a
contract at that moment.30 Further, it found that if the license terms
first disclosed after the purchase were treated as a written
confirmation of the contract, UCC section 2-207 precluded
27

Id. at 648-50.
Id. at 650-56. The court refused to treat the knowledge Zeidenberg may
have gained from his use of an earlier version of the program as knowledge of
the restrictive terms for the updated version. It stated:
Like any other parties to a contract, computer users should be given the
opportunity to review the terms to which they will be bound each and
every time they contract. Although not all users will read the terms
anew each time under such circumstances, it does not follow that they
should not be given this opportunity. Defendants cannot be held to the
user agreement included with the second and third copies of Select
PhoneTM they purchased merely because they were aware of the terms
included with the initial version. Each software purchase creates a new
contract. Computer users should be given a fresh opportunity to review
any terms to which those contracts will bind them.
Id. at 654-55.
29
U.C.C. § 2-206 (1995). Subsection (1)(a) of 2-206 provides: “Unless
otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances (a) an
offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner
and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances . . . .”
30
ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 651-52.
28
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enforcement of such terms,31 absent express agreement thereto by
Zeidenberg.32 Alternatively, if the subsequently disclosed license
terms were treated as a proposal for modification of the contract,
UCC section 2-209 precluded their enforcement,33 absent express
agreement thereto by Zeidenberg.34
The court was reinforced in its conclusion that existing law did
not support ProCD’s “terms later” argument by the fact that the
“terms later” proposition was then being considered in the draft
version of a proposed new UCC section.35 It concluded that such
proposal “is evidence that the American Law Institute views
current law as insufficient to guarantee the enforcement of
standard form contracts such as shrinkwrap licenses.”36 Aware of
31

U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995). That section provides:
(1) A definite and reasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. (2) The
additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer; (b )they materially alter it; or (c)notification of objection to them
has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received. (3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale
although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a
contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of
this act.

Id.
32

ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 652-55.
U.C.C. § 2-209 (1995). That section provides in relevant part: “(1) An
agreement modifying a contract within this title needs no consideration to be
binding.” Id.
34
ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 652-55.
35
Id. at 655. The draft of proposed section 2-2203 would make shrink-wrap
licenses with “terms later” enforceable, i.e., that the buyer would be bound by
such “terms later” if it failed to reject them by returning the goods. Id.
36
Id.
33
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industry efforts to obtain legislation making “terms later” binding
on purchasers, the district court nevertheless thoughtfully and
faithfully applied the existing statutory and common law rules
precluding such imposition.
2. Judge Easterbrook’s Approach on Appeal
Enter Judge Easterbrook who, with a disingenuous and less
than intellectually honest opinion, deftly discarded clear statutory
language and foundational common law principles and created in
their place, virtually out of whole cloth, a new doctrine of contract
formation.37 Writing for a panel of the Seventh Circuit, Judge
Easterbrook concluded that no contract had been formed when
Zeidenberg selected the box of software from the shelf of the
retailer, paid for it, and left the store with it.38 Rather, the contract
was formed only after Zeidenberg used the software after seeing
the screen message referencing the licensing agreement, signaling
his agreement to ProCD’s restrictive terms.39
How could Easterbrook conclude that no contract was formed
until then? Under UCC section 2-206(1)(a), adopted in
Wisconsin,40 the jurisdiction whose law governed the case,
“[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances . . . an offer to make a contract shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable
in the circumstances.”41 Pre-Code Wisconsin case authority cited
by the district court held that a sales contract results when the
customer pays the purchase price and departs the store with the
item.42 Just as other courts that dealt with contract formation issues

37

ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1453-53.
39
Id.
40
WIS. STAT. § 402.206 (1)(a) (1977).
41
U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1995). “Unless otherwise unambiguously
indicated by the language or circumstances (a) an offer to make a contract shall
be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium
reasonable in the circumstances.” Id.
42
See Peeters v. State, 142 N.W. 181 (Wis. 1913).
38
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in the context of retail store sales off the shelf,43 the district court
held that the retailer’s placing the product on the store shelf
constituted an offer.44 It also found that Zeidenberg had accepted
ProCD’s offer to sell in a reasonable manner at the moment he
purchased the product by exchanging money for the program.45
Yet, for Easterbrook, the answer was easy. As to the authorities
upon which the district court relied, he patronizingly observed,
“[i]n Wisconsin, as elsewhere, a contract includes only the terms
on which the parties have agreed.”46 One cannot agree to hidden
terms, the judge concluded.47 So far, so good, except that one of
the terms to which Zeidenberg agreed by purchasing the software
was that the transaction was subject to a license.48 Such a statement
merely begs the legal question raised: whether Zeidenberg could
have agreed to terms not available to him prior to his purchase.
Easterbrook solved this question to his satisfaction with a
rhetorical question of his own: but why would Wisconsin want to

43

See, e.g., Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870 (Okla. 1979), and
cases cited therein. The “exploding bottle” cases presented a real dilemma if the
purchaser were treated as the offeror in response to the retailer’s invitation by
placing the goods on display. That is because in the event the customer were
injured by an exploding bottle prior to forming a contract based on his offer to
buy and the retailer’s acceptance by taking payment, the injured customer could
have no breach of warranty claim. But for trying to avoid that dilemma, courts
would probably continue to have applied the common law presumption that
display of goods for sale was merely an invitation to the customer to make the
offer by tendering payment. Had that common law presumption been applied
here, Zeidenberg would have made the offer to purchase and the retailer would
have accepted by taking his money and delivering the software. Viewed in that
way, it is clear that Zeidenberg’s offer was not one to purchase for only limited,
noncommercial use.
44
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 652 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
45
Id. Additionally, it found payment for the program constituted conduct
sufficient to create a contract under UCC § 2-204(1) that provides “[a] contract
for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a
contract.” Id.
46
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
47
ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645.
48
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (emphasis added).
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“fetter the parties’ choice”49 with respect to the way in which an
offeror could bind the offeree to terms that the offeror wanted? For
Easterbrook, the implicit self-evident answer is that surely
Wisconsin would not want to insist that a seller actually disclose
the terms of sale to the purchaser prior to payment. Interestingly,
he phrases his question in terms of the “parties’ choice,” but one
would be hard-pressed to assume that offerees would ever want to
be bound by terms they could not know of until after they parted
with their money.
a. Purported Common Sense Argument
Easterbrook purports to offer support, but not legal authority,
for his assumed negative answer to his rhetorical question. His first
rationale is the supposedly common sense one, that “[v]endors can
put the entire terms of a contract on the outside of a box only by
using microscopic type, removing other information that buyers
might find more useful (such as what the software does, and on
which computers it works), or both.”50 Common sense, however,
in fact suggests that the difficulty he describes is overstated,
certainly with respect to the restrictive use term at issue in the
case.51 Short phrases conveying the restrictive use limitation such
49

Id. at 1450-51. Additionally, it is apparent that the court is not really
interested in what Wisconsin courts would do in this setting. One commentator
has observed:
Over the last two decades, the Seventh Circuit’s reading of Wisconsin
statutes and cases has been funny or sad, depending on your point of
view. As was true in the ProCD case, that court often embarks on a
frolic of its own rather than attempting to do what a Wisconsin court
would do.
Macaulay, Relational Contracts, supra note 22, at 781 n.36. (citation omitted).
50
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. Easterbrook elaborates on the assumed
difficulty by noting, “The ‘Read Me’ file included with most software,
describing system requirements and potential incompatibilities, may be
equivalent to ten pages of type; warranties and license restrictions take still more
space.” Id.
51
Because of Judge Easterbrook’s commitment to a law and economics ex
ante perspective, however, the facts that actually frame the issue of the case are
of but limited significance. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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as “FOR NONCOMMERCIAL USE ONLY,” or “NO
DUPLICATION PERMITTED” come to mind. Surely such a
phrase could prominently be displayed in large type without
difficulty.
b. Purported Legal Authority
Easterbrook attempts to create the impression that there is solid
legal support for his common sense “terms later” position when in
fact there is none. This is the first of a series of
mischaracterizations and distortions of law by which he seeks to
provide the appearance of legal legitimacy for his opinion. He
states:
Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to
return the software for a refund if the terms are
unacceptable (a right that the license expressly extends),
may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and
sellers alike. See E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Farnsworth on
Contracts § 4.26 (1990); Restatement (2d) of Contracts §
211 comment a (1981) (“Standardization of agreements
serves many of the same functions as standardization of
goods and services; both are essential to a system of mass
production and distribution. Scarce and costly time and
skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than
the details of individual transactions.”).52
The references to the Farnsworth treatise and Second
Restatement do not support the proposition for which they are
cited. It is true that section 4.26 of the Farnsworth treatise is
entitled “Standardized Agreements,” and a sentence in that section
does state, “[a]s with goods, standardization and mass production
contracts may serve the interest of both parties.”53 Note, however,
that the proposition for which Judge Easterbrook cited the
Farnsworth treatise was not merely that standard form contracts
may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers
52

ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 479
(2d ed. 1990).
53
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alike. Rather, the proposition Easterbrook stated was, “[n]otice on
the outside, terms on the inside, and the right to return . . . if the
terms are unacceptable . . . may be a means of doing business
valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”54 Patently, section 4.26 of the
Farnsworth treatise does not directly state or clearly support Judge
Easterbrook’s “terms later” proposition. Actually, the portion of
section 4.26 of the Farnsworth treatise that addresses the
effectiveness of terms of an offer of which the offeree had no
actual awareness at the time he accepted supports a contrary
proposition: that such terms are not part of the offer. It states:
A second judicial technique in dealing with standard
forms is to refuse to hold a party to a term on the ground
that, although the writing may plainly have been an offer,
the term was not one that an uninitiated reader ought
reasonably to have understood to be a part of that offer.
This result is especially easy to reach if the term is on the
reverse side of the form and the reference, if any, to terms
on the reverse side is itself in fine print or otherwise
inadequate. In the colorful language of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania:
One of the most hateful acts of the ill-famed Roman
tyrant Caligula was that of having the laws inscribed
upon pillars so high that the people could not read
them. Although the warrant of attorney [on the back of]
the numerous sheets of the contract at bar was within
the vision of the defendant, it was placed as to be
completely beyond her contemplation of its purport. . . .
....
The same reasoning has been used where the term was in
a separate document, not attached to the signed writing but
incorporated by a reference regarded by the court as
insufficient. The size of the type and other factors affecting
legibility of both the reference and the term itself play an
important part in determining whether such a term is part of

54

ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451 (emphasis added).
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the contract.55
If the Farnsworth treatise concludes that terms physically, but not
realistically, available to the offeree for his inspection prior to
acceptance are not part of the offer, then a fortiori terms that are
not available at all for inspection prior to acceptance cannot be part
of the offer.
The same deficiencies infect Easterbrook’s citation to
Restatement (Second) of Contracts as though it supported the
“terms later” proposition. The particular comment does address the
utility of standardization, but does not at all address Easterbrook’s
novel “terms later” proposition. Furthermore, the entire thrust of
section 211 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts is antithetical to
the proposition.56 That section addresses whether standardized
terms of an offer that are actually available for inspection to the
offeree prior to acceptance are part of the offer and thus part of the
agreement resulting from the offeree’s acceptance. Significantly,
section 211(3) states, “[w]here the other party has reason to believe
that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew
that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of
the agreement.”57
Section 211 stands for the proposition that a term that is
physically, but not realistically, available to the offeree prior to his
apparent manifestation of assent is not part of the agreement where
55

FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, § 4.26, at 483-84 (citations omitted).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
57
Id. (emphasis added). Comment f. to section 211 explains:
Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and
are bound by them without even appearing to know the standardized
terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond
the range of reasonable expectation . . . . [A] party who adheres to the
other party’s standard terms does not assent to a term if the other party
has reason to believe that the adhering party would not have accepted
the agreement if he had known that it contained the particular term . . . .
Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre
or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms
explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant
purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if the adhering
party never had an opportunity to read the term . . . .
Id. at § 211(3) cmt. f (emphasis added).
56
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the offeror has reason to believe that the offeree would not have
assented if he knew that the writing contained such a term. Thus, a
fortiori it does not directly state or clearly support Judge
Easterbrook’s “terms later” proposition under which a party who
could have no knowledge of a term prior to his manifestation of
assent is bound by it.
Judge Easterbrook’s intellectually dishonest citation to the
Farnsworth treatise and Restatement (Second) Contracts as though
each supported his “terms later” proposition brings to mind the rule
regarding when non-disclosure is equivalent to an assertion, and
thus a misrepresentation:
A person’s non-disclosure of a fact known to him is
equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist . . . :
(a) where the person knows that disclosure of the fact is
necessary to prevent some previous assertion from being a
misrepresentation or from being fraudulent or material.58
c. Law and Economics and the ex ante Perspective
Easterbrook’s next line of purported legal support for his
“terms later” proposition illustrates the law and economics ex ante
perspective of decision-making that he brings to his judicial
process.59 That perspective liberates him from the facts of the case,
58

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 (a) (1981) Comment a.
provides that “[a party] may not, of course, tell half-truths and his assertion of
only some of the facts without the inclusion of such additional matters as he
knows or believes to be necessary to prevent it from being misleading is itself a
misrepresentation.” Id. at § 160 cmt. a (emphasis added).
59
Anthony I. Ogus, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Law, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 486-91 (Peter
Newman ed. 1998). Therein the author notes:
Legal doctrine is shaped by judges resolving disputes in a selection of
cases, in relation normally to events that have already occurred. The ex
post appraisal will often lead them to search for ‘just’ outcomes to the
individual dispute, subordinating to that any concern for the ex ante
impact of the ruling on future behavior. In Anglo-Saxon legal systems
this tendency is enhanced by the adversarial culture inherent in the
judicial process. In contrast, law and economics adopts a predominantly
ex ante perspective, predicting the impact of a ruling, or of some
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which are little more than a springboard for his law and economics
analysis.60 Furthermore, it invites his speculation about the impact
of his decision on possible future transactions by people other than
the parties and even upon people who may not be in the affected
business.61 Easterbrook’s framework of the case allows him to
reference for support other contracting transactions in the purchase

alternative to it, on aggregate social behavior. Moreover, because the
data are not limited to those that relate to the legal claim brought in the
individual case, the analysis can potentially take account of a broader
range of economic variables.
Id. at 487. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System,
98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) Easterbrook praises the ex ante perspective, noting,
The first line of inquiry, then, is whether the Justices take an ex ante or
an ex post perspective in analyzing issues. Which they take will
depend, in part, on the extent to which they appreciate how the
economic system creates new gains and losses; those who lack this
appreciation will favor ‘fair’ treatment [or other ex post arguments] of
the parties.
Id.
60
For Easterbrook, one might more appropriately, but less graciously,
describe them as “mere fodder,” in light of his previously expressed view
toward the significance of the parties to a case. See Easterbrook, supra note 59,
at 10-12.
Fairness arguments are ex post arguments. . . . The degree to which
fairness or other ex post arguments dominate in legal decisionmaking
[sic] is directly related to the court’s assumptions about the nature of
the economic system. Judges who see economic transactions as zerosum games are likely to favor ‘fair’ divisions of the gains and
losses . . . . Yet if legal rules can create larger gains . . . the claim from
fairness [or other ex post arguments] becomes weaker. The judge will
pay less attention to today’s unfortunates and more attention to the
effects of the rules.
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
61
Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 12.
The people who might be affected by the rules are not before the court
and may not even be in the affected business (yet). The interests of
prospective consumers and producers are diffuse, too much so for any
one person or group to participate in the litigation. The judge is the
representative of these future interests.
Id.
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of insurance, airline tickets, theater tickets, radios, and drugs.62 He
states, “Transactions in which the exchange of money precedes the
communication of detailed terms are common.”63 Rather than
citing legal authority confirming that purchasers in such other
settings are bound by terms not disclosed or knowable to them
prior to paying for the service or product, he merely invites the
reader to “consider”64 various hypothetical illustrative transactions,
apparently assuming that the self-evident resolution in each
illustration will confirm for the reader that Judge Easterbrook’s
“terms later” proposition is a long-standing, accepted contract
practice.
The particular illustrations that he invites the reader to consider
raise other difficulties that undermine the appropriateness of any
analogy he seeks to make. As has been noted elsewhere, insurance
and airline tickets “are examples of regulated industries, not
dependent on market discipline to prevent unfairness.”65 In an
apparent effort to cause the reader to believe that his airline ticket
illustration reflects the existence of actual legal authority
supporting his “terms later” proposition, Judge Easterbrook cites
two cases,66 neither of which dealt with the imposition of “terms
62

ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id.
64
“Consider the purchase of insurance. . . . Or consider the purchase of an
airline ticket. . . . Just so with a ticket to a concert. . . . Consumer goods work the
same way. . . .” Id.
65
Braucher, supra note 5, at 1823-24.
Easterbrook claimed that delayed disclosure is a long-standing,
accepted contract practice, citing insurance and airline tickets as
examples. But these are examples of regulated industries, not
dependent on market discipline to prevent unfairness. In the case of
insurance, regulators typically have the responsibility of reviewing and
approving policy terms. In addition, often state law provides for a
required disclosure form setting forth key policy terms. In the case of
airline tickets, most of the material in the ticket is dictated by U.S.
Department of Transportation regulations requiring waivers of liability
limits provided for in the Warsaw Convention, and by federal
regulations dealing with overbooking and liability for baggage loss.
Id. (citations omitted).
66
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. “To use the ticket is to accept the terms, even
63
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later.” In Carnival Cruise, the Court expressly noted:
[W]e do not address the question whether respondents had
sufficient notice of the forum clause before entering the
contract for passage. Respondents essentially have
conceded that they had notice of the forum-selection
provision . . . . Additionally, the Court of Appeals
evaluated the enforceability of the forum clause under the
assumption, although “doubtful,” that respondents could be
deemed to have had knowledge of the clause.67
In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, the disputed clause appeared
in a standard form bill of lading, and no suggestion was made in
the opinion that the party opposing its enforceability was unaware
of its terms prior to entering into the contract of carriage.68 Thus
neither case directly states or clearly supports Easterbrook’s “terms
later” rule of law.
When it comes to his concert illustration,69 his conclusion that
what is written on the back of a theater ticket stub is a contractual
term binding on the patron is contrary to hornbook law.70 At this
terms that in retrospect are disadvantageous. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 . . . (1991); see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v.
M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 . . . (1995) (bills of lading).” Id.
67
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added).
68
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, 515 U.S. at 528.
69
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
Just so with a ticket to a concert. The back of the ticket states that the
patron promises not to record the concert; to attend is to agree. A
theater that detects a violation will confiscate the tape and escort the
violator to the exit. One could arrange things so that every concertgoer
signs this promise before forking over the money, but that cumbersome
way of doing things not only would lengthen queues and raise prices
but also would scotch the sale of tickets by phone or electronic data
service.
Id.
70
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 298 (3rd ed. 1999).
One of these techniques [for dealing with standardized terms] is to
refuse to hold a party to a writing on the ground that it was not of a type
that would reasonably appear to the recipient to contain the terms of a
proposed contract. Even under the objective theory, it can be reasoned
that such a writing is not an offer at all. As a New York court said of a
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point in Easterbrook’s rationale one begins to sense that there is no
legal support for his “terms later” conclusion, but only a pretense
of legal support premised on speculation drawn from nonanalogous illustrations.
The consumer goods illustrations that he suggests support his
“terms later” proposition are likewise inapposite. In neither of his
illustrations does a term on the inside of the box diminish the
contractual rights of the purchaser that would normally flow from
his purchase of the goods. In his radio illustration, the radio is
purchased from a retailer and the term in the sealed box is a
manufacturer’s warranty term.71 In his packaged drugs illustration,
the drugs are purchased from a retailer and the sealed box contains
claim check given to a patron by a railroad’s parcel checking service,
“In the mind of the bailor the little piece of cardboard . . . did not arise
to the dignity of a contract by which he agreed that in the event of the
loss of the parcel, even through the negligence of the bailee itself, he
would accept therefore a sum which perhaps would be but a small
fraction of its actual value.” . . . . The argument that the writing is not
an offer is particularly compelling with respect to tickets, passes, and
stubs . . . .
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. d (1981):
Non-contractual documents. The same document may serve both
contractual and other purposes, and a party may assent to it for other
purposes without understanding that it embodies contract terms. . . .
[B]aggage checks or automobile parking lot tickets may appear to be
mere identification tokens, and a party who without knowledge or
reason to know that the token purports to be a contract is then not
bound by terms printed on the token.
Id.
71
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
Consumer goods work the same way. Someone who wants to buy a
radio set visits a store, pays, and walks out with a box. Inside the box is
a leaflet containing some terms, the most important of which usually is
the warranty, read for the first time in the comfort of home. By
Zeidenberg’s lights, the warranty in the box is irrelevant; every
consumer gets the standard warranty implied by the UCC in the event
the contract is silent; yet so far as we are aware no state disregards
warranties furnished with consumer products.
Id.

OF
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information provided by the manufacturer that describes drug
interactions, contraindications, and other vital information.72 As
noted elsewhere, “in . . . indirect marketing, the manufacturer is
not in privity of contract with the buyer. A third-party
manufacturer’s warranty can only add to the deal offered by the
seller, not take away. Manufacturers’ warranties [required by
governmental regulations regarding disclosure and substantive
requirements] are not typically products of contract . . . .”73
Likewise, in the drug illustration the manufacturer is not in privity
with the consumer, and the manufacturer’s disclosure of drug
interactions, contraindications, and other vital information is
supplied because it is mandated by federal regulation for the
protection of consumers.74
According to Easterbrook, unless his “terms later” proposition
was adopted, the buyers in each instance could gain no benefit
against the manufacturer from such terms because they would not
be part of the contract, i.e., the contract between the consumer and
the retailer. That invited conclusion is erroneous. Only by sheer
force of assertion can illustrations of transactions in which
consumers gain benefits as a result of governmentally mandated
terms be analogized to a transaction in which a seller seeks to
reduce the benefits to the consumer after making the purchase.
Easterbrook’s final analogies bear at least some resemblance to
the facts in the case in that they at least deal with software sales.
The resemblance, however, goes no further than that, and
72

Id.
Drugs come with a list of ingredients on the outside and an elaborate
package insert on the inside. The package insert describes drug
interactions, contraindications, and other vital information—but, if
Zeidenberg is right, the purchaser need not read the package insert,
because it is not part of the contract.
Id. The illustration noticeably understates the nature of the information typically
found on the on the outside of the box, probably to make the contents on the
inside appear to be more of a surprise. But even taking the unrealistic facts at
face value, the illustration does not support Judge Easterbrook’s “terms later”
proposition.
73
Braucher, supra note 5, at 1824-25 (emphasis added).
74
FDA Labeling Requirements for Over-the-Counter Drugs, 21 C.F.R. §
201.66, pt. 201, subpt. C (2003).
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apparently, his law and economics ex ante analysis requires no
more.75 Here, he analogizes hypothetical software sales
transactions that bear little resemblance to the context of the case
at hand, other than that they involve sales of software. His
hypothetical sales transactions arise in the context of purchasers
placing orders by phone or over the Internet,76 even though such
contexts are unhampered by physical box size limitation, the very
limitation upon which his first rationale was based. His
hypothetical software transactions do not explicitly state that the
seller’s terms were not disclosed until after the purchaser had
parted with his money and the goods were delivered.77 For these
terms to have relevance as an analogy he necessarily makes an
additional assumption. Such supposition, however, would not be
warranted by the actual practice of sellers selling software over the
Internet.78 But perhaps this supposition would not even be
necessary for Easterbrook to think the analogy instructive or at
least useful to support an additional rationale for “terms later.”
Perhaps under an ex ante analysis, the larger context of software
sales generally and the convenience for sellers in operating their
businesses is the more significant consideration and is sufficient to
make the hypotheticals relevant.
Furthermore, the software hypotheticals Easterbrook uses to
suggest that precluding sellers from a “terms later” practice would
75

Easterbrook, supra note 59.
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-52.
[C]onsider the software industry itself. Only a minority of sales take
place over the counter, where there are boxes to peruse. A customer
may place an order by phone in response to a line item in a catalog or a
review in a magazine. Much software is ordered over the Internet by
purchasers who have never seen a box. Increasingly software arrives by
wire. There is no box; there is only a stream of electrons, a collection of
information that includes data, an application program, instructions,
many limitations . . . .
76

Id.
77

Id.
Jerry C. Liu, Robert J. O’Connell & W. Scott Petty, Electronic
Commerce: Using Clickwrap Agreements, 15 NO. 12 COMPUTER LAWYER 10,
14 (1998); Jennifer Femminella, Note, Online Terms and Conditions
Agreements: Bound by the Web, 2003 ST. JOHNS J. OF LEG. 87, 95-100.
78
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“drive prices through the ceiling or return transactions to the horseand-buggy age”79 bear no resemblance to the issues in ProCD or to
the reality of Internet selling. Certainly there is nothing inherent in
the Internet sales transaction that precludes the seller’s disclosure
of limited warranty or exclusion of consequential damages terms
prior to taking the purchaser’s money. After all, this is the
“information age” and Internet sellers can and do make such prepurchase disclosure on a regular basis.80
When one sorts through all the verbiage, Easterbrook provides
no legal authority for his conclusion that the express provisions of
UCC section 2-206 governing offer-acceptance contract formation
are not controlling in this case. He does not even suggest that the
unusual manner of acceptance described in the sealed shrink-wrap,
unknowable to the buyer prior to purchase, “unambiguously
indicated” that the offer did not invite acceptance in any manner
reasonable under the circumstances, i.e., as by paying the retail
seller the purchase price. His refusal to abide by the statute
conceivably reflects his understanding of the role of the judiciary
described in his writings.81 As he once observed, “[j]udges
question the acts of the other branches and on occasion do
otherwise than these rules command. The judge refuses to abide by
a statute because he believes that some higher law requires this.”82
The higher law in this instance appears to be his perception of the
appropriate balance between optimal creation and optimal use of
information based on his assessment from a policy-making ex ante

79

ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. The particular terms in his hypothetical
transaction are those of a limited warranty and an exclusion of liability for
consequential damages. The conclusion that Easterbrook invites the reader to
draw is that an Internet seller would be unable to protect against exposure for
breach of a broad implied warranty and consequential damages if he could not
bind the purchaser to his limited warranty and preclusion of consequential
damages that were not disclosed until after the purchase. But that is not true as
the practice of Internet sellers is to disclose such terms prior to the purchase
confirms.
80
See Liu, O’Connell & Petty, supra note 78.
81
Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COL. L.
REV. 773 (1990).
82
Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
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perspective.83
d. Purported Distinguishing of Statute and Precedent
Easterbrook employs a different approach to the statutory
prescriptions of UCC section 2-207,84 a section that would appear
to be an insurmountable hurdle to his “terms later” proposition.
Rather than merely refusing to abide by the prescriptions of section
2-207 because they are not practical in this setting, Easterbrook
83

Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 23.
Problems involving intellectual property present the dichotomy
between ex post and ex ante perspectives especially starkly. Once
someone has created information, the cost of using the information is
small. The information may be used without being used up . . . .
Because the marginal cost of using information is small or even zero,
there is a strong case for establishing a system of legal rules that makes
the information freely available . . . . Yet from an ex ante perspective it
is necessary to compensate the programmer. Even if a few people
would write computer programs just for the challenge (or for their own
use), they would not make those programs available to the rest of us
without the promise of compensation. Without a doubt thousands of
people write programs only because of the prospect of reward. Those
who write increase their productivity as the prospect of reward
increases. The lower the rewards, the fewer programs there will be and
the poorer will be the quality of each existing program; it takes a lot of
time to perfect a program, and again the prospect of reward will
influence how much time the programmer invests. The problem is that
if you allow the author to collect a royalty for the effort, you create a
loss by discouraging use. Higher royalties (up to the monopoly level)
yield more and better programs at the same time as they yield less
effective use of programs once the programs exist. The incentives that
yield optimal creation will prevent optimal use, and the reverse. There
is no neat solution to this problem . . . . It is hard to understate the
importance of the way the Supreme Court chooses to deal with the
difficult choices that influence optimal creation versus optimal use of
information. An ex post perspective that always favors free use of
information inevitably leaves us with too little; an ex ante perspective
that recognizes the difficulties of choice is more likely to be beneficial.
Id. at 21-23.
84
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995). See supra note 31 (setting forth the statute in
full).
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summarily disposes of them in another fashion.
He asserts that section 2-207 is “irrelevant,” because “[o]ur
case has only one form,”85 and he purports, in a transparently
disingenuous fashion, to distinguish the relevant section 2-207
precedent which was directly contrary to his “terms later”
proposition.86
As written and uniformly construed prior to Easterbrook’s
ProCD opinion, section 2-207 provides the controlling law with
respect to treatment of additional terms that are first disclosed after
a contract has been formed.87 Pursuant to that section additional
written terms appearing in confirmation of a contract previously
made are “to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract.”88 In a contract “between merchants” such additional
terms will become part of the contract unless either the offer had
85

ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. “Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is
irrelevant.” Id.
86
Id. Easterbrook asserts:
[O]nly three cases (other than ours) touch on the subject, and none
directly addresses it. See Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology; Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.; Arizona Retail
Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc. As their titles suggest, these are
not consumer transactions. Step-Saver is a battle-of-the-forms case, in
which the parties exchange incompatible forms and a court must decide
which prevails. . . . Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is
irrelevant. Vault holds that Louisiana’s special shrinkwrap-license
statute is preempted by federal law, a question to which we return. And
Arizona Retail Systems did not reach the question, because the court
found that the buyer knew the terms of the license before purchasing
the software.
Id. (citations omitted). See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text
(discussing those cases and rebutting Easterbrook’s effort to distinguish them).
87
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1995). See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v.
Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman
Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software
Link, Inc. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); Winter Panel Corp. v. Reichhold
Chems., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 963 (D. Mass. 1993); Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han
Yang Chem. Corp., 813 F. Supp. 310 (D. N.J. 1993); Glyptal, Inc. v. Engelhard
Corp., 801 F. Supp. 887(D. Mass. 1992). See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1249-52 (1995).
88
U.C.C. § 2-207 (2) (1995).
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expressly limited acceptance to the terms of the offer, the
additional terms materially alter the contract previously made, or
they are timely objected to or have previously been objected to.89 If
the contract is not one “between merchants,” the additional terms
are mere proposals for addition and like any other offer to modify a
contract, are not effective unless expressly agreed to by the other
party.90 Under a fair reading of the facts and law, which the district
court adopted, the contract was formed when Zeidenberg
purchased the software at the store.91 The terms that were
accessible only thereafter were merely proposals for addition to the
contract previously formed and did not become a part of the
contract unless they were expressly agreed to, which they were
not.92
Easterbrook’s cavalier treatment of both the statute and
precedent has been roundly and rightly criticized.93 Professor
Gergen states, “[t]here is one real howler in [ProCD and Hill]—
they say that 2-207 applies only when there are two forms. This is
just dead wrong.”94 Professor Hillman is unequivocal in his
condemnation of Easterbrook’s treatment of section 2-207, noting,
“[he] was plainly wrong about section 2-207’s applicability.
Nothing in the text of the section limits it to transactions involving
more than one form.”95 Likewise, Professor Braucher concurs that
“[n]othing in the language of section 2-207 limits its application to
two-form situations or even to forms at all,” further noting that,
“[t]he Pro-CD analysis also is contrary to Comment 1 to Section 2-

89

Id.
Id. See also Richard E. Speidel, Symposium: The Revision of Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: Contract Formation and Modification Under
Revised Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305, 1323 (1994); Christopher L.
Pitet, Note and Comment, The Problem With “Money Now, Terms Later”:
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of “Shrinkwrap” Software
Licenses, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325, 338-39 (1997).
91
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 653-56 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
92
Id.
93
See sources cited supra note 5.
94
Gergen, supra note 7, at 1154 (emphasis added).
95
Hillman, supra note 5, at 753.
90
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207, which refers to one-form transactions.”96
Judge Easterbrook displays the same intellectual dishonesty
when “distinguishing” away relevant case authority that applied
section 2-207 to preclude enforcement of terms a seller first
disclosed after the buyer made the purchase.97 Although none
involved a purchase off a retail shelf, two of the three, Step-Saver
Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology98 and Arizona Retail
Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.,99 presented the very issue that
was before the court in ProCD. In each the issue was whether a
seller of software could bind the buyer to terms not disclosed to the
buyer until after purchase by stating in those belatedly disclosed
terms that opening the shrink-wrap package and using the software
constituted agreement by the buyer.100 In each case the respective
court held that such terms were not enforceable, expressly relying
upon the provisions of section 2-207.101 Only Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd. did not directly address the matter of enforceability
of “terms later.”102 It did not need to address the issue because it
96

Jean Braucher, UCITA and the Concept of Assent, 673 PLI/PAT. 175, 184
(2001). UCC § 2-207 (1) expressly includes “a written confirmation which is
sent within a reasonable time;” and comment 1 states, “This section is intended
to deal with two typical situations. The one is the written confirmation, where an
agreement has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence
between the parties and followed by one or more of the parties sending formal
memoranda embodying terms not discussed.” U.C.C. § 2-207 (1) and cmt. 2
(1995); see also James J. White, Default Rules in Sales and the Myth of
Contracting Out, 48 LOY. L. REV. 53, 80 n.121 (2002) (collecting cases applying
section 2-207 to one-writing transactions); see also Klocek v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (expressly declining to follow
ProCD’s reasoning, noting that court’s conclusion about the irrelevance of
section 2-207 to one-form transactions had been asserted “without support;” and
further that such conclusion was not supported by the statute or by Kansas or
Missouri law construing the statute).
97
See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (asserting that “only three cases (other than
ours) touch on the subject, and none directly addresses it”) (emphasis added).
98
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
99
Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D.
Ariz. 1993).
100
See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
101
Id.
102
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir.
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found that the Copyright Act preempted the Louisiana statute that
made shrink-wrap licenses enforceable, upon which the software
seller premised its contract claim.103
Easterbrook attempts to distinguish Step-Saver and Arizona
Retail Systems first because they did not involve “consumer
transactions,”104 suggesting that section 2-207 is inapplicable to
1988).
103

Id. at 270.
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. For Code purposes, and particularly for § 2207 purposes, a consumer transaction is simply one in which at least one of the
parties is a “non-merchant” under Code terminology. The typical consumer
transaction is sale by a business entity (a “merchant”) to a person purchasing for
personal use. UCC § 2-104 (1) defines “merchant;” UCC § 2-104 (3) defines
transactions “between merchants;” and comment 2 elaborates on the matter,
providing in pertinent part:
The special provisions as to merchants appear only in this Article and
they are of three kinds. Sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209
dealing with the statute of frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda
and modification rest on normal business practices which are or ought
to be typical of and familiar to any person in business. For purposes of
these sections almost every person in business would, therefore, be
deemed to be a “merchant” under the language “who . . . by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices . . . involved in the transaction . . .” since the practices
involved in the transaction are non-specialized business practices such
as answering mail. In this type of provision, banks or even universities,
for example, well may be “merchants.” But even these sections only
apply to a merchant in his mercantile capacity; a lawyer or bank
president buying fishing tackle for his own use is not a merchant.
U.C.C. §2-104 cmt. 2 (1995) (emphasis added).
Thus, the typical consumer transaction is one in which the purchaser buys
for personal, as contrasted with business, use. In concluding that Zeidenberg’s
purchase was a “consumer transaction,” Easterbrook overlooked the express
findings that:
In late 1994, defendant Zeidenberg purchased a copy of Select
PhoneTM at a local retail store. In February or March 1995, defendant
Zeidenberg decided he could download data from Select PhoneTM and
make it available to third parties over the Internet for commercial
purposes. Zeidenberg purchased an updated version of Select
PhoneTM in March 1995 and in April 1995, incorporated Silken
Mountain Web Services, Inc. for the purpose of making a database of
telephone listings available over the Internet.
104
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such transactions; however, that is a clear misinterpretation of the
language of section 2-207(2)105 and authority interpreting that
section.106 The first sentence of subsection (2) states the general
rule with respect to treatment of additional terms in an acceptance
or confirmation: that they “are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract.”107 Like any other proposal, they have no
contractual import unless they are actually agreed to.108 The second
sentence makes an exception to that rule in the case of contracts
between merchants, creating a presumption that additional terms
that do not materially alter the contract become part of the contract
Id. at 645 (emphasis added). Because Zeidenberg was purchasing the phone for
use in his new business, it appears he could have appropriately been considered
a merchant buyer under the definition of merchant in UCC § 2-104 cmt. 2. If
Zeidenberg had been treated as a “merchant” for purposes of Easterbrook’s § 2207 analysis, then Easterbrook would have had to recognize that he was dealing
with exactly the same kind of “between merchants” setting that the courts had
dealt with in Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems. In any event, as discussed
infra text accompanying notes 108-09, treating Zeidenberg as a consumer rather
than as a merchant should have resulted in even more protection against
imposition of “terms later.”
105
UCC § 2-207 (2) states:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them
has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received.
U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
106
See, e.g., McAfee v. Brewer, 203 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Va. 1974); Coastal
Industries, Inc. v. Automatic Steam Products Corp., 654 F. 375, 378 n.2 (5th Cir.
1981). See also John E. Murray, Jr., The Definitive “Battle of the Forms,”
Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. & COM. 1, 7-8 (2000); John E. Murray, Jr. & Harry M.
Flechtner, The Summer, 1999 Draft of Revised Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: What Hath NCCUSL Rejected?, 19 J.L. & COM. 1, 27
(1999); Mark E. Roszkowski & John D. Wladis, U.C.C. Section 2-207: The
Drafting History, 49 BUS. LAW. 1065, 1079 (1994); Mark Andrew Cerny,
Commentary, A Shield Against Arbitration: 2-20’s Role in the Enforceability of
Arbitration Agreements Included With Delivery of Products, 51 ALA. L. REV.
821, 833 (2000).
107
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1998).
108
See sources cited supra note 90.
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unless certain circumstances exist.109 Thus, section 2-207(2)
provides more protection, not less, against imposition of “terms
later” in the case of consumer buyers than it does in transactions in
which both sellers and buyers are merchants. Rather than being
inapplicable because they did not involve consumer transactions,
both Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems, which held that
section 2-207(2) precluded imposition of “terms later” against
merchant buyers, would a fortiori be applicable, powerful
authority that section 2-207(2) precludes such imposition against a
consumer buyer.
Easterbrook’s next purported basis for distinguishing StepSaver is to dismiss it as a “battle of forms case, in which the parties
exchange incompatible forms and a court must decide which
prevails,” rendering it of no relevance to the decision in ProCD,
which involved but one form.110 Step-Saver, however, did not
present an issue of incompatible forms. As cogently noted by one
commentator,
[I]n Step-Saver there was a contract by telephone followed
by a purchase order and invoice that manifested no “battle
of the forms.” The single document that contained different
or additional terms was the box-top license arriving after
the contract was formed. The effort of the Seventh Circuit
in this regard is, therefore, a consummate illustration of a
distinction without a difference.111
109

See Murray & Flechtner, supra note 106, at 33.
[T]he general rule that applies to transactions involving one or more
non-merchants requires express assent to any additional terms while the
exception to that rule would allow immaterial additional terms to
become part of the contract between merchants. Indeed, this is
precisely how § 2-207(2) has been applied in a transaction between
non-merchants.
Id. (emphasis added).
110
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
111
Murray & Flechtner, supra note 106, at 33 (emphasis added). See also
Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1169-70 (6th Cir. 1972). The
court in Dorton concluded in an alternative holding that if the contract had been
formed during a telephone conversation, the single form sent thereafter by the
seller with terms additional to or different from those in the prior oral
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Easterbrook made it easy for himself to distinguish Arizona
Retail Systems by merely ignoring part of the holding in that case.
He asserted, “Arizona Retail Systems did not reach the question [of
terms later], because the court found that the buyer knew the terms
of the license before purchasing the software.”112 The district
court, however, described the issues and holdings of Arizona Retail
Systems with great thoroughness.113 The decision in Arizona Retail
Systems addressed two separate categories of purchases: the initial
one in which the buyer knew the terms of the license before
purchasing; and the subsequent ones in which the buyer ordered
software by phone, the seller accepted in the same conversation,
and thereafter sent the software with the license agreement
attached to the packaging.114 As to the former, the court held the
buyer bound by the license terms.115 With respect to the
subsequent transactions, however, the Arizona Retail Systems court
stated:
[T]he court concludes that the terms of the license
agreement are not applicable. In all material respects, the
subsequent purchases in this case are equivalent to the
purchases in Step-Saver. This court finds that regardless of
whether the terms of the license agreement are treated as
proposals for additional terms under U.C.C. § 2-207, or
proposals for modification under U.C.C. § 2-209, the terms
of the license agreement are not a part of the agreement
between the parties. . . . Having not expressly agreed to the
terms of the agreement, [the buyer] was not bound by those
agreement, such form would be treated as a confirmation and a proposal for
addition of terms to the contract. Under section 2-207(2) such terms would be
added to the contract if they did not materially alter it since both parties were
merchants. If they materially altered the oral agreement, however, the buyer
“could not become bound thereby absent an express agreement to that effect
(emphasis supplied).” Id. at 1170.
112
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
113
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 653-54 (W.D. Wis.
1996).
114
Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc. 831 F. Supp. 759,
760-62 (D. Ariz. 1993).
115
Id. at 763-64.
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terms.116
If a first-year law student were to say that Arizona Retail Systems
did not address the “terms later” issue because the court found that
the buyer knew the terms of the license before purchasing the
software, the student would be given an “F” for demonstrating
such an utter lack of understanding or extreme carelessness in
reading the case.117 But when a brilliant federal judge makes such a
statement with full knowledge of the case’s holdings, it appears to
reflect something quite different and disturbing—a willingness to
engage in intentional misrepresentations to advance a personal
conviction.
With respect to the inference that the district court drew in
support of its rejection of ProCD’s “terms later” position from the
consideration by the American Law Institute of draft section 2-203
of a new UCC provision, Easterbrook purports to dispatch it with a
methodology characteristic of that applied throughout the opinion.
First, he misstates the more limited inference drawn by the district
court that the proposed draft statute was “evidence that the
American Law Institute views current law as insufficient to
guarantee the enforcement of standard form contracts such as
shrinkwrap licenses,”118 into the larger inference that “the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform Laws have conceded the invalidity of
shrinkwrap licenses under current law.”119 To some, making note
of that misstatement of the district court’s rationale may seem to be
much concern about so small a point. But that misstatement is
characteristic of the methodology used throughout the opinion—so
characteristic, in fact, that one cannot dismiss it as mere
sloppiness. Rather, this is but another example of misstatement by
design, one of the trademarks of the opinion.
Then, to dispatch the mis-decsribed rationale he ascribes to the
lower court, Easterbrook merely asserts that it “depends on a faulty

116
117
118
119

Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
Cf. Macaulay, Common Sense, supra note 10, at 1148.
ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 655 (emphasis added).
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (emphasis added).
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inference.”120 To borrow a phrase from Easterbrook, “So far, so
good—but”121 is there any evidence that there existed a “current
rule,” albeit one that needed fortifying, that “terms later” are
enforceable? And among the flux of law review articles discussing
shrink-wrap licenses, did any state that such terms were currently
legally enforceable? One would have thought that if there were any
legal authority for such “current rule” that Easterbrook would have
cited it. But none was cited, and none existed.122 Likewise with
respect to scholarly comment, if any actually supported the
proposition that under then existing law “terms later” were legally
enforceable, one would have expected that they would have been
cited.123 But none was cited. Apparently for Easterbrook, the mere
120

Id.
To propose a change in a law’s text is not necessarily to propose a
change in the law’s effect. New words may be designed to fortify the
current rule with a more precise text that curtails uncertainty. To judge
by the flux of law review articles discussing shrinkwrap licenses,
uncertainty is much in need of reduction—although businesses seem to
feel less uncertainty than do scholars, for only three cases (other than
ours) touch on the subject, and none directly addresses it.
Id.
121

Id. at 1450.
The case authority that had addressed the enforceability of “terms later”
in conjunction with sales of software had denied enforcement. See supra text
accompanying notes 107-17 for discussion of the ways Easterbrook sought to
distinguish such authority out of existence.
123
The scholarly commentary to the contrary was voluminous. See, e.g.,
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CAL. L. REV. 261, 295 (1985); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1249-52 (1995); Symposium,
Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2432, 2516 n.451 (1994) (“Software producers, frustrated by their inability
to enforce private restraints on users’ and purchasers’ rights at the federal level,
have now persuaded the revisors of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2A, to
recommend validation of similar constraints, including ‘shrink wrap’ licenses, at
the state level.”); Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office be Obsolete in
the Twenty-First Century? 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 61 n.31 (1994);
Symposium, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2318 n.26 (1994); Michael D. Scott,
Frontier Issues: Pitfalls in Developing and Marketing Multimedia Products, 13
122
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surmise of some other possible (not necessarily plausible)
inference is sufficient to make any other a “faulty inference.”
e. Purported Support from “Master of the Offer” and the
Objective Theory
Easterbrook’s suggestion that draft section 2-203 was designed
to “fortify” a “current rule” of enforceability of “terms later” is
incredulous. His treatment of UCC section 2-207 and applicable
authority construing and applying it is indefensible. But it is his
refusal to abide by the particular contract formation rule of UCC
section 2-206(1), or to even acknowledge that hornbook law
explains that section is a qualification124 on the general language of
UCC section 2-204(1), that opens the door for him to take his
“master of the offer” step.125 By writing as though the only Code
provision addressing contract formation was section 2-204,126 he
asks:
What then does the current version of the UCC have to
say? We think that the place to start is § 2-204(1): “A
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of such a
contract.”127
For Easterbrook it is also the place to end as far as the current
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 414, 444 (1995); Dennis Cline, Comment,
Copyright Protection of Software in the EEC: The Competing Policies
Underlying Community and National Law and the Case for Harmonization, 75
CAL. L. REV. 633, 662-63 (1987).
124
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
HORNBOOK SERIES § 1-5 at 49-50, (5th ed. 2000). “The Code continues the
offeror’s common law right to specify that one’s offer may be accepted only in a
given manner. But if the offeror does not so specify, 2-206 (1) provides that
offers generally invite acceptance ‘in any manner and by any medium
reasonable in the circumstances.’” Id.
125
By refusing to abide by section 2-206 formation rules he was also able
to ignore section 2-209 and the requirement of express assent to any proposed
modification of an existing contract.
126
U.C.C. § 204(1) (1995).
127
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (quoting from UCC section 2-204(1)).
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version of the Code has anything to say.
The generality of UCC section 2-204(1) is seized upon by
Easterbrook as an invitation to draw exclusively from whatever
general common law principles would be most helpful to his
“terms later” proposition. The common law principle he seizes
upon provides: “A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite
acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of
conduct that constitutes acceptance.”128
For his application of that principle to this case, Easterbrook
treats ProCD as the “vendor” and “master” of the offer.129 The
actual vendor, however, was the retailer from whom Zeidenberg
purchased the software. This seems irrelevant to Easterbrook.130
Yet one wonders by what legal authority a non-party to a sale
transaction can prescribe the exclusive method of contract
formation for the parties and even prescribe that method in a
manner that is unknowable to at least one of the parties prior to the
exchange of money and goods. A third party may be a beneficiary
of a contract formed by other parties, but it has never been
suggested that even an intended third-party beneficiary may
control how the actual parties form their contract. Easterbrook does
not address those knotty questions, preferring to treat the case as
though ProCD had engaged in a direct sale to Zeidenberg.131
Even if it had actually involved a direct sale by ProCD but
presentation of the software package on the sale shelf of a retailer
and exchange of the package in return for payment by the buyer of
the purchase price, the vendor as master of the offer principle does
not support Easterbrook’s conclusion. Here again, it is Easterbrook
suggesting that a rule of law supports his position but failing to
disclose what the rule of law really is. For such candid disclosure
would reveal the “rule” is actually of no support at all for his
position. Easterbrook’s master of the offer theory fails because
under the objective theory of contracts, it is not the undisclosed
intention of a party that controls the legal import of his words or
128

Id.
Id.
130
Zeidenberg purchased the software package at a retail outlet in Madison,
Wisconsin, rather than from ProCD directly. Id. at 1450.
131
Id. at 1448-53.
129
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conduct, a fact he had previously articulated in such colorful
language that it found its way into the Farnsworth treatise.132
Rather, it is the apparent intention manifested by the words or
conduct of a party, judged objectively, that counts. That is why
Restatement (Second) Contracts speaks not of actual subjective
intention, but rather of “manifestation of intention:”
Many contract disputes arise because different people
attach different meanings to the same words and conduct.
The phrase ‘manifestation of intention’ adopts an external
or objective standard for interpreting conduct; it means that
the external expression of intention as distinguished from
undisclosed intention. A promisor manifests an intention if
he believes or has reason to believe that the promisee will
infer that intention from his words or conduct.133
In instances where the parties actually attach different
meanings to their outward manifestations, Restatement (Second)
Contracts establishes what may be called the fault principle for
determining whose meaning is legally operative.134 Applying the
objective theory of contracts, it provides that the manifestations
operate in accordance with the meaning attached to them by one of
the parties if that party had no reason to know of any different
meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know of
the meaning attached by the first party.135 This fault basis for
determining whose understanding of the meaning of manifestations
of intention is operative, is fundamental in the analysis of
Easterbrook’s implicit steps on the way to his conclusion that the
“master of the offer” principle confirms the rightness of his “terms
132

See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6 (2d
ed. 2001). “By the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had
become ascendant and courts universally accept it today. In the words of a
distinguished federal judges, ‘intent’ does not invite a tour through plaintiff’s
cranium, with [plaintiff] as the guide [quoting from Judge Easterbrook’s opinion
in Skycom. Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987), a case
applying Wisconsin law].” See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
19 (1981).
133
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b (1981).
134
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2) (1981).
135
Id. at § 20(2)(b) (1981).
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later” proposition.
With the objective theory of contracts in mind, consider
Easterbrook’s first implicit step: payment and receipt of the
purchase price for the software displayed on the sale shelf could
not have resulted in a contract for sale because ProCD as the
“master of the offer” had no actual intention to be bound by a
contract at that point in time.136 But it is hornbook law that there is
no requirement that a party must actually intend to be legally
bound before his actions can have that effect.137 Thus, a party will
be legally bound if he believes or has reason to believe that the
other party will infer that intention from his conduct.138 “An offer
is the manifestation of a willingness to enter into a bargain, so
made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent
to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”139 Thus even if
ProCD did not have in mind that its manifestations had the legal
effect of being an offer inviting immediate acceptance in any
reasonable manner, i.e., by paying the purchase price, it would not
alter the legal effect of its conduct.
Easterbrook might counter that it was not a matter of ProCD
136

Easterbrook stated that while a contract can be formed simply by paying
the price and walking out of the store, “ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer
would accept by using the software after having opportunity to read the license
at leisure.” ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
137
FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at § 3.7, at 120-21.
Parties to agreements, especially routine ones, often fail to consider the
legal consequences of the actions by which they manifest their
assent . . . . [T]here is no requirement that one intend or even
understand the legal consequences of one’s actions . . . . This rule,
making a party’s intention to be legally bound irrelevant, has the
salutary effects of generally relieving each party to a dispute of the
burden of showing the other’s state of mind in that regard and of
helping to uphold routine agreements.
Id. (emphasis added).
138
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1982).
139
Id. (emphasis added); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, § 3.10, at
132-33. “Conduct that would lead a reasonable person in the other party’s
position to infer a promise in return for performance or promise may amount to
an offer. . . . One who holds out goods may be taken to be offering them for
sale.” Id. (citation omitted).
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merely being unmindful of potential legal consequences of its
conduct; rather, ProCD had an actual intent not to permit
acceptance of its offer to sell to occur when the buyer paid the
price, and thus an actual intent not to be bound contractually at the
time of payment. As “master of the offer” it could make
acceptance effective only by the method it prescribed in its offer
contained in the license agreement.
The law is to the contrary, though. First, an actual intention by
a party not to be bound is of no legal effect unless the other party
knew or had reason to know of that intention.140 Second, with
respect to an offeror’s intention to restrict the way the power of
acceptance may be exercised, the objective theory of contracts puts
some qualification on the meaning of the “offeror as master of the
offer.”
The offeror is often described as ‘the master of the offer.’
In the sense the offeror confers on the offeree the power of
acceptance, the offeror has control over the scope of that
power and over how it can be exercised . . . . The offeror
enjoys a ‘freedom from contract’ except on the offeror’s
own conditions . . . . Under the objective theory, however,
the question is not what the offeror actually sought, but
what the offeree had reason to believe the offeror sought, or
to express it more succinctly, if less precisely, what the
offer sought.141
In this regard, Restatement (Second) Contracts is also quite
explicit.
The offeror is the master of his offer; just as the making of
any offer at all can be avoided by appropriate language or
other conduct, so the power of acceptance can be narrowly
limited. The offeror is bound only in accordance with his
manifested assent . . . . But if he knows or has reason to
know that he is creating an appearance of assent, he may
be bound by that appearance. The considerations apply to
the identity of the offeree . . . as well as to the mode of

140
141

FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, § 3.7, at 121.
Id. § 3.12, at 140.
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manifesting acceptance . . . .142
Insistence on a particular form of acceptance is “unusual.”143
Therefore, the established rule is that “[u]nless otherwise indicated
by the language or circumstances, an offer invites acceptance in
any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances.”144 UCC section 2-206(1), a section that
Easterbrook does not apply, puts an even greater burden on an
offeror to communicate the special manner of acceptance if he
wants to preclude acceptance in any other reasonable manner.145 It
provides: “Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the
language or circumstances,” an offer “shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner . . . reasonable in the
circumstances.”146
Additionally, the effectiveness of an offeror’s effort to require
a particular manner of acceptance is judged under an objective
standard.147 The “offeror is the master of the offer” principle is
thus “mitigated by the interpretation of offers, in accordance with
common understanding, as inviting acceptance in any reasonable
manner unless there is a contrary indication.”148 In particular,
whether offers are interpreted to have limited acceptance to a
particular manner is governed by the objective theory of contracts
and the “fault principle” of Restatement (Second) Contracts section
20.149 The fault principle makes clear that an offeror cannot defeat
the reasonable understanding of the offeree that is based on the
observable circumstances accompanying the offer by merely
uttering the mantra of “master of the offer” and pointing out that
after it received the purchase price and delivered to goods it
prescribed a different manner of acceptance.
Easterbrook applies a clearly inconsistent analysis with respect
142

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29 cmt. a (emphasis added).
Id. § 30 cmt. b (emphasis added).
144
Id. § 30(2).
145
U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1995).
146
Id. (emphasis added).
147
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 58 (1981).
148
Id. § 58 cmt. a (1981) (emphasis added).
149
Id. § 20(2)(b) (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 134-35 for
discussion of the fault principle.
143
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to the offer and the acceptance in ProCD. His analysis indefensibly
applies the subjective theory of contracts to make effective
ProCD’s undisclosed intention that its offer could not be accepted
by purchase, but rather only by use after purchase.150 At the same
time he applies the objective theory of contracts with a vengeance
to declare the purchaser’s use of the product is “acceptance,”
which for the first time gives the purchaser ownership rights, albeit
more limited than what he thought at the time he paid his money.
What purchaser of goods off the shelf would ever think he is
not entitled to treat them as his own? What purchaser would think
the person who sold them to him could tell him he could not use
them without agreeing to objectionable terms he had not seen
before he paid for them?151 Professor White has fittingly observed:
150

Macaulay, Relational Contracts, supra note 22, at 779 n.25.
When we look at a ProCD box, Judge Easterbrook’s “offer” becomes
pure fantasy. The notice is printed on the bottom flap of the box,
flanked by a statement in large type that there are 250 million telephone
numbers on 11 CD-Roms and the bar code for the scanner. The notice
is printed in 6-point type in a space 2 3/4th inches by 1 inch. The notice
that there are terms and conditions inside the box begins in the third
sentence in this paragraph. Judge Easterbrook relies on U.C.C. § 2204(1) that talks about making a contract “in any manner sufficient to
show agreement.” “Agreement,” however, is a term defined in the
Code. Section 1-201(3) says, “‘Agreement’ means the bargain of the
parties in fact . . . .” Using a conventional objective theory, ProCD’s
officials had no reason to think that the buyers of its software knew of
the offer that Judge Easterbrook sees them making. Perhaps, as Judge
Easterbrook says, Article 2 does not require the notice that there is an
offer inside the box to be displayed prominently. But if we are looking
for the bargain of the parties ‘in fact,’ it has to be displayed so that a
reasonable person might find it. If ProCD’s motive had been to hide the
clause, it couldn’t have done better.
Id. See also discussion supra, text accompanying notes 56-57 (discussing the
preclusion of form terms which the profferor of the form has reason to know the
other party would not assent to if he knew of them).
151
What, for example, would a purchaser of a new car think if, after paying
for it and preparing to drive it off the lot, he were told by the sales manager,
“Oh, by the way, by turning the ignition on you agree that if you drive this
beyond 500 miles of this location you void the warranty?” If the buyer were to
tell the manager, in civil terms, to “Jump in the lake; I own this car!” would he
be surprised to be told that he did not own it because he had not yet accepted the
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Contrary to Judge Easterbrook’s suggestion, recognizing
the offeror as “master of the offer” does not give him the
power to turn the offeree’s equivocal acts into
acceptance. . . . [T]he offeror has only limited power to add
to the acts that the offeree would otherwise intend to be
acceptance. . . . [A] term that one accepts all of the terms in
the box by tying his shoelaces the morning after its receipt
would not be effective. In this setting, use of the product,
like tying one’s shoelaces, is equivocal. A buyer could
easily claim that he had earned the right to use by paying
and that no inference of agreement to other terms should be
drawn from his use.152
In this respect, the type of acceptance that Easterbrook’s “terms
later” proposition permits sellers to impose is even more offensive
than that attempted by those who sent unsolicited merchandise to
consumers asserting that the recipient’s failure to return meant the
recipient agreed to pay for the goods.153 That is because in the
former case the purchaser has already paid for the goods,
reasonably believes he owns them, and believes he is legally
entitled to keep and use the goods. Additionally, because he has
finished his search costs, made the purchase, and believes the
transaction has been completed, he does not expect to be
confronted with a decision whether to purchase the goods albeit on
less favorable terms. Thus he can be easily blindsided by
objectionable terms that he may physically receive but is not likely
to bother examining.154 The legislative response has been to

dealership’s offer to sell, which could only be done by turning the ignition on?
152
White, supra note 96, at 63.
153
See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
Iris Taylor, Directory Scam is Persistent But Preventable, RICHMOND-TIMES
DISPATCH, Aug. 24, 2003, at D1 (advising complaining customers that
unsolicited merchandise is theirs to keep), available at 2003 WL 8032051; Ray
Schultz, Publishers Sued Over Unsolicited Books, DIRECT, April 1, 2003, at 18
(describing lawsuits by consumers seeking declarations that they can keep
unsolicited merchandise as gifts), available at WL 8203585.
154
See infra notes 264-93 and accompanying text (noting the disincentive
to study terms after the deal is done and the psychology of not wanting to take
time to try to figure out “legal terms”).
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condemn the abuses of organizations and individuals who send
unsolicited merchandise to consumers with the suggestion that
their failure to return the goods meant they agreed to pay for
them.155 Further, because of the power of “negative option” plans
(i.e., you accept unless you affirmatively reject) to produce more
“acceptances” than would an offer that had to be affirmatively
accepted, marketing programs using that technique have generated
significant regulation.156 Easterbrook’s “terms later” proposition
presents the seller with even more power than generic negative
option plans because his proposition anticipates a very unwary
purchaser who is most unlikely to affirmatively reject
objectionable terms by refraining from use of the goods he believes
he already owns. A purchaser’s use under such circumstances is at
best equivocal conduct from which no confident inference could
ever be drawn that he agrees to the objectionable terms.157
Implicit in the reasonably perceived ownership of the goods by
such a purchaser is the price that he sees he must pay to prevent the
objectionable “terms later” from being binding upon him.158 For
155

See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (2003) (treating mailing unsolicited
merchandise and billing for the same as an unfair method of competition and an
unfair trade practice, and provides the recipient may treat the merchandise as a
gift); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1584.5 (2003) (providing that recipient may treat
unsolicited merchandise as a gift, and if the sender continues to bill for it may
sue to enjoin the conduct and be awarded attorneys fees and costs); VA. CODE
ANN. § 11-2.2 (2003) (providing that recipient may treat as a gift).
156
FTC Rules on Use of Prenotification Negative Option Plans, 16 C.F.R.
§425.1 (2004). See also Owen R. Phillips, Negative Option Contracts and
Consumer Switching Costs, 60 S. ECON. J. 304-315 (1993), noting:
The Federal Trade Commission, although voting to permit the use of
negative option contracts by marketers, has issued detailed guidelines
about the content of negative option contracts. With respect to book
and recording clubs, prenotification of shipment is by the vendor is a
strict requirement in these contracts. Other prominent features of the
guidelines require vendors to make it plain to the consumer what the
costs of exit are before the contract is put into place.
Id. at 314 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
157
White, supra note 96, at 63.
158
This assumes, of course, that the purchaser actually has become aware
of the objectionable terms and the requirement that he return the goods to avoid
being bound by them. But under Easterbrook’s “terms later” proposition it is
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the choice is not his to merely decline and thus remain in the same
position as before the objectionable terms were proposed.
Whatever he chooses will change that position for the worse. Such
a buyer confronted with objectionable “terms later” is in a
“lose/lose” situation under Easterbrook’s proposition. If he retains
the goods, he continues to own them but upon less advantageous
terms. If he returns them, he gives up his ownership rights and gets
his money back. In either case, his position is worse than before
the seller belatedly proposed the objectionable terms. This is a
matter that Easterbrook treats of no significance, finding that the
buyer who is confronted after the purchase with an onerous
demand, for example, “you owe us an extra $10,000,”159 can avoid
it by returning the item and getting his money back. This, of
course, ignores the fact that for the buyer to do so is to give up the
benefit of the bargain he had negotiated and paid for.
f. Purported Support from UCC Section 2-606
Moreover, this latter point underscores the utter fallacy of
Easterbrook’s statement that, “[s]ection 2-606, which defines
‘acceptance of goods’, reinforces this understanding.”160 His
explanation for how that section, which states what constitutes
acceptance of performance under a contract,161 reinforces his
understanding with respect to what constitutes acceptance of an
offer for purposes of formation of a contract is a non-explanation
that attempts to cloud the radical differences between the two uses
of “accepts.” He states:
A buyer accepts goods under § 2-606(1)(b) when, after an
opportunity to inspect, he fails to make an effective
rejection under § 2-602(1). ProCD extended an opportunity
sufficient that he could have become aware of them after he bought the product.
159
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
160
Id.
161
U.C.C. § 2-606 (1995). Comment 1 to that section makes clear that
section 2-606 has no relevance to contract formation, stating: “Under this Article
‘acceptance’ as applied to goods means that the buyer, pursuant to the contract,
takes particular goods which have been appropriated to the contract as his
own. . . .” Id. cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
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to reject if a buyer should find the license terms
unsatisfactory; Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out
the software, learned of the license, and did not reject the
goods. We refer to § 2-606 only to show that the
opportunity to return goods can be important; acceptance of
an offer differs from acceptance of goods after delivery
[citation omitted]; but the UCC consistently permits the
parties to structure their relations so that the buyer has a
chance to make a final decision after a detailed review.162
Easterbrook, in an apparently strategic move, does not identify the
object of the infinitive “to reject” in the second sentence above. It
is, of course, an offer to form a contract. Had he done so, the
second sentence above would have alerted even a casual reader to
the disconnect between the subject matter of the first sentence,
acceptance of goods due to a failure to reject the tendered
performance under a contract, and the second, an opportunity to
reject an offer proposing formation of a contract. The object of the
first clause of the second sentence is an opportunity to reject an
offer. The second clause of that sentence is merely a factual
statement that the buyer did not reject the goods.163 There is a
world of legal difference between a buyer failing to reject
nonconforming goods tendered under an existing contract, and an
offeree failing to reject an offer to enter into a contract. Under the
former, a buyer is bound to pay for the goods at the contract
rate,164 but retains a damage remedy for breach of contract.165
Under the latter, if an offeree fails to reject an offer, the only result
is that no contract is formed.166
162

ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53 (emphasis added).
In the context of this case it would have been even a more accurate
description of Zeidenberg’s conduct to have said Zeidenberg did not return the
goods. That is because the “rejection of goods” is a Code concept that has legal
significance only with respect to instances of breach of contract. Note the title
of Part 6 of Article 2 is “Breach, Repudiation and Excuse.” U.C.C. intro. Pt. 6
Article 2 (1995).
164
U.C.C. § 2-607(1) (1995).
165
U.C.C. § 2-714 (1995).
166
FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, § 3.13. “[A]n offer is a manifestation of
assent that empowers another to enter into a contract by manifesting assent in
163
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The third sentence above is most unique in terms of its
structure and content, but perhaps not without design. Actually it is
three independent clauses, separated only by semicolons, stating
three disconnected truisms.167 There is no legal connection
between an opportunity the Code gives to assess performance of
the other party under an existing contract on the one hand, and
rules governing formation of a contract on the other. Easterbrook’s
best strategy is merely to lump the concepts into the same sentence
without explanation of their connection. Perhaps then a casual
reader might be prompted to think their mere physical convergence
means there is a similarity among them and thus some vindication
for the “terms later” proposition.168

return. If the offeree exercises this power by manifesting assent, the offeree is
said to ‘accept’ the offer. This acceptance is the final step in the making of a
contract” (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Id. After a period of time an offer
not accepted simply lapses, thus precluding formation of contract on the basis of
the offer. Id. at §3.19.
167
The truism in the third clause appears to be strategically phrased to
avoid identifying either what the final decision is that the buyer may make, or of
what he is to have had an opportunity to make a “detailed review,” i.e., the terms
of an offer or the conformity of the tendered goods to the terms of the contract.
The design appears to be to leave these matters cloudy enough that a casual
reader might infer that the Code equates the effect of an opportunity to review
an offer to form a contract with the effect of an opportunity to review goods
tendered under an existing contract to see if they conform to the contract.
168
After all, a person of Easterbrook’s writing renown would surely not
leave a sentence unclear without purpose. Ledwon, supra note 5, at 1074
(pointing out that “Easterbrook is a terrific writer.”); see also Mitu Gulati &
Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the Superstar
Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141, 1168
(2002) (characterizing Easterbrook and Posner as “world-renowned academics”
and surmising that driving the success of their opinions in casebooks is “not
only their brand of Law and Economics, but also the skill with which they use
it—the fact that they are skilled writers whose opinions rank among the highest
on the scales of criteria such as humor, irreverence, and originality.”); Barry A.
Miller & Thomas R. Meites eds., Evaluation of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 747 (1994) (describing
Easterbrook as a “prolific and influential writer.”).
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g. Purported Support from the Code’s “Separately Stated”
Terms Provisions
Easterbrook’s final effort to put forth legal support for his
“terms later” proposition is derived from the Code’s provisos that
certain matters must be “conspicuous”169 or “separately stated”170
to be effective. He suggests the import of such provisos for his
“terms later” proposition as follows:
These special provisos reinforce the impression that, so far
as the UCC is concerned, other terms may be as
inconspicuous as the forum-selection clause on the back of
the cruise ship ticket in Carnival Cruise Lines.171
Zeidenberg has not located any Wisconsin case—for that
matter, any case in any state—holding that under the UCC
the ordinary terms found in shrinkwrap licenses require any
special prominence, or otherwise are to be undercut rather
than enforced.172
This conclusion rests on a faulty and unspoken assumption that
because ordinary terms actually disclosed to the buyer prior to
purchase, albeit in ordinary font size, are effective, such terms
concealed from the buyer until after purchase must also be
effective.
Notwithstanding his valiant effort to create the appearance of
169

ProCD Inc. v. Zeinberger, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996)
(disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability).
170
Id. (A firm offer under §2-205 in which the assurance of irrevocability
is on a form supplied by the offeree, must be separately signed by the offeree to
be effective. A term excluding oral modifications under § 2-209(2) which
appears on a form supplied by a merchant must be separately signed by the other
party to be effective.).
171
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453 (referring to Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585 (1991)). Lest one get the impression that the forum selection
clause in Carnival Lines was on the back of some little ticket stub, the opinion in
the case makes it clear that the ticket was a “three page document;” and further
that the question whether the Shutes had sufficient notice of the forum clause
before entering the contract was not addressed because they “essentially ha[d]
conceded that they had notice of the forum-selection provision.” Carnival
Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 590.
172
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453.
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legal support for his “terms later” proposition, something
necessary for a legal realist,173 the stark reality is that there is none.
Rather, his “legal support” is merely an illusion crafted by a
brilliant federal judge174 known as a terrific writer,175 who is
willing to cast aside basic intellectual honesty to create an
appearance of legal support for his novel policy-making. It is a
demonstration of legal realism that could shock a legal realist.176
173

See Joseph William Singer, Review Essay, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL.
L. REV. 467, 472-73 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). Singer notes:
A judge can almost always construct arguments for a ruling “on either
side of a new case.” At the same time, the judge must construct an
argument based on existing principles of law, and “there are not so
many that can be built defensibly.” This is because it is not always
possible to construct an argument that will be plausible—meaning
persuasive—to other judges and lawyers familiar with the relevant
precedents. To be persuasive, the argument must tie the proposed result
to existing practice in a way that appears not to deviate from
fundamental principles underlying prior law; this is determined partly
by professional consensus, partly by community views, and partly by
the substantive content and organization of existing law. Thus, the fact
that the judge must justify the decision by conventional legal arguments
constrains her, not because the law itself logically requires the result,
but because the argument for a change in the law must appear to fit
with existing practice, and more importantly, the argument must
persuade a particular audience that is likely to be conservative about
such matters.
Id. at 472-73 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
174
See Marc M. Harrold, Essay, Stripping Away at the First Amendment:
The Increasingly Paternal Voice of Our Living Constitution, 32 U. MEM. L. REV
403, 415 at n.42 (2002) (naming Judge Easterbrook as a likely nominee to the
U.S. Supreme Court if George W. Bush were to win the 2000 Presidential
election (citing Stuart Taylor Jr., The Supreme QuestionPicking the Next
Justice, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 23)).
175
See, e.g., Ledwon, supra note 5, at 1074.
176
Legal realism is a pragmatic movement in the law. Its two major facets
are: (1) a rejection of a concept of law as grounded in permanent principles and
realized in logical application of those principles, and (2) a determination to use
law as an instrument for social ends. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE: 1927-1960, 3-7 (1986); Richard A. Posner, Symposium on the
Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought: What Has Pragmatism
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to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1670 (1990); Joseph William Singer,
Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 468-70, 475 (1988) (reviewing
Laura Kalman, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). Legal realism’s
pragmatic attitude treats “law as made, not found.” Id. at 474. Singer elaborates
the point as follows:
Law therefore is, and must be, based on human experience, policy, and
ethics, rather than formal logic. Legal principles are not inherent in
some universal, timeless logical system; they are social constructs,
designed by people in specific historical and social contexts for specific
purposes to achieve specific ends. Law and legal reasoning are a part of
the way we create our form of social life.
Id. With respect to its first facet, legal realism has had widespread success
within the profession and within the legal academy, except among the few
natural law theorists that remain. As to its second facet, among those who
embrace legal realism’s pragmatic approach there is no disagreement over the
use of law as an instrument for social ends. The only disagreement is over how
to determine what the proper social ends are, and as to that the various diverse
modern schools have markedly different views. Professor Tamanaha captured
the latter point with this observation:
One consequence of this shift toward instrumentalism is that the current
state of U.S. legal theory consists of what some have called
“postmodern jurisprudence,” a plethora of competing approaches, each
representing a particular normative or interest group perspective, each
arguing that law should serve the interests they tout. Legal theory has
become thoroughly and openly politicized.
Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to
Normative Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, And the Fact-Value Distinction,
41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 316 (1996) (citations omitted). The core facets of legal
realism that were embraced in an earlier era by luminaries such as Holmes,
Cardozo and Pound are now reflected in legal realism’s “refurbished modern
form.” Posner, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. at 1653. The modern form is often now
described as Legal Pragmatism, and sometimes as Pragmatic Instrumentalism or
Legal Functionalism. See, e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in
Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037,
1040-41 nn.17, 18, 19 (1991); and Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic
Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 861, 863-64 n.2 (1981). Under the contemporary umbrella of Legal
Pragmatism comfortably fit “prominent representatives of the left, center, and
right in U.S. legal theory—of critical legal studies, critical feminism, critical
race theory, law and economics, and of the mainstream scholars who otherwise
hold sharply divergent opinions about law.” Tamanaha, supra, at 316. From
beneath its broad coverage each can freely argue its perspective for determining
the proper social ends. See also Post, supra note 5, at 1226. (“The jurisprudence

BERNMACRO2.DOC

688

4/23/2004 1:12 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Because the pretense is so apparent, ProCD is a classic example of
legal realism in operation and supports the assessment of Critical
Legal Studies theorists that what courts engage in is mere exercise
of power, not law.177
B. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
In ProCD, Easterbrook placed considerable emphasis upon
ProCD’s extensive costs in developing its software, the essential
vulnerability of software to copying, and his own perception of the
necessity of its being able to discriminate in price to most
effectively profit from its creativity.178 That, coupled with his
earlier expressions on the special importance of bringing an ex ante
perspective to intellectual property cases to best assure the proper
balance between fostering creativity and encouraging free use,179
may have prompted some to suppose his novel rule about contract
formation is confined to cases involving the proper use of
intellectual property. Such supposition was, however, short-lived.
Seven months later, in an opinion for another panel of the Seventh
Circuit, Easterbrook announced that the “terms later” rule of
contract formation annunciated in ProCD was “about the law of
contract, not the law of software.”180
1. Judge Easterbrook’s “Terms Later;” Round Two
In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., Gateway advertised its tenth
anniversary system in PC World Magazine and other media
directed at computer buyers.181 The Hills responded to the
advertising by placing a phone order for the system and paying for

of Frank Easterbrook shocks me because I am, admittedly, a legal realist or at
least an admirer of the legal realists.”).
177
See ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A
CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 170-81 (1976).
178
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996).
179
See Easterbrook, supra note 81.
180
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
181
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1996 WL 650631 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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the same with their credit card.182 Following the phone order and
receipt of payment by credit card, Gateway shipped the tenth
anniversary system in a box that also contained a “Standard Terms
and Conditions Agreement.”183 The Hills had not seen these
materials before paying for and receiving the system and had no
prior notice of their content, including the arbitration clause and
the provision that failure to return the system within thirty days of
receipt constituted their agreement to all of the terms, including the
prescribed method for formation of contract.184 When the Hills
brought a class action suit against Gateway asserting a civil
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim
and other claims, Gateway moved to require arbitration pursuant to
the arbitration clause contained in the materials in the box.185 The
trial court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement.186
a. ProCD as Precedent
On the strength of ProCD and his own view of practicality and
common sense, Easterbrook found the Hills bound by the “terms
later” that showed up in the box among the packing materials and
the parts of the computer system.187 For Easterbrook, ProCD
applied to the dispute in Hill because:
“A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by
conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of
conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by
performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as
acceptance.” [citing ProCD]. Gateway shipped computers
with the same sort of accept-or-return offer ProCD made to
users of its software. ProCD relied on the Uniform
182

Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 1148 (holding that “the present record is insufficient to support a
finding of valid arbitration or that the plaintiffs were given adequate notice of
the arbitration clause”).
187
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (stating the “[b]y keeping the computer beyond
30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway’s offer, including the arbitration clause”).
183
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Commercial Code rather than on any peculiarities of
Wisconsin law [and there is nothing atypical of the UCC in
either Illinois or Wisconsin]; ProCD therefore applies to
this case.188
In Hill, unlike the facts in ProCD, there was no notice, not even
fine print notice, to alert the Hills prior to the time they ordered
and paid for the system to expect that other terms were part of the
sales contract.189 Unlike ProCD, in Hill the seller had not
configured its system to flash a message across the screen that the
Hills could not possibly have missed when the system was
operated (or that otherwise came so unavoidably to their attention)
alerting them to the consequences of their retaining the system
beyond thirty days.190 Furthermore, in ProCD the parties agreed
that the retail seller (ProCD’s surrogate for Easterbrook) was the
offeror, providing Easterbrook with at least an apparent
justification to spin his distorted “master of the offer” argument
upon which ProCD was ultimately based;191 but in Hill the buyers
made the offer in response to Gateway’s advertisements which
were nothing more than invitations for offers.192 In Hill it was only
in response to the buyers’ telephone order that Gateway shipped
the system, thus triggering UCC section 2-206(1)(b), a Code
188

Id. at 1149.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Recall that in ProCD
“[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside,” was the first ground upon which
Easterbrook relied to make it appear that existing law supported his “terms later”
proposition.
190
In ProCD, Easterbrook noted: “ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer
would accept by using the software after having an opportunity to read the
license at leisure. This Zeidenberg did. He had no choice, because the software
splashed the license on the screen and would not let him proceed without
indicating acceptance.” ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
191
Id. at 1452.
192
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1981)
(“Advertisements of goods by display, sign, handbill, newspaper, radio or
television are not ordinarily intended or understood as offers to sell . . . there
must ordinarily be some language of commitment or some invitation to take
action without further communication.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, at §
3.10 at 137 (stating that “proposals made to the public through advertisements,
posters, circulars, and the like . . . are generally held not to be offers”).
189
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formation of contract provision not involved at all in ProCD, and
which provides: “an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt
or current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance
either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current
shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods.”193 The facts in
Hill suggest that Gateway probably accepted the Hills’ offer to
purchase in the phone conversation by an oral promise to ship. If it
did not make such a promise, then in any event, as numerous
commentators have noted, Gateway accepted the Hills’ offer by its
prompt shipment in response to the order.194
In applying ProCD’s “terms later” rule to the facts of Hill,
Easterbrook disregards the actual facts and statutory and common
law rules related to offer and acceptance and contract formation.
Instead, the economics/legal realist jurist, emboldened from his
recent transformation of contract formation law with respect to
intellectual property, now brazenly imposes his version of
efficiency on all sales transactions. His peculiar version of
efficiency is, of course, quite simple: Whatever way vendors prefer
to operate their businesses and to form contracts is efficient, and
the law should facilitate that. If a vendor prefers to conceal adverse
terms of the deal until after the buyer has paid and then also prefers
to disclose them in a way that only theoretically, rather than
actually, brings them to the buyer’s attention, and further prefers a
rule that failure to affirmatively reject by returning the goods and
giving up the deal means the buyer accepts the terms, then it must
be efficient and the vendor should be permitted to have his way.
Therefore, the Code and common law rules of contract
formation are interpreted to not interfere with efficient vendor
practices. And the common law rule that assent by a party is
limited only to terms that the party knew or had reason to know
does not apply if “vendors” prefer that a party be deemed to have
assented to terms presented in a fashion designed to avoid
discovery until too late to object. Nor does the common law rule
precluding a party from forcing the other party to affirmatively
193

U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (1995) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 5, at 1820; Ghosh, supra note 5, at 113234; David J. DePippo, Comment, Dear Sir or Madam: You Cannot Contract in a
Closet, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 423, 445-46 (2001); Gale, supra note 5, at 583.
194
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object to a proposed term in order to avoid its imposition apply to
“vendors” if they prefer to force not merely an affirmative
objection but rather an affirmative rejection in the form of
returning the goods and giving up the deal. All of that being so, for
Easterbrook the distinctions between the facts of ProCD and Hill
are of no consequence. Thus the fact that in each case the “vendor”
found it preferable to utilize a “terms later” formation method of
doing business, ergo it was efficient, was at once the sole fact
relevant in each, and also the sole fact sufficient to make the
“terms later” rule of ProCD applicable and controlling in Hill.
Coupled with his prioritizing the vendor’s preference in the
name of “terms later” contracting is his folksy, story-style
description of the facts of the dispute before the court. Only a
person of Easterbrook’s exceptional writing ability could craft a
story so artfully as to suggest to the reader the nature of the case
and what the dispute might be about, without using legal terms or
even ordinary English words like “called,” “ordered,” “paid for,”
and “delivered” to describe what happened.
A customer picks up the phone, orders a computer, and
gives a credit card number. Presently a box arrives,
containing the computer and a list of terms, said to govern
unless the customer returns the computer within 30 days.195
Did the customer pick up the phone to answer an incoming call, or
did he pick up the phone to place a call? The story does not tell us.
Who was on the other end of the line when the customer picked up
the phone and ordered a computer? Was the order the customer
made for a trial use of a computer, or was it a commitment to buy
one? Was the credit card number given for identification reasons,
for security to show the customer had the capability of paying for
the computer in case he chose to buy it after a trial period, or was it
payment for a computer he had just agreed to buy and the
computer company had promised to sell? No help from the story
for figuring out the answers to those questions either. Was the
computer even sent by the person or entity the customer spoke
with on the phone, or did it come just out of the blue on the front
step from some other source? One cannot tell from the story
195

Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1996).
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whether it was an unanticipated arrival or whether it was the
anxiously anticipated delivery of their new computer for which
they had already paid more than $4,000.
Leaving the reader in the dark about the actual facts of the case
(because they would show a completed sales transaction either
when the phone conversation ended with an agreement to ship the
goods in exchange for the credit card payment already received, or
at the least, when the goods were promptly shipped in response to
the order), allows Easterbrook to then phrase the issue in a fashion
designed to make only one answer rational. He phrases the issue
as:
Are these terms [that arrive with the box] effective as the
parties’ contract, or is the contract term-free because the
order taker did not read any terms over the phone and elicit
the customer’s assent?196
Either the contract has terms, i.e., the terms that arrived in the box,
or the contract is “term-free.” The second choice is patently
absurd. All contracts have terms. The very expression “contract
term-free” is an oxymoron. Therefore, the first choice must be
correct. Easterbrook does not explore whether there was a contract
with the terms the parties agreed to in the phone conversation, or a
contract made up of the terms of the offer that was accepted by
Gateway shipping the computer. Best to just not raise those issues,
making it easy to move directly to his “terms later” rule of ProCD.
His “legal analysis” has drawn heavy and well-deserved
criticism. Professor Macaulay, observed, “Whatever the virtues of
Judge Easterbrook’s Gateway opinion, it gets an ‘F’ as a law
exam. It is a pitiful reading of the UCC, ignoring the definition of
‘agreement’ that was so important to Llewellyn.”197 Professor
Braucher noted, “[t]his is dubious contract and commercial
law,”198 pointing out that the analysis did not even cite UCC
section 2-206(1)(b), the controlling Code contract formation
section directly applicable to the case, “let alone explain how it
was ‘unambiguously indicated’ that the Hills’ order did not invite
196
197
198

Id.
Macaulay, Common Sense, supra note 10, at 1148 (emphasis added).
Braucher, supra note 5, at 1820 (emphasis added).
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acceptance by a promise to ship or by actual shipment.”199
Professor Braucher further noted that the analysis erroneously
disregarded the statutory language of section 2-207, ignored the
comment language to section 2-207, and also ignored the logic of
section 2-207.200
b. Purported Common Sense
Easterbrook’s practicality and common sense arguments assert
in essence that “[c]ustomers as a group are better off”201 if
“vendors” are permitted to impose adverse terms upon them under
the pretended assent theory of his “terms later” policy. He posits:
Practical considerations support allowing vendors to
enclose the full legal terms with their products. Cashiers
cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers
before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the
phone for direct-sales operations such as Gateway’s had to
read the four page statement of terms before taking the
buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers.
Others would hang up in rage over the waste of their time.
And oral recitation would not avoid customers’ assertions
199

Id. at 1820-21.
Id. at 1821-23. See also Post, supra note 5, at 1223-25 (emphasis added)
(“Judge Easterbrook did violence to Article 2 . . . . [He] creates a false
dichotomy in the first paragraph of the opinion contrasting a contract with ‘no
terms’—ignoring the terms the statute supplies, including warranties of
merchantability—with a contract with the terms drafted by the seller.”); Ghosh,
supra note 5, at 1132 (emphasis added) (faulting Easterbrook for “reconstituting
the manner in which the contract was formed,” in order to avoid having to
explain why UCC § 2-206(1)(b) did not compel a decision in favor of the Hills).
Law student commentators have also participated in the discussion. See, e.g.,
French, supra note 5, at 813 (characterizing the court’s consideration of the
provisions of the Code as “sloppy”); Gale, supra note 5, at 583 (asserting that
“Easterbrook[‘s] analysis . . . seems to ignore the basic facts of Hill as well as
the provisions of the U.C.C.”); Hazelwood, supra note 5, at 1316 (concluding
that Easterbrook “misapplies and misinterprets the contract formation provisions
of the [Code]”).
201
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
200
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(whether true or feigned) that the clerk did not read term X
to them, or that they did not remember or understand it.
Writing provides benefits for both sides of commercial
transactions. Customers as a group are better off when
vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic
recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return
device. Competent adults are bound by such documents,
read or unread.202
If the approve-or-return “device” were such a benefit to customers,
sellers would likely tout it in their promotions. Perhaps the fact that
Gateway did not do so is an indication that its marketing personnel
did not believe that advertising it was holding terms back would
cause potential buyers to think they were getting a better deal.
After all, it is difficult to imagine a buyer who would think delayed
disclosure was desirable, or who would think that delayed
disclosure meant he was getting a lower price either because the
later disclosed terms would reduce Gateway’s litigation costs or
because holding back terms reduced its selling costs.203 In fact, as
202

Id.
Of Easterbrook’s assertion that customers as a group are better off if
sellers hold back terms, Professors Horsburgh and Cappel find Easterbrook’s
logic problematic, noting “surely, considerations of efficiency dictate that the
information costs be borne by the seller, the lowest cost avoider. No rational
consumer would be willing to incur the high social costs involved in acquiring
information about expensive and complicated merchandise.” Horsburgh &
Cappel, supra note 5, at 1122 n.117 (citations omitted). Professor Ghosh
observes:
The Judge reasons that customers are made better off by the approveor-return policy. There is no elaboration on how these benefits arise
except in reducing the costs to the vendor or engaging in what the
Judge characterizes as long and ineffective recitation of terms.
Presumably, these costs are passed on to the consumer. Furthermore,
the Judge discusses how competent adults are bound by terms, whether
they are read or not. There is an analogy with market exchange that is
being made in this discussion. If I pay X dollars for a product, there is a
presumption that I value the product at X dollars or more. The consent
principle in contract is a proxy for the efficiency of the contract. The
Judge is expanding the consent principle quite a bit here and is
engaging in part in propter hoc reasoning. His logic can be described as
follows: approve-or-return benefits consumers. Therefore, consenting
203
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noted by Professor Ghosh, “[t]he effect of enforcing both the
arbitration clause and the approve-or-return policy is to protect
companies that sell products with latent defects which are difficult
to detect.”204
Easterbrook is correct in describing Gateway’s practice as a
“device,” but it is not one with a noble purpose, as the economic
literature discloses.205 It is a deceptive strategy under the guise of
efficiency to bind customers to adverse terms concealed from them
until after they have made the purchase decision and parted with
their money. One commentator put it this way: “[T]he practice of
holding back terms until after payment and delivery should be
deemed an unfair and deceptive practice . . . . This practice inhibits
shopping and misleads consumers about the nature of the deal at
the crucial time, which is before psychological commitment.”206
Another described Easterbrook’s “terms later” ruling in Hill in
even less flattering terms: “Judge Easterbrook and the judges who
have followed his opinion tell us that misrepresentation is the oil
that lubricates capitalism . . . [i]t is okay for Gateway to hide what
it is doing.”207
to approve-or-return policies would promote efficiency. Since these
terms arose from an approve-or-return policy, the terms must be
efficient and enforced. However, there is a presumption of consent in
this reasoning. There is an even stronger assumption that since consent
implies efficiency, the efficiency of terms would imply that a customer
would consent to them. This last point is specious not only because of
the confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions, but also because it
is not clear what is the basis for determining that certain terms are
efficient, other than the court’s ipse dixit.
Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1139.
204
Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1138.
205
See discussion infra Part II.
206
Braucher, supra note 5, at 1827.
207
Macaulay, Common Sense, supra note 10, at 1148-49. Macaulay also
comments:
If we think that choice is an important value, we cannot be content with
polite evasions such as: there is a duty to read and understand a
document written in a code (legal English) and buried in a box. The
doctrine of reasonable expectations exists largely in insurance to limit
what can be hidden by lawyers in documents which they know will not
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Easterbrook’s practicality analysis posits that the direct
marketing vendors can only orally convey terms of the bargain to
customers prior to purchase. A variety of inexpensive ways are
available to vendors for written disclosure of terms prior to
purchase, however, including the very ads and computer
magazines in which Gateway touted all of the positive features of
its product and support service.208 In this information age it could
post all contract terms on its web page for potential buyers to view
at their leisure. Nor would it require four pages of legalese or even
a few short sentences over the phone to communicate that
arbitration is required, that the seller does not promise the product
will work, or that if the buyer is hurt by the product the buyer
cannot sue the seller.209 Even the brick and mortar retail store
be read and understood. In an impossibly just world, measured by my
preferences, this doctrine would apply to all form contracts. Given the
cost barriers to litigation, it wouldn’t raise the price of goods enough to
matter. I suspect that the impact would be largely symbolic, but I like
symbolizing that fraud from fancy offices is a bad thing. It would make
some corporate lawyers unhappy, but it couldn’t happen to a better
bunch of people. Instead of the “safe harbors” that they demand, they
deserve harbors filled with mines put down in random patterns. There
is a simple safe harbor that they work hard to avoid: don’t try to
deceive people.
You could challenge me: Suppose Gateway advertised in big type as
they puff their products, and said “if there is trouble, you must trust us
to fix the computer because you have no legal remedy.” Would it make
any difference? Wouldn’t customers just accept this? Would any of
them understand what risks they would be taking? Would competitors
jump in and advertise that they didn’t take away legal rights? Of
course, this is but a mind experiment. We’ll never know. Gateway and
its legal staff work hard to hide that this is what they are doing with
their arbitration clause that creates a Kangaroo Court.
Id. (emphasis added).
208
See Jean R. Sternlight, Recent Decision Opens Wider Gateway to Unfair
Binding Arbitration, 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 129, 132 (1997).
209
Braucher, supra note 5, at 1828-29.
Why exactly does Gateway need four pages of terms? Why can’t
Gateway primarily use the background terms of the U.C.C., which need
not be mentioned to become part of the contract? There are good
arguments for disclosure of key terms even in telephone transactions. If
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operation can spare its cashiers the drudgery and inefficiency of
reading terms to each customer before taking the payment: If it has
an arbitration policy it can easily post it in the same places it
typically posts its policies for returns and charges for bad checks.
One commentator has characterized Easterbrook’s overall
analysis in Hill as lacking in imagination,210 an accurate
assessment with respect to his premise that only oral
communication of terms is possible, which in turn gives the
appearance of supporting his “terms later” rule of contract
formation. But it is not really a matter of lack of imagination but
rather a lack of honesty coupled with a ruthlessness to employ
whatever strategy is necessary to facilitate preferred vendor
practices, or, in Easterbrook’s framework, efficient vendor
practices.211
c. Purported Irrelevance of Notice and the Common Sense of
Ignoring Its Lack
Easterbrook addresses the issue of providing notice to the Hills
prior to their purchase by faulting them for not discovering the
a particular term cannot be easily explained, it may be because the term
is inherently too complex and unfair for a consumer to understand and
knowingly give assent to it.
Id.
210

Post, supra note 5, at 1230-31. “Easterbrook’s analysis lacks an
appreciation for history and for the values and desires (not translatable into
dollars and cents) that animate human beings. It lacks the imagination
(sometimes called empathy) that would allow him to see the full consequences
of the decision he reached in the Gateway case.” Id.
211
Id. at 1230.
Judge Easterbrook employed an “end game” strategy. The subject of
the dispute, however that is defined—whether it is the quality that a
consumer can reasonably expect from a computer manufacturer or the
willingness of consumers to submit disputes to arbitration—has been
settled with finality. A rule has been stated and the facts constructed—
the vendor is the offeror, the offeror is master of the offer and § 2-207
does not apply when there is only one form. There can only be one
outcome. The vendor wins. End of conversation.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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adverse terms and objecting to them by returning the computer.
For him the matter is elementary—the vendor need not give notice
in advance that other terms governing the transaction are in the box
because buyers like the Hills know other terms are going to come
with the box.212
If Easterbrook is so sure buyers like the Hills know other terms
governing the transaction will be coming after they pay for the
goods, therefore obviating any need for notice, one wonders why
seven months earlier he did not say the same for a buyer like
Zeidenberg. Surely Zeidenberg must have known that there would
212

Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted). Putting the onus on purchasers to ferret out undisclosed
terms, Easterbrook notes:
Perhaps the Hills would have had a better argument if they were first
alerted to the bundling of hardware and legal-ware after opening the
box and wanted to return the computer in order to avoid disagreeable
terms, but were dissuaded by the expense of shipping. What the remedy
would be in such a case—could it exceed the shipping charges?—is an
interesting question, but one that need not detain us because the Hills
knew before they ordered the computer that the carton would include
some important terms, and they did not seek to discover these in
advance. Gateway’s ads state that their products come with limited
warranties and lifetime support. How limited was the warranty—30
days, with service contingent on shipping the computer back, or five
years, with free onsite service? What sort of support was offered?
Shoppers have three principal ways to discover these things. First, they
can ask the vendor to send a copy before deciding whether to buy. The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires firms to distribute their
warranty terms on request . . . the Hills do not contend that Gateway
would have refused to enclose the remaining terms too. Concealment
would be bad for business, scaring some customers away and leading to
excess returns from others. Second, shoppers can consult public sources
(computer magazines, the Web sites of vendors) that may contain this
information. Third, they may inspect the documents after the product’s
delivery. Like Zeidenberg, the Hills took the third option. By keeping
the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway’s offer,
including the arbitration clause.
Id. Easterbrook’s suggestion that it is more efficient for consumers to search out
terms than for sellers to disclose them is not supported by any empirical
evidence, nor could it be, and it is contrary to economic reality. See infra Part II
notes and text relating to transaction costs.
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be some important terms inside the shrink-wrap or on the disk such
as installation and operating instructions, or how to obtain help in
operation and the like. Perhaps the reason is that as a legal realist
Easterbrook simply made use of what was available to create the
appearance that his radical “terms later” proposition was dictated
by well-accepted contract formation principles. After all, the
shrink-wrap package did make a reference, albeit in fine print and
perhaps not actually noticed by the purchaser, to a license inside.213
Of course, to give his “terms later” proposition the appearance
of law, it was certainly easier to lay the groundwork by saying,
“Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the
software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that the
license expressly extends) may be a means of doing business
valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”214 That is what provided the
opportunity to deceptively suggest that scholarly authority and
Restatement (Second) Contracts, which rejected such a
proposition, actually supported it.215 Because as a legal realist
Easterbrook must always give an appearance of legal authority for
his legal propositions, “Notice on the outside, terms on the inside,”
is certainly more strategic that blatantly saying “terms prescribing
contract formation rules concealed from the buyer until after
purchase are binding on the buyer.” “Notice on the outside, terms
on the inside” has a nice ring to it that still conveys the impression,
along with his misstatements of law, that might persuade some
readers that “terms later” contract formation was standard legal
doctrine. And for those who might be skeptical, the significance he
apparently attached to at least a theoretical warning by the vendor
of “terms later” might allay their worst fears, persuading them that
at most this was but a half-step beyond established contract
formation doctrine, rather than a wholesale abandonment of it and
the fundamentals of assent.
By the time the Hills appeared before his court, Easterbrook
was equipped with the rule of ProCD: Vendors are permitted to
213
214

Hill v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. See also supra notes 50-57 and accompanying

text.
215

ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
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bind buyers to prescribed contract formation rules that they
conceal until after the buyer has committed to the purchase and has
paid the price.216 The reason for the rule is efficiency; what is good
for vendors is good for everyone.217
Furthermore, because buyers already know vendors are going
to do this, notice is irrelevant. If Easterbrook’s explanation of the
difficulties of conveying information about terms to consumers
lacked imagination, he demonstrated an overactive imagination in
dispensing with any need for advanced warning of objectionable
terms. He must imagine that buyers as a class make or endeavor to
make Kaldor-Hicks efficient bargains and that they thus must
know contract formation according to vendors’ concealed rules is
efficient; and that compelling buyers to discover the concealed
terms is more efficient than requiring that vendors simply disclose
them prior to purchase; and armed with that knowledge, of course
they know to expect undisclosed terms and of their duty to search
for them.218
216

But see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (explaining the
Restatement (Second) Contracts’ position on “terms later” contracting).
217
See supra note 203.
218
Thomas W. Joo, Common Sense and Contract Law: Fear of a
Normative Planet?, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1037 (2000). Joo notes:
According to the Gateway court, the Hills should have assented to the
accept-or-return device because it is efficient; therefore they
constructively did assent. Could they rebut the presumption of
majoritarian expectations with proof that they genuinely entertained
deviant expectations (i.e., unlike most folks, they do not make KaldorHicks efficient bargains)? Apparently not; the court (like most courts)
is uninterested in their subjective expectations. Enforcing a contract in
accord with the expectations of most people rewards conformist
expectations and punishes nonconformist expectations. As every good
law-and-economist knows, a judicial decision that sets majority
sentiment as the default rule today will put all tomorrow’s deviants on
notice that they should bargain around the default rule; thus future
deviants who do not explicitly contract around the default rule can be
presumed, like non-deviants, to have subjectively assented to it.
However, that theory, even if we accept it, focuses on the contractual
freedom of future parties and not on that of the Hills and their class—
who are, after all, the parties before the court. It sounds
communitarian, rather than libertarian, to sacrifice today’s litigants,
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Only with that kind of imagination can he so easily dispatch
any need for notice and create a purely artificial assent. As two
commentators have observed, however, the premise for
Easterbrook is that consumers in a transaction like that in Hill use
rationalist seriosymbolic219 reasoning in which they “engage in
deliberations and carefully consider the consequences of their
bargains. Yet in ruling against the need for notice, [Easterbrook]
dispensed with the very means by which this logical and cautious
style of thought could ensue.”220 Because consumers in
transactions like that in Hill are most likely to be engaging in
connectionist reasoning,221 they are all the more vulnerable to
deviant though they may be, to enhance the contractual liberty of future
parties.
Id. at 1047-48 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
219
Horsburgh & Cappel, supra note 5, at 1103-04.
Cognitivists have proposed two distinct types of mental architecture
that may govern the thought process. The first is that reasoning
operates by means of seriosymbolic processing, a deliberate, rule-based
method of thinking and reasoning in which information is coded into
abstract symbols that are manipulated sequentially, or in a chain of
steps, according to the formal conventions of logic and grammatical
syntax. Reasoning is thereby conceived of as the purely formal
manipulation of abstract symbols representing concepts according to a
series of logical inferences and rule-governed arrangements. . . . A key
advantage of seriosymbolic processing is that it is cognitively powerful,
inasmuch as it can apply to problems in a wide variety of situations.
Id. at 1103.
220
Id. at 1120 (emphasis added).
221
Id. at 1105-06.
[The second type] of processing system within the mind, [is] termed
“connectionist.” In a connectionist model, mental processing is
organized in a network of linked processing units, which—when
activated—”fire” in a manner analogous to neurons in the human
brain. . . . Unlike linear seriosymbolic processing, connectionist
networks are linked in parallel, which allows greater speed and
flexibility in processing inputs.
Connectionist processing can easily accomplish the sorts of cognitive
tasks that are difficult for seriosymbolic systems. In particular,
connectionist systems can account for how we acquire cultural
information, a learning skill that is so problematic for seriosymbolic
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unusual terms that are not affirmatively and pointedly called to
their attention.222
processing. In a connectionist system, we internalize implicit cultural
knowledge by observing and participating in events of daily life. The
inputs derived from these experiences and from our own reactions to
these experiences, are processed in a distinctive pattern of network
activation. As these patterns of observation and action are repeated, the
weights of the connections between activated units become
increasingly stronger, until eventually the system solidifies to the point
that we almost instantaneously comprehend a situation and how to
respond to it. . . .
Id. at 1105-06.
222
Id. at 1114-15.
Large commercial enterprises typically attempt to act as rational profit
maximizers. In keeping with this goal, processes of planning,
production, and marketing are organized along formal, deliberative
lines; indeed, such firms typically employ a wide variety of specialists
to apply deliberative expertise to the various facets of running the
business. . . . Such deliberative seriosymbolic thinking is made possible
by the fact that the seller is engaged in only a limited number of types
of sales transactions, and has the resources to employ considerable
bodies of expert knowledge.
In contrast, consumers must handle a multiple number of different
kinds of sales events encountered in daily living, and are limited to the
use of their own cognitive faculties. Consequently, they typically make
use of connectionist reasoning and build up a prototypical cultural
model of sales transactions. . . . . Recall, however, that there is a price
to pay for such cognitive efficiency. Because the kind of information
that is processed must be able to fit within pre-defined abstract
knowledge categories, there is a tendency to omit information that is
inconsistent with what is already known and to reinforce familiar
expectations. Consequently, buyers, who employ a relatively simple
cognitive model of sales transactions, are not on an equal footing with
sellers and might well overlook unusual terms in their, agreements
until a dispute arises that causes them to focus on these terms at some
later point in time. . . .
....
A different but related problem exists where the parties do not in fact
understand the commercial event in the same way, and are operating
using different cognitive systems. Because consumers are typically the
parties who are unable to fully process all aspects of an unfamiliar
transaction, more knowledgeable sellers are in the position to exploit
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Easterbrook’s suggestion that consumers know that in the box
they will find warranty and service and support information
because they know from the vendor’s advertising that such terms
are part of the deal ignores the fact that in Hill the dispute dealt
with whether an arbitration clause could be forced on the
purchasers by their retention of the computer that they had already
paid for.223 As to that matter, nothing in Gateway’s advertising or
in its other communications with the Hills had alerted them to be
on the lookout for remedy limitation terms such as arbitration, or
even more importantly to be on the lookout for a surprise
announcement, couched in legalese, that “you do not own this yet
even though you paid for it and have received it; but you will own
it subject to a lot of terms adverse to your interests if you keep it
for more than thirty days.” Justifying his conclusion with an
analogy to a clearly distinguishable set of facts is typical
Easterbrook, as one will recall from the analogies he used in
ProCD.224 He deflects attention from the actual facts of the case to
hypothetical settings in which his “terms later” rule might seem
more plausible, or at least more palatable.
Easterbrook’s speculative assertions about the way consumers
reason and what they must know suggest there is only one mode of
human reasoning.
In the mind of the judge, there is just one mode of
reasoning (seriosymbolic processing) and just one model of
human behavior: parties should be mentally prepared and
constantly on guard to protect their interests in every
bargaining situation. But it should be clear by now that this
another type of disparity: a cognitive disparity in bargaining power.
Moreover, it may be difficult (or even impossible) for consumers to
overcome this disparity by shifting their thinking in specific contractual
situations to the seriosymbolic mode, and away from the connectionist
reasoning used in most everyday transactions, especially if they are not
given adequate notice of the need to do so. For this reason, exploitation
of cognitive disparity appears to be fundamentally unfair on a deep,
cognitive level.
Id. at 1114-15 (emphasis added).
223
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997).
224
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 1996).
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is nonsense. It is simply not possible given the way our
minds really work.225
Believing that all actors engage in seriosymbolic processing is
necessary to argue that at least a trace of assent still undergirds his
“terms later” contract formation rule. But the assent for
Easterbrook is an artificial construct—this is underscored by the
progeny of ProCD/Hill.226 In an even more expansive sense than
Professor Kessler ever imagined, Easterbrook’s “terms later”
contract formation rule enables vendors to “legislate by contract
and . . . to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without
using the appearance of authoritarian forms.”227
Easterbrook purports to clothe this expansive authorization for
vendors to legislate terms in the garb of common sense. Although
he uses the word “sense” at only one point in his Hill opinion,228 he
makes several appeals to common sense to justify his “terms later”
contract formation rule. His explicit “Where is the sense of that?”
rhetorical question to the suggestion that ProCD’s holding should
be limited to software, enables him to quickly paint ProCD’s
holding broadly as a matter of contract law, while enabling him to
avoid addressing the significant factual and legal distinctions
between the two cases. The implicit answer to that rhetorical
question is that if there is controlling precedent, then follow it.229
225

Horsburgh & Cappel, supra note 5, at 1103-17 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., infra Part IV.B (providing an example of a case that has
followed ProCD in its erroneous finding of assent).
227
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943). See also Post, supra
note 5, at 1232 “Judge Frank Easterbrook is in the vanguard of those who are
actively working not just to protect a political minority from the consequences
of the democratic process, but to give that minority the power to dictate the
terms of their legal relationships.” Id. at 1233.
228
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
229
Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1140.
The Judge uses “sense” in five different ways in his opinion. The first
and the fifth ways can be described as ‘process based’ definitions that
look to case interpretation and precedent in gauging the sense of
treating ProCD as the applicable precedent. The second way can be
described as an appeal to empiricism. An act is commonsensical if it is
similar to acts in other contexts. The third and fourth ways are appeals
226
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The appeal to common sense also appears in his assertion that
“[p]ayment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for
air transportation, insurance, and many other endeavors,”
suggesting such regularity of the practice as to validate it.230
Additionally, he points out “practical considerations,” both with
respect to what vendors would need to do and what customers
would have to put up with if the rule were otherwise, and to the
“benefits” that both vendors and customers experience from
written disclosure of terms after the sale that they could not have
had with prior oral disclosure.231 That “[c]ustomers as a group are
better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as
telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return
device,” suggests that it would be nonsensical to prohibit its use.232
Presenting a “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander”
argument, Easterbrook notes that under his “terms later” rule
to practicality and economic efficiency. Something is commonsensical
if it generates positive net benefits or efficiencies. In characterizing the
Hills’ argument as non-sensical, the Judge is affirming several legal
and market based norms. The first is the norm of judicial craftsmanship
and common law rule making through precedent. The Judge, by
appealing to precedent, is asserting its naturalness as the only way of
determining a particular legal issue. Of course, the Judge also
overlooks the many ways he has to sidestep precedent to reach the
result.
Id.
230

Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149. But Professor Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1140-41,
referring to the second norm of “sense,” comments on those analogies as
follows:
The second norm is that of practice. The best measure of the right thing
to do is determining what others have done in similar situations. The
norm is similar to that of judicial craftsmanship and precedent in that it
aims at consistency. But while the first norm focuses squarely on
judicial practice, the second focuses on practice in the marketplace and
in the community. The difficult question avoided is, what is the
relevant marketplace and community? The Judge refers to air transport
and insurance and “other endeavors” without a careful parsing of the
differences among the various representative markets or communities.
Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1140-41.
231
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
232
Id.
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Gateway is bound by the warranty provision in the box, and the
Hills want the benefit of that, so it is only fair that the Hills be
bound by the contract formation terms and the arbitration term.233
The weakness of that argument is that the Hills could have had a
claim for breach of warranty without relying on the warranty
contained in the box. Under the circumstances of this purchase an
implied warranty accompanied the computer as a matter of law.234
As to the absence of notice on the outside of the box to alert
the purchaser that unusual contract formation terms are inside the
box, Easterbrook suggests it is a most natural (and thus sensible)
omission. In fact, his description suggests that absence of notice on
the outside of the box is as natural in the Hill transaction as was the
presence of a notice on the outside of the shrink-wrap in ProCD.
The difference is functional, not legal. Consumers
browsing the aisles of a store can look at the box, and if
they are unwilling to deal with the prospect of additional
terms can leave the box alone, avoiding the transactions
costs of returning the package after reviewing its contents.
Gateway’s box, by contrast, is just a shipping carton; it is
not on display anywhere. Its function is to protect the
product during transit, and the information on its sides is
for the use of handlers (“Fragile!” “This Side Up!”) rather
than would-be purchasers.235
And because the Hills “knew” there would be other terms inside
the box, no notice on the outside is of no consequence.236
Easterbrook’s “common sense” rationale for the Hill opinion
has been specifically subjected to scholarly critique, even
generating a law review symposium devoted to it.237 Because an
233

Id. at 1149-50.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1995).
235
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (symbols omitted).
236
Id.
237
See Symposium, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium, 16 TOURO
L. REV. 1037 (2000). One of the contributors to that symposium observed:
Easterbrook is a terrific writer and a good part of his strength comes
from a style that is invigorated by a “feel” for common sense. Take a
look at his diction in the [passage where Easterbrook rhetorically asks,
“Where’s the sense in that?” regarding limiting the holding of ProCD
234
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appeal to “common sense” connotes universal acceptance and
discourages counter-argument, it often provides a powerful
rhetorical cover for a position that cannot be supported by logical
argument and persuasion.238
Where legal analysis fails to illuminate Judge
Easterbrook’s reasoning, economic analysis provides an
answer. However, characterizing the Judge’s approach
either as application of a command mechanism or a
property right mechanism would miss the heart of the
opinion. The Judge is not commanding an outcome to be
enforced by monetary or other sanctions. Nor is he creating
a property right over which the parties could bargain. In
affirming ProCD, the Judge is affirming a norm that allows
the parties to create property rights through contract. Judge
Easterbrook concludes that the arbitration clause is
to software]: “sense,” “practical considerations,” “benefits,” “simple.”
This is a passage infused with connotative meanings. The sound
reinforces the sense. The totality of this passage resonates with the
rhetoric of common sense or, perhaps more accurately, resonates with
something believed by certain readers to be common sense. . . .
Easterbrook’s decision has elements of all four definitions of “common
sense.” It is similar to the first definition [(phenomenological]) in that it
lacks a certain quality of imagination. . . As for the second definition
(normal, average understanding), Easterbrook’s passage evokes a kind
of practical wisdom, the sort of sensible statement we would expect
from someone who knows chalk from cheese. Per the third definition
(the general sense of the community), the passage draws on a bit of old
fashioned communal well-being: the decision is good for customers and
good for vendors, both sides benefit and everyone should be happy.
Finally, in accord with the fourth definition (“primary truths”), the
argument seems compelling precisely because common sense bypasses
argument. It is non-deliberative, instinctive, “natural.” Easterbrook’s
passage commands truth not so much through argumentation but
through reliance on a common sense that usurps the place of
deliberation. This also discourages counter-argument, for who, after
all, can argue with common sense?
Ledwon, supra note 5, at 1074-75 (emphasis added).
238
Joo, supra note 218, at 1039. “The argument that contract law should
follow ‘common sense’ seems rather innocuous, but it often provides rhetorical
cover for unspoken normative assumptions.” Id.
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enforceable because the Hills agreed to it. In light of his
insistence on relying on ProCD and his appeal to “sense,”
the Judge’s approach can best be described as one of
seeding norms having to do with contractual transactions,
especially the norms involving the provision of
information.239
And the “seeding” of the norm is done so authoritatively.240 For
legal realists a court’s dictating of norms is not surprising.
In the absence of a superhuman normative arbiter, it is hard
to speak of normative assumptions as anything more than
fungible preferences. Knowing this, we are usually too
embarrassed to admit it when we make normative
assumptions. After all, the Realists have taught us well that
the winners among such preferences triumph, not from
logical or “legal” processes, but from sheer political power.
This, I suppose, helps to explain why secularists find such
comfort in evidence that our preferred normative schemes
are consistent with human behavior. The state’s imposition
of norm X, though by its very nature an exercise of power,
is a relatively harmless one when its net result is pretty
much what people would have done on their own
anyway.241
As demonstrated by the extensive scholarly critique, the
normative assumptions Easterbrook makes in ProCD and Hill do
not simply reflect “common sense;” they attempt to create it.242
“Easterbrook is not describing what ‘is’, he is describing what
‘ought to be.’”243 As Professor Leff appropriately noted,
“[n]ormative preferences are just that; they don’t get any more
proved by being talked about.”244 Thus when one merely expresses
239

Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1134 (emphasis added).
See supra note 211.
241
Joo, supra note 218, at 1049-50.
242
Post, supra note 5, at 1229.
243
Id.
244
Arthur Allen Leff, Commentary on Richard A. Posner’s ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 477
(1974).
240
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his normative preferences in a book, they have no coercive impact;
they are nothing more than ideas that one can accept or not as he
chooses. But when one in a position of power imposes his
normative preference on the basis of a distorted “creation” of
“common sense,” then even legal realists would be hard pressed to
pass off such exercise of power as merely “a relatively harmless
one.”
The norm Easterbrook prescribes has serious consequences for
Zeidenberg and for the Hills. It defrocks consumers of their
reasonable assumptions about contract formation and jettisons the
fundamental common law and statutory rules that had embodied
and protected those assumptions. Although the scholarly critique
of Easterbrook’s assumptions about “common sense” in ProCD
and expanded upon in Hill is powerful, the silliness of his
assumptions is perhaps most powerfully demonstrated by the
pejorative treatment they receive as the butt of “Dilbert” cartoon
humor.245
245

Stephen Y. Chow, Contracting in Cyberspace: The Triumph of Forms?,
41 BOSTON B. J. 16 (1997).
John Adams’s “Dilbert” remarked recently: “I didn’t read all of the
shrink wrap license agreement on my new software until after I opened
it. Apparently I agreed to spend the rest of my life as a towel boy in Bill
Gates’ new mansion.” The scenario is a not-too-absurd extension of a
commercial law trend towards enforcement of all terms in a form
“contract,” as exemplified by the recent ProCD and Gateway 2000
decisions by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, as well
as by a proposed new Article 2B (Licenses) of the Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”).
Id. (citations omitted); see also Macaulay, Relational Contracts, supra note 22,
at 777 n.17.
Dilbert’s subversive messages are taped and pinned up in many
business offices as a way of commenting on the absurdity of office
work in the 1990s. In Dilbert those who know things are powerless;
those who know nothing run corporations. From time to time Scott
Adams, who draws Dilbert, deals with matters of interest to contracts
teachers. Two of my favorites involve contracts created by the magic of
tearing the shrinkwrap on packages of computer software. In a cartoon
dated Jan. 14, 1997, Dilbert is talking to Dogbert. He says, “I didn’t
read all of the shrink-wrap license agreement on my new software until
after I opened it.” He continues in the next panel: “Apparently I agreed
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2. Hill and ProCD as Examples of Legal Realism in Operation
Such humorous ridicule of the absurdity of a decision is
significant. It indicates the disdain for law that such absurdity
engenders.246 To the extent that even those outside the legal
community recognize that these decisions are nothing more than an
arrogant exercise of power, they present a potentially very serious
challenge for legal realism. If no standard exists, for validation of
law higher than the decision-makers themselves expands beyond
the legal elite to the rest of society (who read “Dilbert”), the
implications for instability of “law” become more ominous. “Why
should the public believe the decision makers have made the right
decisions, or even that they have authority to do so?”247
to spend the rest of my life as a towel boy in Bill Gates’ new mansion.”
Dogbert says, “Call your lawyer.” In the next panel, Dilbert says, “Too
late. He opened software yesterday. Now he’s Bill’s laundry boy.”
Dogbert responds: “It must be dangerous for lawyers to iron pants.
They’d always have one hand in a pocket.” In another dated April 7,
1997, Dilbert reads: “Software License: By opening this package, you
agree . . . .” In the next panel, the license terms continue: “[Y]ou will
not make copies or export to despotic nations. You will submit to strip
searches in your home . . . .” In the next panel, Dilbert opens the
package. An employee of the software company is pulling on a rubber
glove and says, “Frankly, both of us would have been happier if you
had just walked away.” Purchasers of software can sign a petition
calling
for
warranty
protection
at
<http://
www.zdnet.com/anchordesk/smbg/ index.html>. Somehow, signing a
petition on the web hardly seems like the revolution people talked
about at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the 1960s.
Id.; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping And Slouching Toward
Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation And The Decline Of Consent, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1381, 1383 n.6 (1996).
246
At the very least it appears to reflect the thought expressed by the
Dickens character, Mr. Brumble, “If the law supposes that, . . . the law is a ass, a
idiot.” See CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 354 (Kathleen Tillotson ed.
1966)..
247
Roger Bern, A Biblical Model for Analysis of Issues of Law and Public
Policy: With Illustrative Applications to Contracts, Antitrust, Remedies and
Public Policy Issues, 6 REGENT U. L. REV. 103, 106 (1995); see also HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 39 (1983). In his ABA-award winning book, Berman identifies what
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This was the very problem identified by Harvard Law School
Dean Roscoe Pound in 1922, when he acknowledged:
From the time when lawgivers gave over the attempt to
maintain the general security by belief that particular
bodies of human law had been divinely dictated or divinely
revealed or divinely sanctioned, they have had to wrestle
with the problem of proving to mankind that the law was
something fixed and settled, whose authority was beyond
question, while at the same time enabling it to make
constant readjustments and occasional radical changes
under the pressure of infinite and variable human desires.
248

In Hill, Easterbrook’s treats the facts of the case and the Hills as
mere fodder providing the occasion to impose his economic theory.
It appears that by the time he reaches Hill, his sense of power has
come to the point where he no longer even wrestles with the
problem of how to make his decision appear to be adjudicating the
dispute at hand. 249 He is creating policy because he is in a position
he terms the “crisis of the Western legal tradition”:
The crisis of the Western legal tradition is not merely a crisis in legal
philosophy but also a crisis in law itself . . . [A]s a matter of historical
fact the legal systems of all the nations that are heirs to the Western
legal tradition have been rooted in certain beliefs or postulates: that is,
the legal systems themselves have presupposed the validity of those
beliefs. Today those beliefs or postulates—such as the structural
integrity of law, its ongoingness, its religious roots, its transcendent
qualities—are rapidly disappearing, not only from the minds of
philosophers, not only from the minds of lawmakers, judges, lawyers,
law teachers, and other members of the legal profession, but from the
consciousness of the vast majority of citizens, the people as a whole;
and more than that, they are disappearing from the law itself . . . Thus
the historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being washed away
in the twentieth century, and the tradition itself is threatened with
collapse.
Id. (emphasis added).
248
ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3
(revised ed., 7th printing, 1965).
249
Joo, supra note 218, at 1039-42, 1045.
The court attempts to show that the Hills knew that the telephone
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of power to do so. Justice, or even perceived justice, in a given
dispute between real parties is, at most, a secondary concern.
As a policy-maker operating from an ex ante perspective,
Easterbrook must be forward looking, not backward looking to the
facts of the dispute presented. It matters not that the Hills, and
perhaps even Gateway, had no idea at the time of their transaction
that it would be governed by a new set of rules.250 Although his
conversation did not constitute a contract. Of course, it does not argue
that the Hills were familiar with the ProCD rule. Nonetheless,
according to the court, “the Hills knew before they ordered the
computer that the carton would contain some important terms, and they
did not seek to discover these in advance.” The court apparently does
not mean that the Hills actually knew this, but rather that they should
have inferred it from Gateway’s advertisement . . . [B]ecause
Gateway’s ads mention warranties and product support, the Hills
should have surmised that their purchase could be subject to any
number of other additional terms not mentioned in the ads or by the
telephone agent. It was up to the Hills to ask the agent about
undisclosed terms . . . The court implies that contract formation and
terms are based on whether they make “sense” and not on whether they
are actually assented to; and, further, that the Hills, as reasonable
buyers, should have known this. There is no finding that the Hills
actually knew that efficiency required the telephone clerks to omit
important terms, that they knew that a judicial analysis of contract
formation would rely on a principle of wealth maximization rather than
on the Hills’ own manifestations of assent, or that the Hills based their
contracting choices on long-term wealth maximization rather than on
short-term rent-seeking considerations . . . One reason the Hills “knew”
that additional terms would be in the box was that, according to the
court, such was the more efficient practice. Thus it is unnecessary to
examine assent directly. Because freedom of contract results in efficient
terms, efficiency and assent are effectively collapsed into a single
inquiry . . . The Gateway opinion refers to the Hills by name, but the
decision is really not about their individual assent; it about the
hypothetical rational assent of a hypothetical rational
plaintiff . . .[A]lthough Rich and Enza Hill are very real people, “the
Hills” of Hill v. Gateway, and their “subjective assent,” are no more
than metaphorical constructs.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
250
Id. at 1047-48.
As every good law-and-economist knows, a judicial decision that sets
majority sentiment [as stated by the court] as the default rule today will
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status is described as that of judge, his role is not judging with a
goal of achieving justice in an individual case. It is a purely
utilitarian policy-creating role to impose a rule that, according to
his economic theory, will be good for society. If the parties before
him find themselves to be the objects of an ex post facto rule, so be
it.
Hill, even more than ProCD, exposes the theoretical
bankruptcy of the current legal system, grounded as it is upon a
jurisprudence of legal realism. Hill presents an even better
illustration than does ProCD of the truth expressed by Critical
Legal Studies theorists that there is no longer law, only power.251 It
put all tomorrow’s deviants on notice that they should bargain around
the default rule; thus future deviants who do not explicitly contract
around the default rule can be presumed, like non-deviants, to have
subjectively assented to it. However, that theory, even if we accept it,
focuses on the contractual freedom of future parties and not on that of
the Hills and their class—who are, after all, the parties before the
court. It sounds communitarian, rather than libertarian, to sacrifice
today’s litigants, deviant though they may be, to enhance the
contractual liberty of future parties.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
251
UNGER, supra note 177, at 83, 131-32, 169-81. Noting the contemporary
rejection of both a Creator God and a created order which reflects regularities in
nature and social life according to a divine plan, Unger asks: “What happens
when the positive rules of the state lose all touch with a higher law and come to
be seen as nothing more that the outcomes of a power struggle? Can the ideals
of autonomy and generality in law survive the demise of the religious beliefs
that presided over their birth?” Id. at 83. He notes that when the mentality of
viewing nature and society “as expressions of a sacred order, and thus selfsubsisting if not self-generating, and independent of the human will,” was
replaced with a new consciousness that viewed the social order as something
“that could and indeed had to be devised rather than just accepted ready-made,”
certain consequences were unavoidable. Id. at 130. One was “to bring out the
conventional and contingent character of every form of social hierarchy so that
the exercise of power had to be justified in new and more explicit ways.” Id. at
129-31. “But whose will was to replace nature as the source of social order?
Because the crisis was bound up with ever widening disparities among social
ranks, the source had to be the will of the rulers . . . .” Id. at 132. Unger notes
that the recognition that the social order is merely the reflection of decisions of
those in power “ends in the conviction that they are based upon the naked acts
of will by which people choose among conflicting ultimate values.” Id. at 169.
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smacks of unchecked and arbitrary exercise of power and of a
lawlessness foreign to the principles upon which the nation was
founded. This cannot go unnoticed by the public, especially when
so many consumers will experience its effect.252 That obviously
does not bode well for legal realism or a “legal” system grounded
252

Bern, supra note 247, at 106 n.16.
Critical Legal Studies’ open assessment that contemporary “law” is
without legitimate foundation reminds one of the candid observation of
the little child in HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE
EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES (1949). While all others observing the
procession pretended they saw beautiful new clothes on the Emperor,
lest they be thought stupid, the little boy spoke reality; “But the
Emperor has nothing on at all!” To carry the parallel a step further,
perhaps the folk tale also suggests the answer to Pound’s question
whether the legal elite would be able to keep the rest of society
convinced that contemporary “law” is fixed, settled, and its authority
beyond question, when it is not. “What the child said was whispered
from one to another, until everyone knew. And they all cried out
together, ‘HE HAS NOTHING ON AT ALL!’”
Id. (internal page references omitted). See also Calvin Woodard, The Limits of
Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968), reprinted
in HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL
EDUCATION, 329 (1972). Professor Woodard, reflecting on the decline of the
mysterious in law, observes:
Modern man, no longer sub deo et sub legi, feels himself morally free
of the demands of externally imposed law that clash with his own
innermost convictions. Predictably, the result is a generation of law
teachers who find it difficult to believe—by this I mean profoundly
believe—in the existence of law beyond what fallible courts say it is; a
generation of law students who consequently do not learn to be
restrained in any essential way by the law; and a generation of laymen
who are markedly uninhibited by, and indeed contemptuous of, the
sanctions of law. . . .[D]oes the functional approach not teach all
manner of men to look to law as an instrument for their private or
personal disposal? Surely no ‘social problem’ could be more critical, or
chronic, as that of people regarding law first as a means of gratifying
their own wants, and only incidentally as imposing upon them
responsibilities towards their fellow men and their society. The appeal
to a “Rule of Law” under such circumstances is rather pathetic and
almost hopeless.
Id. at 378-79.
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upon it.
II. BAD ECONOMICS
Easterbrook’s ProCD/Hill “terms later” is not only bad law—it
is dreadful economics. “Traditional economics is powerful
precisely because it rests on the simplest possible axioms about
how people behave.”253 In a bargaining transaction one can expect
that each party will choose a strategy that advances its own
interests under the circumstances that exist.254 Information is
important, “playing a crucial role in the way individuals
interact.”255 “[W]henever one party possesses private nonverifiable
information, there is a potential for inefficient outcomes, even
when parties can negotiate with each other.”256 The private gain to
one party from hiding information may induce that party to behave
in a way that, though privately beneficial, is not socially
optimal.”257 Easterbrook’s ProCD/Hill “terms later” rule ignores
human nature and these economic realities. It is based upon a
surreal bargaining setting created by an artificial attribution of
knowledge and bargaining behavior to consumers. It also ignores
253

Douglas G. Baird, Game Theory, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 192, 192 (Peter Newman ed., Macmillan
Reference Ltd. 1998).
254
Id.
A player will choose a strictly dominant strategy [the best choice for
that player] whenever possible and will not choose any strategy that is
strictly dominated by another. Few people would take issue with the
idea that individuals are likely to choose a strategy when then they can
always do better in their own eyes choosing that strategy than by
choosing any other.
Id.
255
Id. at 195.
256
Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 J. OF ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 113, 115 (1987) “[A] large literature has developed on ‘noncooperative’ models of bargaining, formalizing the process of offers and
counteroffers that we see in real transactions. The main conclusion of these
models . . . is that bargaining is typically inefficient when, as is likely, each
bargainer knows something relevant that the other does not. . . .” Id.
257
Baird, supra note 253, at 196.
OF
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yet another significant economic reality: transaction costs.258 A
search by consumers for hidden terms is not a costless one.
Law and economics is supposed to be able to predict and thus
produce good policy for society, giving the supposed justification
for courts operating from an ex ante perspective informed by
economic reality to create policy.259 Easterbrook should thus have
been able to predict that his “terms later” rule and creation of a
new method of contract formation would increase information
asymmetry, increase transaction costs, enhance hold-up260 or
opportunistic behavior by vendors,261 and result in inefficiencies as
258

David de Meza, Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 274, 274-75 (Peter Newman ed., Macmillan
Reference Ltd. 1998).
259
See Ogus, supra note 59.
260
Benjamin Klein, Hold-Up Problem, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241, 241 (Peter Newman ed.,
Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998). “A hold-up occurs only when a transactor,
taking these future effects into account, decides it is wealth-maximizing to take
advantage of contractual incompleteness to expropriate the rents on the specific
investments made by its transacting partner.” Id. Klein identifies three factors
that are necessary for the occurrence of a hold-up: (1) the victim’s investment
must be specific to the circumstances enabling the other party to do the hold-up;
(2) the contract governing the relationship between the parties must be
incomplete in the sense that it did not preclude the opportunity for the hold-up;
(3) the one engaging in the hold-up must find it profitable to do so. Id. He notes
that his view of hold-up does not necessarily carry the “unsavory” features of
lying, stealing, cheating, and more subtle forms of deceit such as incomplete or
distorted disclosure of information that some writers associate with the term
“opportunism;” but rather may be more often be merely the result of specific
investment, incomplete contracts and unanticipated events. Id. at 244. Thus
although in layman’s terms “hold-up” may connote something more
reprehensible and blameworthy than does the term “opportunistic behavior,” in
the economic literature the former is considered to be the more benign of the
terms.
261
Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunistic Behavior in Contracts, in 2 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 703-709, (Peter
Newman ed., Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998). Williamson notes:
Opportunism is a type of self-interest seeking and may be contrasted
both with stewardship (unself-interest seeking) and with simple selfinterest seeking (look to your interests but keep all of your promises).
Opportunism contemplates self-interest seeking with guile – to include
OF

BERNMACRO2.DOC

718

4/23/2004 1:12 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

well as distributional unfairness by systematically redistributing
wealth from consumers to vendors.
A. Information Asymmetry and Bounded Rationality
In bargaining, information asymmetry—the imbalance of
information known to the parties—is typical.262 If costs for
searching for information were zero, a purely rational actor
contemplating a decision would make a comprehensive search for
relevant information.263 But searches entail costs “in the form of
time, energy and perhaps money.”264 Further, even if an actor were
to incur the search costs and thus acquire all of the information
the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise
confuse.
Id. at 703 (emphasis added). Williamson also notes that: “[O]pportunism in
contracts is not a free-standing concept but requires, additionally, that bounded
rationality and transaction attributes be introduced.” Id. at 704. He identifies a
number of examples of “asset-specificity” transaction attributes that can give
rise to bilateral dependency and thus the opportunity for abuse. Id. at 707. All
have in common the following: “[T]he faceless contracting, out of which
orthodox economics works, gives way to contracting in which the pairwise
identity of the parties matters.” Id. In the context of “terms later” offers, the
situation is loaded with “transaction attributes.” It does matter that the buyer has
made a specific investment in the form of full payment and has even begun
enjoying the benefit of the goods before becoming aware the adverse terms
proposed, and that the “offeror” will get the benefit of the adverse terms unless
the buyer promptly returns the goods, relinquishing all rights he thought he had
already obtained in them. Unlike in a “faceless transaction” in which a
hypothetical offeror offers to sell goods subject to terms adverse to a
hypothetical offeree who will decide whether to affirmatively accept based on
the pure merits of the offer, uninfluenced by any “transactional attributes,” in the
“terms later” setting the “transactional attributes” will powerfully influence the
offeree’s decision.
262
Farrell, supra note 256, at 115 (explaining the inefficiency of the
bargaining process when participants possess an unequal level of relevant
knowledge).
263
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Cognition and Contract, in 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 282, 282 (Peter Newman
ed., Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998).
264
Id.
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relevant to a transaction, because human information processing
(evaluating and deliberating on information) is imperfect, he will
often imperfectly process it.265 It appears that both ProCD and
Gateway were aware of these economic realities and that they
respectively used them to their advantage in crafting their “terms
later” contract formation strategy. They reflect the reality that,
unlike the hypothetical rational actor that Easterbrook imagines,
“human rationality is normally bounded by limited information and
limited information processing.”266
Commenting on the concept of bounded rationality, Professor
Eisenberg observes:
That actors limit search and processing does not necessarily
mean that they fail to rationally maximize their total utility
in making decisions. An actor’s total utility from a decision
depends not only on the substantive merits of the decision,
but also on the costs of the decision-making procedure.
Limits on search and processing costs may maximize an
actor’s overall utility, because the utility gain from
substituting a lower cost of limited search and processing
may offset the utility shortfall from substituting a
satisfactory decision for an optimal decision. However,
even if actors follow the model of optimal decision-making
procedure, so that their ignorance of undiscovered
alternatives and consequences is rational, their calculations
concerning the alternatives and consequences they do
consider may not be rational.267
Elaborating on that latter point, Eisenberg identifies two bodies of
empirical evidence showing “that under certain circumstances
actors are often systematically irrational; that is, that they often fail
to make rational decisions even within the bounds of the

265

Id.
Id. “Most actors either don’t want to expend the resources required for
comprehensive search and processing or recognize that comprehensive search
and processing would not be achievable at any realistic cost.” Id. In this sense,
an actor’s decision to limit search can be characterized as one of “rational
ignorance.” Id. at 282-83.
267
Id. at 283 (emphasis added).
266
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information they have acquired.”268 The first body of empirical
evidence concerns “disposition,” showing that “as a systematic
matter, people are unrealistically optimistic.”269 The second body
of empirical evidence concerns “defective capability.”270 “Just as
defects in disposition systematically tilt actors’ judgments toward
optimism, so defects in capability systematically distort the way
actors search for, process, and weigh information and
scenarios.”271 Defects in capability refer to what “cognitive
psychology has established [with respect to] certain decisionmaking rules (heuristics) that real people use and that yield
systematic errors.”272 Four such defects in capability are
particularly relevant to contract law. They are defects associated
with the heuristics known as availability,273 representativeness,274
268

Id.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Cognition and Contract, in 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 282, 283 (Peter Newman
ed., Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998).
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id. at 284.
When an actor must make a decision that requires a judgment about the
probability of an event, he commonly judges that probability on the
basis of comparable data and scenarios that are readily available to his
memory or imagination. This heuristic leads to systematic biases
because factors other than objective frequency and probability affect
the salience of data and scenarios and therefore affect the ease with
which an actor imagines a scenario or retrieves data from memory . . .
The availability heuristic concerns the manner in which actors bring
acquired data to mind and imagine future scenarios.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
274
Eisenberg, supra note 269, at 283.
The representativeness heuristic “concerns the manner of making
judgments concerning the adequacy of search. As the concept of
bounded rationality implies, actors seldom collect all relevant data
before making decisions. Rather, they usually make decisions on the
basis of some subset of the data, which they judge to be representative.
In making that judgment, however, actors systematically and
erroneously view unduly small samples as representative.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
269
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defective telescopic faculties,275 and defective risk-assessment
faculties.276
Eisenberg insightfully notes how closely related and interactive
the defects in cognition are and their link to bounded rationality.277
His examination of cognition and contract, written prior to ProCD,
assessed the combined impact of bounded rationality and cognitive
defects in the context of standard form contracts presented to
buyers prior to or at the time of their purchase decision.278 The
combined effect of those factors is to produce a setting in which
275

Id. “[The faulty telescopic faculties type] concerns the ability of actors
to make rational comparisons between present and future states. Actors
systematically give too little weight to future benefits and costs as compared to
present benefits and costs.” Id. This defect and the following one, faulty riskestimation faculties, are exemplified in the observations concerning
“endowment effect,” “status quo effect,” and “loss aversion,” infra at notes 27781 and 282-85 and accompanying text.
276
Id. at 284. The empirical evidence “strongly suggests that actors
systematically underestimate most risks, including low-probability risks of
economic losses.” Id. at 285.
277
Id. at 285.
The defects in cognition are closely related and interactive. For
example, actors may underweigh future costs in part because the future
involves a great number of risks, and actors underestimate risks, and in
part because the present is vivid, concrete, and instantiated, while the
future is pallid, abstract, and general. Conversely, actors may
underestimate risks in part because risks are often pallid, abstract, and
general, and in part because risks relate to the future, and actors give
too little weight to future costs.
These defects in cognition are also closely related to and interact
with the dispositional problem of unrealistic optimism: If actors are
unrealistically optimistic, they will systematically underestimate risks.
If actors systematically underestimate risks, they will be unrealistically
optimistic.
Finally, these defects in cognition are closely tied to bounded
rationality. Availability and representativeness, for instance, would not
even come into play if search and processing were unbounded. Only
where actors rely on selective, incomplete information does undue
emphasis on available and unrepresentative data pose a problem.
Id.
278

Id. at 287-88.
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consumers are very vulnerable to being overreached by sellers and
sellers are tempted to act opportunistically.279 In this setting, the
preprinted terms are typically nonperformance terms in the sense
that they relate to the future and concern low-probability risks.280
For that reason, all of the cognitive problems of bounded
rationality, optimistic disposition, systematic underestimating of
risk, and undue weight on the present as compared with the future
are implicated.281 Optimistic disposition and systematic
underestimating of risk, for example, will prompt a consumer to tilt
toward believing the product will perform well, and that even if it
might not, that danger is slight, so any remedy limitation is likely
to never pose a problem. Visually experiencing the highly touted
product enhances the natural tendency to give more weight to
favorable present experience than to potential future problems that
could emerge from the purchase.
Compounding those cognitive problems in the setting of
preprinted terms is the “the phenomenon of rational ignorance
[that] plays a particularly powerful role, because of the high
disincentives for the consumer to engage in a serious search
effort.”282
279

Eisenberg, supra note 269, at 287.
Id.
281
Id. at 287.
282
Id.
A form-giver typically offers a package consisting of a physical
commodity and a form contract that states the terms on which the
commodity is sold. Each part of the package, in turn, consists of a
number of subparts. The physical commodity has physical attributes,
such as size, shape and colour. The form contract has the business and
legal attributes, such as price, quantity, and limitations on remedies.
280

To make an optimum substantive decision, the form-taker would, at a
minimum, carefully deliberate on the legal attributes of all the form
contracts that are coupled with the physical commodities he is
considering. Analysing legal attributes in this manner, however, will
often be unduly costly. First, a form contract often contains a very large
number of legal terms. . . . Moreover, the meaning and effect of the
preprinted provisions will very often be inaccessible to nonlawyers. In
part, this is because the terms are often written in exceedingly technical
prose. Even if the terms are written clearly, however, the form-taker
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Eisenberg concludes that Restatement (Second) of Contracts
section 211, and UCC section 2-207, the respective common law
and statutory responses that protect against imposition of
preprinted terms, rest ultimately on the limits of cognition.283
Under the former, “preprinted terms will not be enforced if the
form-giver had reason to know the form-taker would not expect the
term to be included in the contract.”284 Under the latter, a contract
for the sale of goods will be formed by a response to an offer that
appears to be an acceptance even though its preprinted terms do
not mirror those of the offer, thus eliminating the pre-Code lastshot rule and the “unilateral trick” that it invited.285
The vulnerability of consumers to overreaching and the
temptation of sellers to act opportunistically are magnified
dramatically in the context of a “terms later” rule where the
standard terms are not disclosed until after the purchase decision
usually will be unable fully to understand their effects, because
preprinted terms characteristically vary the form-taker’s baseline legal
rights, and nonlawyers often do not know their baseline legal rights.
If all that were not enough, most form contracts are tendered by
agents who have no authority to vary the preprinted terms, so that
deliberating on those terms will often be pointless. Furthermore, formtakers often encounter form contracts under circumstances that
encourage them to exert only minimal effort to understand the
preprinted terms. . . .
The bottom line is simple. The verbal and legal obscurity of
preprinted terms renders the cost of searching out and deliberating on
these terms exceptionally high. . . . [So] a rational form-taker will
typically decide to remain ignorant of the preprinted terms. . . .
For the form-taker, any given contract term may be a one-shot
transaction. . . . For the form-giver, however, a form contract is a high
volume, repeat transaction. Thus a rational form-giver will spend a
significant amount of time and money, including money for legal
advice, to prepare a form contract that is optimal from his perspective.
These asymmetrical incentives almost always work to slant form
contracts heavily in favour of form-givers.
Id. (emphasis added).
283
Id. at 288.
284
Id.
285
Id.
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and payment have been made, and when, under the Hill version of
the rule, the disclosure is strategically made in a manner calculated
to minimize actual awareness of the terms by the purchaser. While
inclination to search with respect to preprinted terms presented
prior to or at the time of the purchase decision is small for the
reasons noted by Eisenberg, it virtually vanishes when the terms
are held back until after the purchase decision has been made and
the purchaser has parted with his money.
Writing even before ProCD/Hill created a rule imposing a
search duty on buyers for their self-defense against terms that
reduced the value of their purchases, Professor Shavell concluded,
“[w]hen information has no social value [i.e., cannot lead to an
increase in value], acquisition of information after sale has no
relevance: no buyer would rationally engage in costly acquisition
of information after making a purchase if it could not be used to
raise the value of his good.”286 And all of the other cognitive
defects of optimistic disposition, systematic underestimating of
risk, and undue weight on the present as compared with the future
are also dramatically magnified by the double-pronged tactic of
parting the purchaser from his money and placing the goods into
his hands prior to disclosure. That tactic enhances the vulnerability
already inherent in those defects by adding to them the “loss
aversion” principle that is manifested in the “endowment effect”
and the “status quo bias.”287 All combine to make it most unlikely
that a purchaser will send the goods back even if he actually timely
gains knowledge of objectionable terms.
B. Loss Aversion, Endowment Effect, and Status Quo Bias
“Loss aversion” is the term given an asymmetry of value such
that “the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility
associated with acquiring it.”288 One of its manifestations is the
286

Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale,
25 RAND J. ECON. 20, 35 (1994).
287
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies:
The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
193 (1991).
288
Id. at 193-94 (1991). “One implication of loss aversion is that
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“endowment effect,” a term that describes the “fact that people
often demand much more to give up an object than they would be
willing to pay to acquire it.”289 Those who have conducted
experiments with respect to the matter have concluded that “the
main effect of endowment is not to enhance the appeal of the good
one owns, only the pain of giving it up.”290
Another outworking of loss aversion is “status quo bias,” the
term used to describe “a preference for the current state that biases
[a person who has purchased an item] against both buying and
selling [it].”291 The authors who have studied these effects
conclude:
A central conclusion of the study of risky choice has been
that such choices are best explained by assuming that the
significant carriers of utility are not states of wealth or
welfare, but changes relative to a neutral reference point.
Another central result is that changes that make things
worse (losses) loom larger than improvements or gains.292
In the context of a Hill setting, the implications are clear. Once
the purchaser has the computer in hand, even if he knows of the
objectionable terms in time to resist them, he is most unlikely to do
so. The downside of parting with “his computer” (including the
hassle of getting it back into the box and shipping it back), along
with the need to begin a search for its replacement, loom much
larger than the possible upside of averting potential remedial
limitations he may face if by chance the thing does not function
properly. “Foregone gains are less painful than perceived
losses.”293
Additionally, loss aversion reflected in the asymmetry between
the willingness to voluntarily accept a new risk in contrast to
merely failing to eliminate an existing one, and its impact on

individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because the
disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages.” Id. at 197-98.
289
Id. at 194.
290
Id. at 197.
291
Id. at 194.
292
Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
293
Kahnemann, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 287, at 203.
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judgments about responsibility, has been confirmed by
psychological research.294 Examination of studies exploring this
matter shows that “[this] asymmetry affects both blame and regret
after a mishap, and the anticipation of blame and regret, in turn,
could affect behavior.”295 They note that even Justice Holmes
showed an understanding of that point, albeit in other than
sophisticated psychological or economic terms, when he observed:
It is in the nature of a man’s mind. A thing which you
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether
property or opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be
torn away without your resenting the act and trying to
defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask
no better justification than the deepest instincts of man.296
That reality and its implication for the law appear to have
escaped Easterbrook. It obviously did not escape ProCD or
Gateway, who well appreciated the psychological power that
completing the sale and placing the product in a buyer’s hands
would have on the buyer’s likely response to the subsequent
disclosure of objectionable terms. The effort to justify the wisdom
of the basic purchase and thus to avoid having to admit being
tricked as to the deal’s real value, when coupled with the other
cognitive defects, the inconveniences connected with return, and
the cost of search for a replacement, undermines the supposed
efficiency of the transaction and benefits for producers and
consumers.
C. Silent Acceptance Not Supported by Economics: Professor
Katz’s Model
Because the preprinted terms under the ProCD/Hill “terms
later” rule do not relate merely to substantive entitlements, but
rather to the very mechanics of contract formation, they implicate
rules that “are from an economic point of view theoretically prior
294

Id. at 202.
Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
296
Id. at 204 (quoting from Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 728 (1897)).
295
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to all other legal rules.”297 Professor Katz underscores the
fundamental economic importance of legal rules of contract
formation in the context of his article addressing the issue of
“silent-acceptance.” Written prior to ProCD, it analyzes the silentacceptance issue in its traditional setting, in which an offeror
announces in advance of payment by the offeree that silence by the
offeree in the face of the offer will constitute acceptance of the
terms of the offer. The common law, however, has not
countenanced forcing silence as acceptance except in very limited
circumstances.298 Katz concludes that the common law rule
297

Avery Katz, Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange:
When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer be Construed as Acceptance?, 9 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 77, 77 (1993).
298
Id. The limited circumstances in which offerees have been held bound
by silent-acceptance are those described in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 69, and in section 2-207(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code
with respect to transactions between merchants in which proposals for addition
to a contract do not materially alter the contract previously formed. Id. The
former provides:
§ 69. Acceptance by Silence or Exercise of Dominion. (1) Where an
offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate as an
acceptance in the following cases only: (a) Where an offeree takes the
benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them
and reason to know they were offered with the expectation of
compensation. (b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree
reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or
inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to
accept the offer. (c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it
is reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does not
intend to accept. (2) An offeree who does any act inconsistent with the
offeror’s ownership of offered property is bound in accordance with the
offered terms unless they are manifestly unreasonable. But if the act is
wrongful against the offeror it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
Id. at 91 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69). Katz notes that
the § 69(2) category is in fact acceptance by conduct, rather than acceptance by
silence. But the kind of conduct from an economic point of view that triggers it
is incurring some cost or effort “in order to accept, instead of incurring cost to
avoid accepting.” Id. at 91. It, like the exception for taking the benefit of
services under § 69(1)(a), also “reflects the principle of restitution.” Id. at 91.
Neither of those exceptions is implicated by failure to affirmatively reject a
“terms later” “offer.” Mere failure to affirmatively reject would not trigger an
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requiring, in all but the few identified special instances, the
recipient of an offer to respond affirmatively before he is legally
bound is efficient and is also distributionally fair.299 His insightful
economic analysis of the common law rule, its efficiencies and
distributional equities, and of the inefficiencies and distributional
inequities that would result from a contrary rule, applies with even
more force to the “terms later” contract formation rule of
ProCD/Hill.
Katz acknowledges that the offeror is master of the offer, but,
unlike Easterbrook, he recognizes the qualification that the law, for
very good reasons, has put on that concept. He observes:
Under the common law rule, the person who proposes an
exchange has substantial control over the course of
bargaining—a fact captured by the maxim that “the offeror
is master of the offer.” The traditional justification for this
result is the principle of freedom of contract. An offer, by
its terms, defines the proposed contract in form as well as
content. In order to have freedom to choose the terms on
which she is willing to enter into exchange, the offeror
must have power to specify what kind of response counts as
an acceptance. For instance, an offeror would ordinarily be
free to require that acceptance take place by a certain date
or be communicated by a particular medium.
If this logic were taken to the extreme, the offeror could
provide that the offeree need do nothing at all in order to
accept. For instance, a seller of goods could send a letter
acceptance under the former. Nor could it be said that a buyer is unjustly
enriched by retaining goods for which he had paid the full price extracted by the
seller on a basis that did not include the value-detracting “terms later.”§ 2207(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract. Between merchants such become part of the contract
unless: (a) the offeror expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them
has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received.
Id. at 95 (quoting UCC § 2-207(2)).
299
Id at 97.

BERNMACRO2.DOC

4/23/2004 1:12 PM

“TERMS LATER” CONTRACTING

729

announcing that a shipment of merchandise will be sent
unless the recipient objects. Or, the seller could make
acceptance arise not from inaction, but from some
affirmative action that the offeree would have taken
anyway. There are several good reasons for the seller to do
this. For offers that the buyer would accept anyway, the
trouble of the extra communication is saved. If the goods
are shipped along with the offer, the buyer can enjoy their
use at an earlier time. And putting them in front of the buyer
may be an effective way to increase his desire for them.
On the other hand, such offers raise the potential for rent
seeking, since any increase in the seller’s profits comes in
part at the buyer’s expense. The buyer may be induced by
the trouble of responding to accept an offer he would not
otherwise entertain. And buyers who reject must pay a cost
to do so. The principle of freedom of contract is an
inconclusive criterion for such a case, accordingly, since
the seller’s freedom to enter into the exchange only on such
terms as she is willing is incompatible with a similar
freedom for the buyer.
In general, the offeror’s control over the offer gives way
to the offeree’s right to be let alone. . . .300
Katz evaluates the consequences of the common law rule
requiring affirmative acceptance of an offer before the offeree is
bound and a silent-acceptance rule under which the offeree is
bound unless he affirmatively rejects. His economic model
assumes conditions of perfect information, and thus, unlike the rule
of ProCD/Hill, eliminates the opportunity for the offeror to
conceal important information prior to payment by the offeree.
Thus, any tendency under his model for the offeror to engage in
rent seeking behavior, and its resulting inefficiencies and
distributional inequities, will pale in comparison with the
predictable rent seeking behavior and resulting inefficiencies and
distributional inequities invited and encouraged by the rule of
ProCD/Hill. He demonstrates that a silent-acceptance rule, where
300

Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
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the buyer must expressly reject to prevent contract formation,
effectively “converts the buyer’s response cost into an appropriable
rent. In contrast, the common-law rule prevents this forced
redistribution, and ensures that both parties share in the surplus
when there is an exchange.”301 That was the result even with his
model’s assumption that the buyer’s response cost was the same
regardless of whether the buyer accepted or rejected.302
But the cost of rejecting often differs from the cost of
accepting. Perhaps the most significant reason for this difference is
that “offerors may deliberately influence those costs.”303 Katz
suggests how an offeror might do so.
The seller can often affect the buyer’s response cost by
the manner in which she makes the offer—for instance, by
demanding that response come through some expensive
medium—and her incentives to do this will depend on the
legal regime. . . . Under a silent-acceptance rule . . .the
seller benefits from raising the buyer’s response cost, and
she has an incentive to try to make it burdensome for him to
reply.
The seller’s ability to raise [response costs] under a
silent-acceptance rule raises both the likelihood of
opportunistic exchanges and their cost to the buyer, while
her ability to lower [response costs] under the common law
lowers the cost and likelihood of missed efficient
exchanges. Furthermore, under a silent-acceptance rule,
distributional gains to the offeror may be dissipated by
increased rent seeking that raises the cost of making the
offer. Any resources the offeror invests in raising [response
costs] is a pure deadweight loss, as are any resources the
parties might spend competing for the position of offeror in
the first place. The risk of rent seeking under a silent
acceptance rule, accordingly, provides an additional
efficiency argument for the common-law rule.304
301
302
303
304

Id. at 83.
Id. at 80.
Katz, supra note 297, at 84 (emphasis added).
Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
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Although written prior to ProCD/Hill, it is strikingly prophetic
with regard to the strategic planning of a Gateway decision maker.
1. Katz’s Model Applied
Gateway, like any vendor who would want to make its offer
effective only after it receives payment and places the goods in the
buyer’s hands, obviously must make resource investments in
making such an “offer” that are significantly greater than what
would be required to make a simple offer that invited acceptance
by return promise or performance (e.g., paying for the goods). It
must first identify the particular potential “offeree,” determine that
potential offeree’s systems requirements, configure the computer
for that potential offeree, and then ship the computer to that person
with terms that explain for the first time that an “offer” to form a
contract for sale is being made and that the offeree is legally bound
by all of its terms unless he rejects. Then it must make rejection of
the offer costly, for example by requiring it to be expressed by an
actual return of the goods within a relatively short period of time.
The payoff for incurring such costs is apparent. By making
such an unusual offer that actually places the goods in the offeree’s
hands, and by requiring that rejection be expressed only by return
of the goods, a vendor could dramatically increase the cost to the
buyer of rejecting the offer, and thus dramatically decrease the
likelihood that the buyer will avoid the objectionable terms. As a
consequence, a vendor can do so without being saddled with the
significant up front costs of such an offer by getting full payment
from the potential offeree before incurring most of those strategic
costs.
a. The Vendor’s Perspective Prior to Legal Sanction of “Terms
Later” Practice
This strategy, if legally sanctioned, could pay large dividends.
Whether it pays worthwhile dividends even without the support of
the legal regime is a significant question to consider in light of the
fact that ProCD and Gateway employed that business strategy prior
to being blessed by Easterbrook’s opinions.
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ProCD and Gateway apparently believed that they improved
their respective bottom lines by incurring additional costs in
structuring their respective offers. Consider the possible outcomes
for the vendors in the face of legal uncertainty. Some buyers may
actually become aware of the objectionable terms in time to reject
in the prescribed matter. Factors such as those associated with
cognitive defects, endowment effect, status quo bias, and basic risk
aversion make it very unlikely that many will reverse the
transaction—so few sales will be lost.305 Even with respect to the
few that will be lost, the cost, basically shipping expenses, will be
small. In a Gateway-like setting, many, perhaps most, will not
become aware of the terms in time to reject, thus those sales will
not be reversed. In many instances no displeasure with the goods
implicating the terms will arise and the enforceability of the “terms
later” will not be an issue. Still, that does not change the fact that
the buyer received a product with terms not bargained for or
agreed to.
In some instances buyers will be displeased with the product
and the “terms later” will be implicated. Some or many who kept
the product with knowledge of the “terms later” in time to have
rejected them may believe themselves to be bound by them, and
thus conform their conduct to them. As to that number, the terms
have worked for the vendors even without the benefit of the law.
Some or many buyers who do not become aware of the “terms
later” until after the time to reject them has passed, and probably
only after their displeasure with the goods, may also believe
themselves bound and thus conform their conduct accordingly.
Again, even without the benefit of law, vendors will have received
the benefit of the protection of their terms.
Further, consider instances where a buyer actually believes
himself not bound by the terms and is dissatisfied with the product.
Few are likely to be willing to incur the expenses of litigation if
their personal efforts to get a favorable resolution are rebuffed. Of
those few who would pursue litigation, they may or may not be
successful. If they were to draw a court that enforced the common
law rule reflected in UCC sections 2-206 and 2-207(2) and thus
305

See discussion supra notes 262-96 and accompanying text.
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precluded imposition of “terms later” on consumers by silentacceptance, those particular litigants would avoid the effect of the
“terms later.” 306 As to those litigants, except for the vendor’s
litigation expenses, the vendor’s position would be the same as it
would have been without imposing the “terms later.” It would have
all of the obligations that the default provisions of the law would
provide, but nothing worse, and it would have received a price that
it was able to command because the buyers believed those default
rights were part of the value they were paying for. Even a ruling
favorable to such litigants may alter little the perceptions of other
buyers who read the “terms later” but do not read the cases. Like
the “salutary” effect achieved by the abuse of including
exculpatory clauses in contracts by those who know courts will
refuse enforcement on public policy grounds, the “terms later”
provisions are still likely to work their practical in terrorem effect
on numerous buyers.
If litigating buyers were to draw an Easterbrook-kind of judge,
they would lose. In that situation, vendors would have collected a
price that reflected the value buyers thought they were getting, but
without having to deliver it. From the standpoint of a vendor’s
bottom line, that would be a wonderful position to be in. And if
competitors followed the same strategy, or if these were basically
one-shot transactions with buyers, reputational concerns would be
minimal.
b. Societal Perspective—”Terms Later” Rule Does Not
Maximize Societal Wealth
A “terms later” rule will not still somehow maximize societal
wealth,307 despite the predictable inefficiencies Katz identifies that
306

See, e.g., Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S. 389 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001);
infra Part IV.H (discussing the Licitra court’s finding that to enforce “terms
later” would violate UCC § 2-207 and public policy).
307
Wealth maximization is a theory of welfare that identifies welfare with
economic surplus. “Economic surplus is the sum of (1) the difference between
what a consumer must pay and the maximum she is willing to pay for
something, and (2) the difference between the price a seller obtains for its
product and the minimum price necessary to sustain the seller in the market.”
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are inherent with informational asymmetry and which will only be
magnified by such a rule. The employment of this stratagem to
maximize vendors’ wealth is no more a surrogate for the
maximization of the wealth of society than is maximization of the
wealth of the fraudfeasors who employ a more traditional form of
deception. Fraudfeasors, however, must give up their gains when
they are caught.
Recall that Katz also concludes that the common law rule
which precludes forcing offerees to reject to avoid accepting
offers, reflected in UCC sections 2-206 and 2-207(2), is justified as
being distributionally fair “because it ensures that both parties to
the exchange receive some gain and it prevents offerors from
profiting at the expense of passive offerees.”308 The general
common law rule “is thus equally well explained by efficiency and
equity.”309 Elaborating on the distributional fairness of the
common law rule, Katz notes:
[Under a silent-acceptance rule] gains are primarily by the
offeror, who will offer less generous terms under a regime
in which it is costly to reject, and by those offerees who
attach a relatively high value to exchange. Offerees who
attach a relatively low value to exchange are generally
made worse off by a silent-acceptance rule, for they are
forced to choose between accepting on terms that yield
them a negative return and expending resources in sending
rejections. In either event such offerees are worse off than
if they had just been left alone. The common law rule, in
contrast, blocks this redistribution and ensures that both
parties to the exchange share in any surplus.310
Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 825
(1990). “[W]ealth maximization is an aggregate concept. That is, it is more
concerned with societal well-being than with individual welfare. . . . Value is
measured by a willingness and ability to pay, and the goal of a wealth
maximizing society must be to maximize aggregate value.” Whitney
Cunningham, Note, Testing Posner’s Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization, 81
GEO. L. J. 141, 143 (1992) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
308
See Katz, supra note 297, at 97.
309
Id. (emphasis added).
310
Avery Wiener Katz, Contract Formation and Interpretation, in 1 THE
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The significance of the choice of contract formation rules from
the standpoint of distributional equity is concisely captured by one
writer’s observation that “[l]egal rules . . . do more than simply
facilitate trade. They may also affect the way the parties divide the
potential gains from any trade. . . .”311 That latter point illustrates
why Katz is correct in concluding that from the economic point of
view, contract formation rules are theoretically prior to all other
legal rules.312 With the increased bargaining power that the legal
rule of ProCD/Hill gives vendors, one should not be surprised if
vendors used it grab as much value for themselves as possible.
D. The Human Self-Interestedness Tendency for Opportunistic
Behavior
A vendor’s behavior to get as much for himself as possible is
consistent with the “active tendency of the human agent to take
advantage, in any circumstance, of all available means to further
his own privileges.”313 This human tendency of “selfinterestedness” is as fundamental to normal economic analysis as
is the limitation on human cognition.314 That is because together
they create the potential for “hold-up,”315 or, in its more unsavory
form, “opportunistic behavior.”316
1. “Holding-up” the Hills
Three factors are necessary for the occurrence of a hold-up: (1)
the victim’s investment must be specific to the circumstances
enabling the other party to do the hold-up; (2) the contract
governing the relationship between the parties must be incomplete
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 425, 427 (Peter
Newman ed., Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998).
311
See Baird, supra note 253 at 197.
312
See Katz, supra note 297, at 77.
313
See Williamson, supra note 261, at 706 (footnotes omitted).
314
Id. at 705.
315
See Klein, supra note 260 (providing Klein’s definition of hold-up).
316
See Williamson, supra note 261 (providing Williamson’s definition of
opportunism).
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in the sense that it did not preclude the opportunity for the hold-up;
(3) the one engaging in the hold-up must find it profitable, wealth
maximizing, to do so.317
In Hill, the victim’s specific investment is obvious—the Hills
paid full price for the computer prior to its delivery, and prior to
disclosure of the objectionable terms. The Hills may have believed
the contract for purchase was completed and the terms were set
when they put their order in, paid with their credit card, and
Gateway promised to ship the goods. Under Easterbrook’s “terms
later” formation rule, however, the contract certainly was
“incomplete” in the sense that it did not preclude a hold-up. In fact,
according to Easterbrook, the contract was not merely
“incomplete,” it was not in existence at all at the time the Hills
parted with their money.318 It is apparent then that the second of
the necessary factors for hold-up is also met in the Hill context.
As for the third factor, the actor in a position to engage in holdup will do so only if it is wealth maximizing.319 Put another way,
the one engaging in hold-up must expect the short-run gains from
such conduct to outweigh any long-run costs that could be imposed
by the victim of hold-up by way of retaliation. If, for example, the
parties have an ongoing relationship that is valuable to the one who
could benefit from a hold-up, and the victim is likely to retaliate by
terminating it in the event of hold up, that could prevent a hold-up
from being wealth maximizing.320 Threat of retaliation by the
victim is within the larger category of “reputational concerns”
identified in the economic literature as the most significant
“private enforcement” restraint against hold-up.321 Engaging in
hold-up obviously tarnishes the reputation of the one engaging in
that practice and is likely to sour future relations between the
parties. But private enforcement capital is limited.322 The larger
question is whether the reputational damage will be less than the
317

See Klein, supra note 260.
See supra Part 1.A.2 (discussing Easterbrook’s formulation of the
“terms later” formation rule in ProCD).
319
See Klein, supra note 260.
320
Id. at 241-44.
321
Id.
322
Id.
318
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gain achieved by the hold-up.
It is unlikely that Gateway feared that spoiling its reputation
with the Hills by taking advantage of the hold-up opportunity
would hurt its bottom line, or that, by using its “terms later”
strategy, it would it sour its relationship with the Hills so they
would not buy a Gateway computer in the future. If the computer
worked as promised, the Hills could care less about the
objectionable remedies limitations because they would never have
been confronted with them (and perhaps they would never have
even known about them). If the computer did not work as
promised, the bad performance itself would probably have
prompted the Hills to buy their next computer from Dell or some
other manufacturer even if they had been able to pursue legal
remedies against Gateway.
Even if the bad performance of the computer would not have
discouraged the Hills from buying another Gateway computer, but
the unsatisfactory remedy limitations would have, it probably
would not be enough to deter Gateway from pursuing its “terms
later” strategy. If a few such future sales were lost, the negative
effect on the bottom line would be minimal and not enough to
forego the present gains achieved by doing the hold-up. Gateway
was able to hold-up the Hills, and was able to profit from that
strategy by using it to stop the Hills’ litigation efforts cold. In
typical consumer transactions occurring in markets in which
purchases by any particular buyer are infrequent one-shot
transactions, and buyers are isolated and dispersed, reputational
concerns are not significant deterrents for hold-up.323
2. Acting Opportunistically against the Hills
Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule satisfies not only the
requirements for a successful hold-up, but also invites opportunism
by vendors. Opportunism is not like the more benign hold-up
323

Katz, supra note 310, at 505. Katz makes his observation about the
insufficiency of reputational concerns in such markets to moderate opportunism
for drafters of form documents. A fortiori it is insufficient to moderate against
hold-up made possible by form documents first disclosed after the purchaser has
paid the full price.
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situation in which a party advances its self-interest by taking
advantage of an opportunity that arises after a contract has been
made and that is made possible by the inherent limits on parties’
being able to anticipate all potential future risks and expressly
guard against them.324 Rather, opportunism is a special culpable
variety of self-interest seeking. It is self-interest seeking “with
guile” and includes advancing one’s self-interest by “incomplete or
distorted disclosure of information, especially calculated efforts to
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse.”325 As
noted in the literature, “opportunism is not a free-standing concept
but requires, additionally, that bounded rationality and transaction
attributes be introduced.”326
The first element of opportunism, bounded rationality, has been
examined earlier in the larger context of human cognitive
limitations.327 As has been noted previously, bounded rationality is
a normal feature present in virtually all bargaining settings.328
Normally each party possesses incomplete information about one
another and each party’s respective motivations with respect to the
transaction are not necessarily disclosed. For example, typically a
seller does not know exactly the highest price a buyer would be
willing to pay, nor does the buyer know exactly the lowest price a
seller would be willing to accept. Still, the dynamics of negotiation
do not carry overtones of culpability or moral shortcomings.
The kind of bounded rationality that permits opportunism is
introduced by design for the very purpose of increasing
information asymmetry. A number of different methods short of
actionable fraud are available to a party for decreasing information
available to the other party. As noted above, they may take the
form of “incomplete or distorted disclosure of information,
especially calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate
or otherwise confuse.”329 When such methods are employed the

324
325
326
327
328
329

Klein, supra note 260, at 241-42.
See Williamson, supra note 261, at 703.
Id. at 704.
See supra notes 262-96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
See Williamson, supra note 325 and accompanying text.
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resulting contracts will be “strategically incomplete.”330 They are
not “incomplete” in the sense that the parties could not have
anticipated the potential opportunism in order to prevent it from
occurring. Rather, they are “strategically incomplete” because one
of the parties strategically held back information in order to set up
the very opportunity to act opportunistically.
The first element of opportunism is met with Easterbrook’s
“terms later” rule. In the Hill context, for example, Gateway
withheld several important items of information from the buyers.
Notwithstanding Easterbrook’s statements to the contrary, the
information about the exclusive method of acceptance and the
arbitration term could have been disclosed as easily prior to taking
the money from the buyers and delivering the computers as
after.331 But if it had been disclosed prior to taking the money,
buyers may have been unwilling to purchase the computers or may
have been unwilling to pay as much for them. Whatever their
decisions might have been, at least they would have been operating
with the same information about formation method and arbitration
that Gateway was. Thus the Hill setting presents a classic example
of strategic withholding of information to increase information
asymmetry.
Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule encourages vendors to
strategically hold back information to create a setting in which they
can act opportunistically. It is unlikely, however, that such
strategic withholding of information will lead to more efficient
contracts.332
330

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertnert, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 94 (1989).
331
Gateway might have efficiently notified of terms in advance, for
example, by placing them on its web site and mentioning them in its ads, at least
in summary fashion with a reference to its web site for full terms.
332
Farrell, supra note 256, at 129. See also Ayers & Gertnert, supra note
330, at 94. The authors note, “One party might strategically withhold
information that would increase the total gains from contracting (the “size of the
pie”) in order to increase her private share of the gains from contracting (her
“share of the pie”).” Id. They also observe, “[w]hen strategic considerations
cause a more knowledgeable party not to raise issues that could improve
contractual efficiency, a default that penalizes the more informed party may
encourage the revelation of information.” Id. at 128. Although they caution that
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The second element necessary for opportunism is the
introduction of “transaction attributes.”333 “Asset specificity” has
been identified as “the big locomotive out of which transactioncost economics works.”334 When a party makes an investment in a
specific asset, a dynamic is introduced that removes the transaction
from the realm of “faceless contracting, out of which orthodox
economics works,” and puts it squarely into the realm where the
identity and position of the particular parties and their realistic
alternatives really matter.335
In the context of a “terms later” offer in a setting like that in
Hill, the situation is loaded with “transaction attributes.” The buyer
has made a specific investment in the form of full payment and has
even begun enjoying the benefit of the goods before becoming
aware of the adverse terms proposed. The “offeror” will get the
benefit of the adverse terms unless the buyer promptly returns the
goods and thereby relinquishes all rights he thought he had already
obtained in them. Unlike the situation in a “faceless transaction” in
which a hypothetical offeror offers to sell goods subject to terms
adverse to a hypothetical offeree, who will decide whether to
affirmatively accept based on the pure merits of the offer and
uninfluenced by any “transactional attributes,” in the “terms later”
setting the “transactional attributes” will powerfully influence the
buyer’s response to the adverse terms.336 Accordingly, they will
dramatically increase the likelihood that the vendor will be able to
obtain both its terms and a price greater than what the buyer may
have been willing to pay had the terms been disclosed up front.
Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule disregards both the
lawmakers should not impose penalty defaults indiscriminately, they conclude
that in some instances penalizing parties who withhold information would likely
lead to more efficient contracts. Id. One instance is where the private
information is acquired passively and can be revealed with low transaction costs.
Id. The information withheld in ProCD and in Hill is that type of information.
333
See Williamson, supra note 261, at 704.
334
Id. at 707.
335
Id.
336
See supra notes 262-87 and accompanying text (regarding bounded
rationality); supra notes 288-96 and accompanying text (regarding cognitive
defects, endowment effect, status quo effect, and loss aversion).
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fundamentals of self-interestedness and limits on human cognition,
but not out of ignorance. Less than a year before his ProCD
opinion he authored an opinion in which he addressed the matter of
opportunism directly.337 Therein he wrote:
“Opportunism” in the law of contracts usually signifies one
of two situations. First, there is effort to wring some
advantage from the fact that the party who performs first
sinks costs, which the other party may hold hostage by
demanding greater compensation in exchange for its own
performance. . . . Second, there is an effort to take
advantage of one’s contracting partner “in a way that could
not have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and
which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the
parties.”338
The conduct that his “terms later” rule authorizes creates the
first of the two situations for opportunism that he described.339
Buyers perform first. They engage in search costs, make a decision
to purchase based on the information they have, and pay in full for
the product. Only then do vendors endeavor to “wring some
advantage” from the fact that they have the buyers’ commitment to
buy. They do so by disclosing the concessions they demand (in a
way that they will not necessarily actually come to the attention of
337

Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128 (7th Cir.

1996).
338

Id. at 129-30 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therein Easterbrook
shows he is also aware of the human tendency toward self-interestedness. He
observes, “[p]arties to contracts are entitled to seek, and retain, personal
advantage; striving for that advantage is the source of much economic progress.
Contract law does not require parties to be fair, or kind, or reasonable, or to
share gains or losses equitably.” Id. at 132.
339
Only because Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule prevents a contract from
being formed at the time of purchase, by definition it cannot come within the
second opportunism setting he describes. The vendors and buyers are not
technically “contracting partners” at the time the vendors exercise their
advantage. That does not negate the fact that vendors are endeavoring to take
advantage of buyers in a way that buyers could not have contemplated at the
time they purchased. Nor does it negate that fact that buyers were not alerted in
time to guard against it with contract language. It is merely an acknowledgment
that it does not fit the technical requirement of his second opportunism setting.

BERNMACRO2.DOC

742

4/23/2004 1:12 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

the buyers) before they will actually part with ownership by
mandating that the concessions are accepted unless buyers
affirmatively “reject” and by assuring the unlikelihood of
“rejection” by making it costly.
It appears that Easterbrook, who is perfectly aware of the
hazards of opportunism, simply shut his eyes to the predictable
opportunistic behavior his “terms later” rule legalizes and thus
promotes. Although Easterbrook touts the law and economics ex
ante perspective for its ability to predict the impact of a ruling on
aggregate social behavior, he patently disregarded the most
fundamental matters that guide economic prediction in ProCD and
Hill. Thus, he rejected any consideration of human selfinterestedness, bounded rationality, transaction costs, limitation on
human cognition, and loss aversion particularly as it is manifested
in the endowment effect and the status quo bias. By doing so he
produced a new legal rule of contract formation that increases
information asymmetry, increases transaction costs, enhances holdup and opportunistic behavior by vendors, and results in
inefficiencies as well as distributional unfairness by systematically
redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors. One is greatly
tempted to characterize Easterbrook’s reasoning and the “terms
later” legal rule it produced as “anti-economics.” At the very least,
both the reasoning and resulting rule of ProCD/Hill are bad
economics.
III. BAD MORALS
In addition to being bad law and bad economics, Easterbrook’s
ProCD/Hill “terms later” rule is also bad morals. It annihilates the
moral justification for courts enforcing promises. In its place it
introduces a purely utilitarian rule that permits a court to impose
obligations on a party whenever a court believes its doing so will
be best for society.
A. Moral Basis for Enforcement of Promises: Protect
Reasonable Expectations
The moral justification for courts enforcing promises has
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historically derived from the premise that contractual liability is
consensual.340 Contract enforcement is promise enforcement. The
person against whom enforcement is sought has by words or
conduct made a promise that has instilled in another an
expectation, a confidence, that it will be kept.341 That expectation
may be created even if the person against whom enforcement is
sought did not subjectively intend to make a promise but
voluntarily uttered words or engaged in conduct that he had reason
to know would justify another in inferring that a promise had been
made.342 Protection of reasonable expectations is thus at the heart
of contract enforcement.343
That the law enforces only to protect reasonable expectations
of a promisee is well illustrated by the common law doctrines of
fraud and duress.344 The fraudfeasor who turns the odometer back
340

See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, §§ 1.2-.6; CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 14-17
(Harvard Univ. Press 1981); Kevin M. Teeven, The Advent of Recovery on
Market Transactions in the Absence of a Bargain, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 289, 31112, 320-21, 336, 346 (2002).
341
See, e.g. FRIED, supra note 340, at 14-17. See also Bern, supra note 247,
at 131-32. Therein Bern observes:
One of the ways man may more effectively carry out his
stewardship-dominion duties to God is by entering into agreements
with his fellows. Such agreements are possible because, in creating
man in His own image, God has endowed man with language, the
ability to communicate with words. In particular, He has given man the
ability to communicate with words of a special quality—words of
promise. The essence of such words, spoken by one created in the
image of God, is to instill in the one who hears them a confidence, an
expectation, that they will be kept.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The special nature of words of promise as creating an
expectation in the hearer that they will be kept is also illustrated by the fact that
promise keeping is a fundamental norm in international law, Pacta sunt
servanda (see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties/
htm), and is limited only by the peremptory norm, Jus cogens. Id. art. 53.
342
See supra notes 124-49 and accompanying text regarding the objective
theory of contracts and its protection of reasonable expectations.
343
FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, § 1.6, at 17.
344
Id. at § 4.9; Bern, supra note 247, at 144-45.
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from 200,000 miles to 30,000 miles and on that basis extracts a
promise from his victim to pay the price for what the latter believes
is a low mileage car will not get court enforcement of that promise.
Put simply, the fraudfeasor had no reason to believe the victim was
really promising to pay that much money for the car the
fraudfeasor actually intended to deliver, and thus no had no
reasonable expectation worthy of court enforcement.345
1. The Common Law (Restatement) Protects Reasonable
Expectations
Protection of reasonable expectations is reflected in the
objective theory of contract law.346 The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 211(3) captures the theory with respect to terms
in standardized agreements: “Where the other party has reason to
believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he
knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not
part of the agreement.”347 It is also reflected in Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 69 which precludes silence or
exercise of dominion from operating as an acceptance except in
narrowly circumscribed instances that would give rise to
reasonable expectations on the part of the offeror that the offeree
was actually signifying acceptance by silence or exercise of
dominion, or where the offeree was invited to accept by silence
and in fact intended to do so.348
Use of goods that a buyer has purchased and paid for signals
that the buyer reasonably believes he has ownership rights and is
exercising them. The seller’s belated insistence that the buyer does
not own the goods, that he can have no ownership rights in those
very goods except on less favorable terms, and that his continued
use of them signifies his agreement to those terms seems
preposterous. The buyer’s continued use, far from signaling
agreement to the adverse terms, is more consistent with an
345
346
347
348

Bern, supra note 247, at 144-46.
See supra Part I.A.2.e.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981).
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understanding, in accord with the objective theory of contracts,
that the buyer fully owns the goods and seller is crazy to think he
can force adverse terms on the buyer. Under those circumstances,
the seller can have no reasonable expectation that the buyer’s use
is signaling his agreement to the adverse terms.
Sections 211(3) and 69 also illustrate the companion principle
of “freedom from contract.”349 Freedom from contract is as
foundational a principle as is freedom of contract.350 Freedom from
contract rests on an understanding of individual autonomy and
worth, and also, in a sense, of personal liberty and even justice.
Without freedom from contract, freedom of contract lacks the
character of a voluntary knowing expression of commitment that
creates an actual expectation in the party who hears or observes it
that it will be kept. Thus, without freedom from contract there is no
moral basis for judicial enforcement.
2. The UCC Protects Reasonable Expectations
UCC section 2-206(1)(b) protects reasonable expectations,
providing, “[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the
language or circumstances . . . an order or other offer to buy goods
for prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting
acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or
current shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods.” It
eliminates the potential for the so-called “unilateral contract
trick”351 that had been possible under the common law mirror
image rule. Under the common law rule, shipment of
nonconforming goods in response to an offer did not constitute
acceptance of the offer, but rather was merely a counter-offer.
Consequently, a seller could intentionally ship inferior goods in
response to an order, e.g., #2 quality instead of the ordered #1
quality but at the price for #1, in the hope that the inferior goods
would be unwittingly received and retained by buyer’s non349

See Katz, supra note 297.
Id.
351
John D. Wladis, The Contract Formation Sections of the Proposed
Revisions To U.C.C. Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 997, 1004 (2001).
350
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decision making employees. Failure of a decision maker to
promptly notice the defects and order the goods returned would
constitute acceptance of the counter-offer of #2s at #1 prices.
Obviously in those circumstances the seller who engaged in such a
ploy would have no reasonable expectation that such inadvertent
conduct by the buyer was really a promise by the buyer to pay #1
price for #2 goods, and UCC section 2-206(1)(b) now precludes a
seller from benefiting from that kind of trickery.352
The provisions of UCC section 2-207 also reflect the policy of
enforcement of promises to protect reasonable expectations. The
essence of current section 2-207(1) is that a definite expression of
acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it contains some
boilerplate terms that are different or additional to the terms of an
offer.353 It abandons the common law mirror image rule so that a
response to an offer that, with respect to the dickered terms, looks
like an acceptance. Such a response matching dickered terms
creates a reasonable expectation in the offeror that the other party
has made a commitment to perform as proposed in the offer. That
expectation is now protected under UCC section 2-207(1); a
contract between the parties has been formed on the basis of the
offer and acceptance that matched dickered terms.
Current section 2-207(2) also protects reasonable
expectations.354 In transactions involving at least one non-merchant
(the typical consumer transaction) the terms of the contract are the
terms that were contained in the offer with which the offeror is
familiar. The offeror has a reasonable expectation that those are the
terms of the deal because the offeree manifests agreement to them
by making a definite expression of acceptance, albeit with some
other boilerplate terms that the offeror may or may not be familiar
with. Under the current version of the Code the offeree has no
reasonable expectation that his boilerplate terms are part of the
agreement merely because they accompanied his acceptance.355 He
can have no expectation that the offeror has actually agreed to the
352
353
354
355

Id. at 1004-05.
U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1995). See supra note 31 for the explicit language.
§ 2-206(1).
See id. § 2-207(1).
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boilerplate terms short of a subsequent affirmative expression of
agreement by the offeror. Such other terms are nothing more than
mere proposals to the contract that will simply lapse after a period
of time unless affirmatively accepted by the other party.356 This
reflects the general common law rule that precludes forcing silence
as acceptance.
Although the current version of UCC section 2-207(2) has a
special rule for transactions “between merchants,” under which
proposed additional terms become a part of the contract without
the need for an affirmative acceptance, even that special rule
nevertheless gives significant protection to reasonable
expectations. Such proposed terms do not become a part of the
contract if they would materially alter it.357 The party proposing
terms that would materially alter the contract has no reasonable
expectation that the other party’s silence means he agrees to such
terms. The party who receives such a proposal has no reason to
expect that, absent his affirmative agreement to make that kind of
change in the deal, it can become part of the contract.
Nor do proposals for additional terms become a part of the
contract if the offer expressly limited acceptance to the terms of
the offer.358 In such an instance, the offeror reasonably expects that
no other terms will become part of the deal and that expectation is
protected; and the party making the proposal can have no
reasonable expectation that the offer permits him to force
additional terms.
Finally, such proposed terms do not become part of the
contract if notification of objection to such terms has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them has
been received.359 In both such instances the offeror is reasonably
expecting because of that action on his part that the proposals will
not be part of the contract, and the one making the proposals can
have no reasonable expectation that the other has agreed to be
bound by them.
356

See supra note 90 and sources cited therein; see also FARNSWORTH,
supra note 132, at §3.19.
357
See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b).
358
See § 2-207(2)(a)-(b).
359
See § 2-207(2)(a) &(c).
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3. “Terms Later” Contracting Does Not Protect Reasonable
Expectations
Easterbrook’s analysis that produced the “terms later” rule
rejects or ignores all of the above rules designed to protect
reasonable expectations. It does not protect the reasonable
expectations of buyers that they own goods and can use them as
their own once they have paid for them and taken delivery. It
compels such buyers, contrary to their reasonable expectations, to
give up the deals they thought they had made. While denying
protection to reasonable expectations of buyers, it rewards the
unreasonable expectations of vendors that buyers acquire no
ownership rights when they pay for the goods, and that retention of
goods by such buyers after they have had time to learn about the
objectionable terms means the buyers are promising to accept and
abide by them. Abandoning the only moral justification for courts
to enforce promises, Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule is ultimately
validated by nothing more than power, the power of the court to
pronounce it, for reasons sufficient to the court, and to command
obedience to it.
In addition to being the moral undergirding for courts’
enforcing promises, protection of reasonable expectations is also
foundational for accomplishing justice,360 yet Easterbrook ignores
this. Only by taking into account the reasonable expectations of the
parties in the contractual dispute before it, can a court do justice
for the parties, rendering to each his due. The parties are not mere
grist that affords a court the opportunity to establish some policy it
perceives will advance some larger good for society or a segment
of society. Accordingly, the judicial function has traditionally been
ex post in perspective, with the court adjudicating the particular
dispute between the parties in a manner to do justice for the

360

A definition of “justice” found in an earlier edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary is, in pertinent part: “In Jurisprudence. The constant and perpetual
disposition to render to every man his due. . . . Cummutative justice is that which
should govern contracts. It consists in rendering to every man the exact measure
of his dues, without regard to his personal worth or merits, i.e., placing all men
on an equality.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY1002 (4th ed. 1968).
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parties.361 That is also why litigants like the Hills, who were but
fodder for an ex ante law and economics court’s pronouncement
and application to them of a new rule of contract formation, could
rightly say of their experience with the judicial system, “There is
no justice.”
B. “Terms Later” and ex ante Analysis Contra Fundamental
Principles of Justice
Easterbrook’s adjudication process and the rule of law it
produced in ProCD/Hill violate fundamental principles of justice
in several respects. The author has described the “Requisites for
Law and Justice,”362 premising his analysis upon the classical
361

See Ogus, supra note 59.
See Bern, supra note 247, at 110-115.
Encompassed within the Biblical Model are three components. The
first, Requisites for Law and Justice, is foundational to the Model. It
sets forth [four] Biblical requisites for substantive law and for its proper
administration. It reflects aspects of God’s character and sovereignty
which are manifested in the perfection of both His law and His
administration of justice. Put very simply, at the level of human beings
and institutions, only if these requisites are reflected in law and in its
administration can there be any hope of achieving justice.

362

....
The Psalmist extols God’s law, its perfection and his love for it, and
proclaims the righteousness of His judgments. Consistent with His
character, God’s law is the embodiment of truth and His perfect
administration always produces judgments that are true. Three features
of God’s law, and requisites for its proper administration, are captured
by the Hebrew words tsedeq, mishpat, and meshar.
. . . [These three Hebrew words taken together] express the thought
of the evenhanded and impartial application (mishpat) of a righteous
moral standard (tsedeq) producing an evenness or equality (meshar) in
outcomes in like cases. While the three Hebrew words are descriptive
of distinct features of the administration of justice, with respect to the
nature of substantive law itself, the one word, tsedeq, the righteous
moral standard, appears to encompass the rule, its scope of application,
and consequences for violation. The fourth requisite for the proper
administration of justice is jurisdiction, the authority to determine the
matter.

BERNMACRO2.DOC

750

4/23/2004 1:12 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

natural law363 theory articulated by Blackstone.364 Easterbrook’s
Id. at 110-13, 115 (citations omitted).
363
“Natural law, also called the law of nature, in moral and political
philosophy [is] an objective norm or set of objective norms governing human
behavior, similar to the positive laws of a human ruler, but binding on all people
alike and usually understood as involving a superhuman legislator.” CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 520 (1995).
364
1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 38-42 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws
of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. . . .
....
This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when
he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility,
established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so,
when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself
in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human
nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and
restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the
purport of those laws.
Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able
unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his
creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of
infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in
those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent
to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good
and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms;
and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are
necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are
these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and
should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts
Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law. (citation omitted)
....
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God
himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other—It is binding
over all the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are
of any validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are valid derive
all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from
this original.
But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each
individual, it is still necessary to have recourse to reason; whose office
it is to discover, as was before observed, what the law of nature directs
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analysis is based on the imagined knowledge of consumers and
artificial assent on their part to patently objectionable terms and
thus is the antithesis of a truthful judgment. Further, the “terms
later” rule violates the tsedeq requisite of justice by withdrawing
the law’s historic protection of reasonable expectations in order to
encourage strategic nondisclosure and opportunism by vendors. It
is thus the antithesis of a righteous moral standard. Finally, the
“terms later” rule has built within itself an element of favoritism
in every circumstance of life: . . . And if our reason were always, as in
our first ancestor before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled
by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or
intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no
other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own
experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of
ignorance and error.
This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of
divine providence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the
imperfection, and the blindness of human reason, hath been pleased, at
sundry times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce it’s laws
by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we
call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the
holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon
comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they
tend in all their consequences to man’s felicity. But we are not from
thence to conclude that the knowledge of these truths was attainable by
reason, in it’s present corrupted state; since we find that, until they
were revealed, they were hid from the wisdom of ages. As then the
moral precepts of this law are indeed of the same original with those of
the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of equal strength and
perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely more
authenticity than that moral system, which is framed by ethical writers,
and denominated the natural law. Because one is the law of nature,
expressly declared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by
the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could
be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an
equal authority; but, till then, they can never be put in any competition
together.
Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of
revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should
be suffered to contradict these.
Id. at 39-42.
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for vendors by creating special benefits for them as a class and thus
violates the righteous moral standard of uniformity of application
to all without regard to person or situation.365
The method of adjudication in ProCD/Hill also violates the
mishpat requisite of justice, the impartial application of the
underlying law.366 Easterbrook purports to apply established rules
of contract formation, but in fact applies different theories of
contract formation to the same contracting transaction.367 Thus, he
evaluates the legal effect of the vendors’ undisclosed intent under
the discredited subjective theory of contracts while evaluating the
legal effect of the buyers’ retention and use of goods they
purchased under a distorted version of the objective theory of
contracts. His refusal to afford the purchasers in each instance of
the clear statutory protection of UCC sections 2-206 and 2-207 in
order to permit vendors to have their way in imposing terms
violates the impartiality principle so necessary to achieve justice in
any given case.
All of this should not surprise anyone. Easterbrook is simply
operating in accord with the contemporary legal realism that
pervades the law schools, the courts, the legal profession, and
society generally.368 Legal Realism perceives courts as policymakers who create law.369 The law is nothing more than what the
courts say it is.370 Law is instrumental, serving as a tool for
achieving results.371 Like a good policy maker Easterbrook is most
concerned with the impact of the rules he makes. Thus the ex ante
approach is best suited for his creation of legal rules that will
365

Bern, supra note 247, at 115.
Id. at 113-115.
367
Supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
368
See, e.g., RUDOLPH J GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND
PROFESSIONALISM: THE AGENDA FOR REFORM 37, 49 (Paul L. Murphy ed.,
Greenwood Press 1989); Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law
School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 247-50 (1978).
369
See GERBER, supra note 368, at 33.
370
See, id. at 37, 49; THOMAS SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 3
(1987).
371
See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 368, at 37; Cramton, supra note 368, at
249-50.
366
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benefit society. The matter of rule-making is purely utilitarian, i.e.,
what will be best for society. Any notion of justice for the
particular parties to the litigation is at best secondary to the larger
good of society and thus may be readily sacrificed to achieve a
perceived greater good.
IV. BAD FRUIT—THE CASE LAW
Remarkably, several courts have swallowed ProCD/Hill’s
“terms later” rule in both sale of goods and services settings. In
lemming-like fashion they have followed Easterbrook’s “terms
later” rule as though its validity were beyond question.372 None of
the courts has done the slightest analysis of Easterbrook’s legal or
economic reasoning.373 None of the sale of goods cases does any
direct statutory analysis of UCC section 2-206.374 None analyzes
the implications for the objective theory of contracts precluding
contract formation at the time of payment and delivery of goods or
services.375 Only a couple endeavor to engage in even rudimentary
statutory analysis of UCC section 2-207, and in each instance the
effort discloses fundamental ineptitude at the task.376 For the most
part each appears content to quote a few of Easterbrook’s
arguments, or a few of his illustrations, or merely his conclusions,
372

Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (C.D. Cal.
2002); Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (C.D. Ca. 2002);
I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D.
Mass 2002); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85
F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Kaczmarek v. Microsoft Corp., 39 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 975 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., C.A. No.
16913, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *9-10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000); 1-A Equip.
Co. v. Icode, Inc., No. 1460, 2003 WL 549913, at *2 (Mass. App. Div. Feb. 21,
2003); Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 282 A.D. 2d 180, 185 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 250-51 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 809
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D. 2d 246, 251
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
373
See sources cited supra note 372.
374
Id.
375
Id.
376
I.Lan Systems, Inc., 183 F. Supp. at 336-37; Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 250.
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and deem that sufficient to justify applying the new rule of contract
formation in its case.377 In one instance a mere citation of the cases
is treated as sufficient for establishing the correctness of the
rule.378
A. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
The court in Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the first to embrace
ProCD/Hill’s “terms later” rule, accepts Easterbrook’s rationale.379
It briefly describes the facts and holding in Hill, the facts in
ProCD, its conclusion that UCC section 2-207 does not apply
except in a “battle of the forms” setting, and then states
approvingly that Hill “takes note of the realities of conducting

377

Lozano, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1073; Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v.
UPS, 236 F. Supp. 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Peerless Wall & Window
Coverings, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d at 527-28. In Peerless Wall & Window
Coverings, Inc. the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, citing ProCD, Hill, Mortenson, and an unpublished Ohio
appellate court opinion, applies the “terms later” rule to hold the purchaser of
cash register software bound by a warranty disclaimer first disclosed to the
purchaser after order and payment. Id. The terms were printed on the diskette
envelopes and in the user manuals accompanying the software. Id. Without
independent statutory and factual analysis, and without any critique of the
validity of the underlying rationale of those cases, the court concludes, “[t]he
recent weight of authority is that ‘shrink-wrap’ licenses which the customer
impliedly assents to by, for example, opening the envelope enclosing the
software distribution media, are generally valid and enforceable.” Id. at 527.
Swallowing Easterbrook’s ProCD rationale hook, line and sinker, it
characterizes Easterbrook’s opinion as “insightful[],”and in an extensive
quotation from ProCD excerpts virtually every argument Easterbrook had made
as though each were indisputable, including: the difficulty of including all the
terms on the outside of a package; how notice on the outside, and terms on the
inside may be a means of business valuable to sellers and buyers alike; the
commonness of transactions in which payment precedes terms; the illustrations
he gave that suggested prices would be driven through the ceiling returning
transactions to the horse-and-buggy age if “terms later” were not the rule; and
his vendor, as master of the offer rationale. Id. at 527-8; see also Brower, 246
A.D.2d at 250-51.
378
Kaczmarek, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
379
676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
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business in today’s world.”380 It then observes that “[t]ransactions
involving ‘cash now, terms later’ have become commonplace,
enabling the consumer to make purchases of sophisticated
merchandise such as computers over the phone or by mail—and
even by computer,”381 as though without delayed disclosure of
terms, sellers would not be able to make merchandize available to
consumers by phone or mail.
Perhaps the court was unaware that companies like Sears, J.C.
Penney’s, and others had been offering sophisticated merchandize
for consumers to order by phone or mail for decades before we
entered the information age; and they had been able to do it
without a “terms later” rule of law. In any event, such “reasons”
are treated as sufficient to prompt the Brower court to voice its
agreement “with the rationale” of ProCD/Hill.382
B. Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
The court in Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc. next embraced
the ProCD/Hill “terms later” rule.383 It also engages in no statutory
analysis and makes no effort to explore the validity of
Easterbrook’s assertions or reasoning.
Unlike the situation in Hill where the Hills were the purchasers
and were also the ones to whom the computer and the “terms later”
were delivered, in Westendorf the person who ordered and paid for
the computer purchased it for delivery to another.384 Even though
380

Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
382
Id.
383
Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., C.A. No. 16913, 2000 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 54, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000). See also Kaczmarek v. Microsoft
Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Ill. 1999). The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois followed the “terms later” rule of ProCD/Hill in
a software transaction in which the disputed terms were first presented in a
2,200 page manual that accompanied the software delivered in response to an
order from the purchaser and payment in advance. Id at 977-78. The court
summarily concluded that the terms in the manual were incorporated into the
contract, citing as its authority ProCD and Hill, making only a brief
parenthetical reference to the facts and holding in each. Id.
384
Westendorf, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *6.
381
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Gateway knew that the person purchasing the computer lived in a
state other than that in which the person to whom the computer
was to be delivered, it nevertheless did not send the “terms later”
to the purchaser.385 Rather, it just sent them in the box along with
the computer to the designated recipient.386 The recipient,
dissatisfied with the computer’s performance, brought suit against
Gateway.387 The recipient had received the “terms later” in the
box, but was not the purchaser and was not a party to any contract
with Gateway.388 The purchaser, who was the only person with
whom Gateway had a contract, had never received the “terms
later.”389
One might wonder how the purchaser could under these
circumstances be said to have assented to those terms, and thus to
have formed a contract that included them. Nevertheless, the
Westendorf court finds that because the recipient retained the
computer for more than thirty days, the “same rationale” of Hill
was applicable in its case where the recipient was suing
Gateway.390 In doing so the Westendorf court makes explicit what
had merely been implicit in Easterbrook’s rationale: that the assent
necessary to bind a purchaser to “terms later” is only an artificial
construct. Thus, with an apparently straight face, the Westendorf
385

Id.
Id.
387
Id. at *8-9.
388
Id. at *5-6.
389
Id.
390
Id. at *3. The court noted:
In a separate action, with different underlying facts, a Gateway
customer challenged the enforceability of the arbitration clause in the
Standard Terms and Conditions Agreement arguing that it was not
binding on him because he was not aware of it when he ordered the
computer. The 7th Circuit rejected that argument, however, and found
the agreement enforceable as written. Judge Easterbrook, writing for
the unanimous panel, noted “[b]y keeping the computer beyond 30
days, the [buyers] accepted Gateway’s offer, including the arbitration
clause.” Undeniably, plaintiff in the present case retained the computer
and accessories for more than thirty days. The same rationale,
therefore, applies to this plaintiff as in the case before the 7th Circuit.
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
386
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court can conclude that disclosure of “terms later” only to the
recipient of the computer, a non-party to the contract, is sufficient
to find that the purchaser, to whom the terms were not disclosed,
had assented to their being part of his contact with Gateway. But if
the bottom line of ProCD/Hill “terms later” is that vendors get
their way because that will be best for everyone, including
consumers, then such seemingly bizarre logic need not be
troubling.
In giving this full expression to Hill’s “terms later” rule, the
Westendorf court is compelled to distort basic third party contract
law principles.391 Thus, the court concludes that because the
recipient accepted the benefits of her friend’s purchase, “and
otherwise met the requisite conditions for the agreement to become
effective,” the recipient was bound by the arbitration agreement
included in the “terms later.”392 The latter reference to the
beneficiary meeting conditions for the agreement to become
effective is a curious one as the legal status of an intended third
party beneficiary is “created by contract.”393 The beneficiary takes
the benefits of an existing contract already formed by other parties,
and is subject to limitations stated in the contract, but that is not
what makes the agreement effective.394 It appears Easterbrook’s
“terms later” transformation of contract formation may also have
some transforming effects on the law of third party beneficiaries of
contracts.
C. M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc. v. Timberline Software
Corp.
The Washington Supreme Court also welcomed the “terms
later” rule of ProCD/Hill.395 In an en banc opinion with one
391

Id. at 14-15 (holding that under the specific facts of the case, “both the
passing of the donor’s rights and donor’s obligations to the donee” are
warranted).
392
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
393
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309 cmt. a (1981).
394
Id. § 309(4).
395
M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d
305 (Wash. 2000).
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dissent, it applied the rule to preclude a nationwide construction
contractor who purchased computer software for use in preparing
bids from suing for consequential damages resulting from the
software’s defects.396 The software was delivered to the purchaser,
Mortenson, following Mortenson’s submission of a written
purchase order and payment for the goods.397 “Terms later,” in
shrink-wrap form and also programmed to appear on the screen
during the installation process, accompanied delivery.398 They
provided that if the purchaser did not agree to the terms he should
promptly return the software for a refund.399 They further provided
that use of the software program meant the purchaser
acknowledged he had read and agreed to be bound by the terms.400
One of the substantive terms precluded recovery of consequential
damages, the very kind of damages Mortenson sustained when the
software caused errors in bids it submitted.401
The Washington Supreme Court does not inquire into the
validity of Easterbrook’s rationale for the rule.402 Like
Easterbrook, it also, without explanation, does not address the
applicability of UCC section 2-206(1)(a) and (b), provisions
relevant for assessing contract formation in this instance of a
written offer to purchase, accompanied by full payment, and
responded to by prompt shipment by the seller of the ordered
software.403
Like Easterbrook, it endeavors to distinguish Step-Saver Data
396

Id. In a compelling dissent Justice Sanders demonstrates the lack of
analysis of both law and facts by the majority. Id. at 316.
397
Id. at 307-08.
398
Id. at 308-09 (providing visual access to the licensing agreement “on the
outside of each diskette pouch and the inside cover of the instruction manuals
[as well as on] the first screen that appears each time the program is used”).
399
Id. at 308.
400
Id.
401
M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc., 998 P.2d at 308-09.
402
The Court of Appeals’ opinion was also devoid of any exploration of the
validity of Easterbrook’s rationale. See M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc. v.
Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1999).
403
See generally M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc., 998 P.2d at 305, in which
the only reference to UCC § 2-206 is that in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Sanders, 998 P.2d at 316.
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Systems, Inc. v. Wyse;404 and similarly, its efforts are distinctions
without a difference on the basic issue of contract formation.405 To
distinguish Step-Saver, the court adds a footnote that demonstrates
its significant analytical shortcomings with respect to dealing with
the UCC. It states:
We also note the contract here, unlike the contract in StepSaver, was not “between merchants” because Mortenson
does not deal in software. RCW 62A.2-104 (merchant is
person who deals in or has particular skill with respect to
the kind of goods involved in the transaction). RCW
62A.2-207 does not specify when additional terms become
part of a contract involving a nonmerchant.406
Mortenson clearly was a merchant under the Code’s definition.
The court excerpts only a part of the Code’s definition, apparently
oblivious to the remainder of the definition in subsection (1),407 the
404

939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
998 P.2d at 312.
First, Step-Saver did not involve the enforceability of a standard license
agreement against an end user of the software, but instead involved its
applicability to a value added retailer who simply included the software
in an integrated system sold to the end user. In fact, in Step-Saver the
party contesting applicability of the licensing agreement had been
assured the license did not apply to it at all. . . . Such is not the case
here, as Mortenson was the end user of the Bid Analysis software and
was never told the license agreement did not apply. Further, in StepSaver the seller of the program twice asked the buyer to sign an
agreement comparable to their disputed license agreement. Both times
the buyer refused, but the seller continued to make the software
available. . . . In contrast, Mortenson and Timberline had utilized a
license agreement throughout Mortenson’s use of the Medallion and
Precision Bid Analysis software. Given these distinctions, we find
Step-Saver to be inapplicable to the present case.
405

Id.
406

998 P.2d at 312 n.9.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-104(1) (2003).
(1) “Merchant” means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
407
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language of subsection (3),408 and detailed explanatory comment
2409 to RCW 62A.2-104. All make it clear that for purposes of
contract formation and terms, Mortenson, as a national
construction contractor purchasing software in its business
capacity for business use, was a merchant.
Once the court mistakenly concludes that Mortenson is not a
merchant, it observes that section 2-207 “does not specify when
additional terms become part of a contract involving a
nonmerchant,” as though that section gives no instruction with
respect to what the legal significance of the additional terms is and

himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
Id. (emphasis added).
408
Id. § 62A.2-104(3). (3) “‘Between merchants’ means in any transaction
with respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of
merchants.” Id. (emphasis added).
409
Comment 2 provides:
The term “merchant” as defined here roots in the “law merchant”
concept of a professional in business. The professional status under the
definition may be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods,
specialized knowledge as to business practices, or specialized
knowledge as to both and which kind of specialized knowledge may be
sufficient to establish the merchant status is indicated by the nature of
the provisions.
The special provisions as to merchants appear only in this Article and
they are of three kinds. Sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209
dealing with the statute of frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda
and modification rest on normal business practices which are or ought
to be typical of and familiar to any person in business. For purposes of
these sections almost every person in business would, therefore, be
deemed to be a “merchant” under the language “who. . . . by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices . . . involved in the transaction . . .” since the practices
involved in the transaction are non-specialized business practices such
as answering mail. In this type of provision, banks or even universities,
for example, well may be “merchants.” But even these sections only
apply to a merchant in his mercantile capacity; a lawyer or bank
president buying fishing tackle for his own use is not status as to
particular kinds of goods.
Id. at cmt. 2 (West 2003). (emphasis added).
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what happens to them in such a situation.410 The court appears
unaware of the relationship between UCC section 2-207(1) and
UCC section 2-207(2), and in particular, that section 2-207(2)
comes into play only if a contract has been formed—by informal
oral agreement or by offer and shipment as acceptance or by a
definite written expression of acceptance albeit with some
additional boilerplate terms.411 That contract, of course, already
has terms that the parties agreed to by their words or conduct,
supplemented by any Code gap-fillers. The court also appears to be
unaware of the first sentence of section 2-207(2) that provides,
“[t]he additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
additions to the contract.”412 Thus, it is not as though section 2-207
gives no guidance as to what is to become of the additional terms.
Its guidance is clear: the additional terms are simply proposals for
addition to the existing contract. Again, proposals (just another
term for “offers”) do not become anything unless they are accepted
by the one to whom they are made. Absent an actual acceptance,
they simply lapse after a reasonable period of time.
The opinion assumes that Easterbrook is correct that section 2204 is the only relevant Code provision. It justifies the “terms
later” rule by sketching the facts and holdings in ProCD, Hill, and
Brower, with an added conclusion that the approach of those cases
“represents the overwhelming majority view on this issue [as]
demonstrated by its adoption into the UCITA.”413 Its conclusion
drawn from the adoption of UCITA by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) was
premature. As of January 2004 only two states, Virginia and
Maryland, have adopted versions of the UCITA,414 and three have
enacted “bomb shelter” legislation precluding enforcement of
choice of law provisions selecting a state that had adopted the
UCITA.415 Moreover, the UCITA never gained the support of
410

U.C.C. § 2-207.
See supra note 31 (providing the text of UCC section 2-207(1)-(2)).
412
U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
413
998 P.2d at 338 n.10.
414
VA. CODE ANN. 59.1-501.1 (Michie 2002); MD. CODE ANN., Comm.
Law § 22-101 to 816 (2003).
415
IOWA CODE § 554D.104(4) (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2004);
411
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American Bar Association,416 and in August of 2003 NCCUSL
officially abandoned further efforts to get it enacted by state
legislatures.417
D. I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp.
The court in I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp.,
another software purchase case, also falls short in Code analysis as
it embraces ProCD/Hill’s “terms later” rule in the context of a
click-wrap license that purported to limit liability to the amount of
the license fees paid.418 In response to the purchaser’s written
purchase order, the seller delivered the software that contained the
“terms later” in click-wrap form that displayed on the screen
during the installation process.419 The I.Lan court, like
Easterbrook, fails to take into account the UCC section 2-206(1)(a)
and (b) formation rules under which the seller’s shipment of the
software in response to the order constitutes acceptance of the
offer, forming a contract on the terms in the purchase order plus
Code gap-fillers. It states its choice with respect to contract
formation rules is between UCC sections 2-204 and 2-207.420
Analysis under UCC section 2-204 would be simple; I.Lan
manifested assent to the click-wrap license agreement when in
clicked the “I agree” box.421
The court notes that analysis under section 2-207 would be
more complicated. In the course of describing how that analysis
would operate, the court discloses its misunderstanding of the
W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2003).
416
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Statement from
NCCUSL President Burentt to all NCCUSL Commissioners on UCITA (Aug. 1,
2003), available at http://www.nccusl.org./nccusl/DesktopModules/News
Display.aspx?ItemID=46K. King Burnett, NCCUSL President and the
organization’s representative to the House, withdrew the resolution approving
UCITA from consideration by the House of Delegates “[w]hen it became
evident that a clear consensus on the act was unlikely to emerge. . . .”
417
See infra note 479 and accompanying text.
418
183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002)
419
Id. at 330.
420
Id. at 335-36.
421
Id. at 336.
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meaning and effect of UCC section 2-207(3).422 It assumes that the
language in the click-wrap terms has the effect of an acceptance
expressly conditioned on agreement by the purchaser to its terms,
thus not forming a contract on the basis of the exchange of
writings.423 It further concludes that under such circumstances
conduct of the parties formed the contract and notes its awareness
of the applicability of section 2-207(3) in such a setting.424
It ignores, however, the plain language of section 2-207(3) that
provides the terms of such a contract “consist of the terms on
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of
this Act.”425 Although it cites to section 1.3 of the White and
Summers Treatise,426 it ignores the most crucial portion of that
section on the issue and concludes that the terms were those in the
seller’s writing if after the completed purchase and sale transaction
the purchaser clicked the “I agree” button in order to install the
program it had bought.427 But according to the cited authors:
Section 2-207(3) is only applicable when the writings of
the parties do not otherwise establish a contract yet their
conduct evidences a contract. Additionally, it presumes that
there have been “writings of the parties” in which they
failed to reach an agreement. Absent such, 2-207(3) is
inapplicable and the proper analysis focuses on 2-204. Note
that contract formation under subsection (3) gives neither
422

Id. at 336-37.
Id.
424
Id. at 336.
425
U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1995).
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such
case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which
the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
423

Id.
426

JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 1.3 (4th ed. 1995 & Supp. 2001).
427
I.Lan, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 336.

BERNMACRO2.DOC

764

4/23/2004 1:12 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

party the relevant terms in its document, but fills the
contract with the standardized provisions of Article 2. As a
practical matter this solution may put a seller at a
disadvantage, for seller will often wish to undertake less
responsibility for the quality of his goods than the Code
imposes or else wish to limit its damages liability more
narrowly than would the Code.428
Rather, the I.Lan court treats the click-wrap terms like a
traditional common law counter-offer, and the purchaser’s clicking
of “I agree” in order to install the program that it had bought and
paid for as though it were an acceptance under the common law’s
“last shot” rule. In addition, it erroneously treats as relevant to the
determination of the terms of the contract UCC section 2-207(2), a
subsection that, coupled with section 2-207(1), rejects the “last
shot” rule and has applicability only in settings where additional
terms are proposed after a contract has been previously formed by
a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance to an offer. Its
erroneous analysis contributes to the court’s willingness to
embrace ProCD’s “terms later” rule as “a practical way to form
contracts.”429
E. 1-A Equipment Co. v. Icode, Inc.
In yet another software case, a Massachusetts appellate court
embraced ProCD/Hill’s “terms later” rule without any independent
428

Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added). White and Summers follow that
observation with a reference to the history behind comment 7 to § 2-207, and
quoted that comment which should have been of special import to the I.Lan
court, but was not:
In many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and paid for
before any dispute arises, there is no question whether a contract has
been made. In such cases, where the writings of the parties do not
establish a contract, it is not necessary to determine which act or
document constituted the offer and which the acceptance. See § 2-204.
The only question is what terms are included in the contract, and
subsection (3) furnishes the governing rule.
Id.
429
183 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
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statutory analysis or critical inquiry regarding the validity of
Easterbrook’s rationale.430 Here, it was a forum selection clause of
which the buyer was not aware until after placing the order, paying
the full price, and receiving the software.431 It first became aware
of the “terms later” when they appeared as it was loading the
software.432 The buyer submitted a purchase order form prepared
by the seller that stated, “Please read the End User License and
Service Agreement,” but did not indicate the terms or their
purported legal effect. 433 The terms purported to make the
purchaser’s retention of the software for more than seven days
after installation operate as acceptance of the terms.434
To support its application of the “terms later” rule the court
merely references the Massachusetts federal district court’s
opinion in I.Lan Systems, quotes Easterbrook in ProCD and Hill,
and cites the Brower court’s conclusion that “[t]ransactions
involving ‘cash now, terms later’ have become commonplace.”435
It parrots Easterbrook’s quotation from the Farnsworth treatise that
“[n]otice on the outside, terms in the inside, and a right to return
the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a
means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike,” as
though it supported the “terms later” rule.436 Yet that section of the
Farnsworth treatise stands for the opposite proposition with respect
to “terms later.”437
The court also quotes excerpts of Easterbrook’s illustrations
about the binding effect of terms not called to a buyer’s attention
prior to purchase, including his theater ticket illustration, as though
they were credible proof of a general rule of law validating terms
withheld initially from buyers.438 Easterbrook’s suggestion as to
430

1-A Equipment Co. v. Icode, Inc., No. 1460, 2003 WL 549913 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2003).
431
Id. at *1.
432
Id.
433
Id.
434
Id. at *2.
435
Id.
436
I-A Equipment Co., 2003 WL549913 at *2.
437
See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
438
1-A Equipment Co., 2003 WL 549913, at *2.
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the binding effect of the theater ticket stub on the purchaser is
directly contrary to existing law, and his other illustrations are
merely his views on what courts would hold rather than upon
actual holdings.439 Likewise Easterbrook’s conclusions in Hill that
customers as a group are better off with “terms later” is quoted and
apparently accepted as though it were an established economic
fact. The willingness of courts to embrace—without the slightest
question—the numerous novel legal and economic assertions upon
which Easterbrook built his “terms later” rule is truly amazing, and
disappointing.
F. Bischoff v. Direct TV, Inc.
Some courts have embraced Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule in
transactions involving services rather than sale of goods. In
Bischoff v. Direct TV, Inc. the United States District Court for
California’s Central District applies the “terms later” rule to hold
that customers of television programming services are bound by an
arbitration clause of which they were not aware until after they had
purchased the Direct TV equipment, ordered the service, and
Direct TV activated the service.440 The court does not analyze the
order and installation of service under traditional common law
formation rules and the objective theory of contracts. Had it done
so, it would have found customers had reason to believe the
contract had been formed by their order and activation of the
service in response, and that the “terms later” were offers to
modify that would lapse absent affirmative agreement to them by
the purchasers. It also declines to treat by analogy earlier Code
cases in which additional terms were sought to be introduced after
an oral or written agreement between the parties for purchase and
sale had been made. Rather it chooses to characterize the later
disclosed terms of the Customer Agreement as merely “terms of
the ongoing contractual relationship between Direct TV and its
subscribers,”441 embracing the “terms later” rule that envisages no
439
440
441

See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
180 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Id. at 1104 (emphasis added).
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final contract until after the time period for rejection passes,
euphemistically referred to as the “rolling contract” approach.442
The Bischoff court finds support for that approach in Carnival
Cruise Lines,443 in ProCD and Hill, and in some other unreported
decisions from other lower courts (whose dates of decision were
subsequent to ProCD and Hill).444 Although the evidence was
disputed with regard to how long it was after service had been
activated before the terms were disclosed to the purchasers, there
was no dispute that some time had elapsed after activation and
before disclosure.445 The court rebuffs the customers’ efforts to
distinguish Hill on the basis that the “terms later” in that case came
at the same time as delivery.446 It finds that the length of time
between the two events is not dispositive on the issue of whether
the “terms later” are part of the parties’ agreement.447 “The more
controlling issue is the economic and practical considerations
involved in selling services to mass consumers which make it
acceptable for terms and conditions to follow the initial
transaction,”448 citing ProCD and quoting approvingly from Hill
the argument about the “droning voice” and its conclusion that
“[c]ustomers as a group are better off”449 when sellers disclose
terms after the purchase. “Practical business realities make it
unrealistic to expect DirecTV, or any television programming
service provider for that matter, to negotiate all of the terms of
their customer contracts, including arbitration provisions, with

442

Hillman, supra note 5, at 743. “In a rolling contract, a consumer orders
and pays for goods before seeing most of the terms, which are contained on or in
the packaging of the goods. Upon receipt, the buyer enjoys the right to return the
goods for a limited period of time.” Id. at 744.
443
499 U.S. 585 (1991); see supra note 67 and accompanying text
(demonstrating the holding in that case rested on the stated assumption that the
Shutes had knowledge of the terms prior to making their purchase).
444
Birschoff, 108 F. Supp. at 1105.
445
Id. at 1101.
446
Id. at 1105-06.
447
Id. at 1105.
448
180 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. (emphasis added).
449
Id.
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each customer before initiating service.”450
The bottom line is that it is not practical to require mass
marketers of services to do what other sellers of services have
always been required to do—state the terms on which they are
willing to sell as part of their offers. For the court it is as though
the objective theory of contract formation is nothing more than an
archaic relic, and as though the moral authority for courts to
enforce promises, derived from objectively judged assent in order
to protect reasonable expectations, is a mere nicety that can be
ignored for practicality’s sake.
G. Lozano v. AT&T Wireless
A few months later, in Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, another
California district court applied the “terms later” rule of
ProCD/Hill in a services case.451 This time the context was a
cellular service transaction in which the service provider first
disclosed a mandatory arbitration term after the purchaser had
signed a service plan.452 Its terms appeared in a welcome guide
within the box containing the newly purchased phone to be used
with the service.453
The service provider asserted that plaintiff had received a rate
plan brochure that stated service “is subject to the Terms and
Conditions contained in your . . . Welcome Guide, which is
included with your phone or available at point-of-purchase.”454
That latter phrase suggests that the case might not strictly have
been one of “terms later.” If the terms were actually and
reasonably available for inspection prior to the purchase decision,
and the purchaser simply chose to not read them, the purchaser
might be held bound by such terms under traditional contract
principles.455
The court, however, taking the lead from Bischoff, does not
450
451
452
453
454
455

Id. (emphasis added).
216 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Id. at 1073.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, at § 4.26.
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choose that path. Rather, it simply begins with its conclusion “that
providing customers with terms and conditions after an initial
transaction is acceptable, and that such terms and conditions are
enforceable, including arbitration clauses.”456 Relying heavily on
Bischoff and its extensive quotations from ProCD and Hill, the
court embraces the “economic and practical aspects of selling
services to mass customers” rationale and the rationale that
“[c]ustomers as a group are better off” with “terms later.”457 It
applies to a cellular telephone service provider the Bischoff court’s
conclusion that vendors cannot realistically negotiate all of the
contract terms before initiating service.458 For the Lozano court,
perceived “practical business realities” trump any legal or
economic considerations to the contrary.459
Several other courts have made favorable reference to the
“terms later” rule of ProCD/Hill in cases that did not involve clear
fact settings of order by a consumer, full payment and then
delivery with new terms.460 A few others have distinguished
456

216 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
Id. (quoting Bischoff, 180 F. Supp 1097, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
458
Id.
459
See also Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corporation, 726 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001). In yet another services case in the telecommunications realm,
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, relies upon the ProCD/Hill
“terms later” rule earlier embraced by Brower, to hold subscribers to a high
speed internet service are bound by disclaimer of warranties first disclosed to
them on an installation CD-ROM provided by Bell Atlantic after subscribing to
the service. Id. at 63. The subscribers contended that it was possible to use the
service without having actually read the terms and conditions. The court rebuffs
that contention on two grounds. Id. The pleadings did not allege that any of the
subscribers used the service without reading the terms, “and, with regard to the
location or conspicuousness of the terms and conditions within the installation
package, it has been held that such does not impair the enforcement of the
agreement,” citing the trilogy. Id. at 64. The Scott court thus treats those cases as
teaching the unimportance of not only the timing of the disclosure but also of the
actual likelihood it will be noticed by the purchaser. Like the decision in
Westendorf, it confirms that assent for purposes of binding a purchaser to “terms
later” is purely fictional at best.
460
See Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574, 577-78 (W.D.N.C. 2000)
(finding plaintiff credit cardholder agreed to an amendment to his credit card
agreement limiting his ability to arbitrate class actions because plaintiff did not
457
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ProCD/Hill.461 With respect to the latter, it is not clear whether the
courts felt it necessary to distinguish them on the belief that they
were good law, or whether it was just easier to distinguish them
than to refute the erroneous position for which they stand.
H. Licitra v. Gateway, Inc.
Except for the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas, in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,462 the only other court
expressing criticism of ProCD/Hill appears to be the New York
City Civil Court in Licitra v. Gateway, Inc.463 Confronted with the
controlling authority in its jurisdiction that had fully embraced
ProCD/Hill,464 the court in Licitra pays deference to the
conclusion that the contract was not formed until the time for
rejection had passed, but refuses to hold that such conclusion
compels the inclusion of the arbitration term, finding to enforce it
would be contrary to the public policy of the state of New York 465
and also UCC section 2-207.466 The court cogently notes:
cancel his account after receiving notification of the amendment, but continued
to use the card); Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala.
1998) (upholding arbitration clause in an amendment to plaintiff’s cardholder
agreement despite plaintiff not signing the amendment); Hunt v. Up North
Plastics, 980 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Minn. 1997) (finding plaintiff agreed to
arbitration clause incorporated in invoices because failed to reasonably object to
the clause); Boyd v. Homes of Legend, 981 F. Supp. 1423 (M.D. Ala. 1997)
(upholding arbitration clause in an agreement “subject to specific terms to be
decided at delivery” and that plaintiff assented to arbitration clause upon signing
purchase agreement when delivery of plaintiff’s mobile home was made).
461
See Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002);
Mattingly v. Hughes Elecs. Corp., 810 A.2d 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
462
104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
463
734 N.Y.S.2d 389 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001).
464
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988).
465
734 N.Y.S.2d at 393-97.
466
Id. at 396.
Finally, assuming that the UCC applies to the transaction, under UCC
2-207 in New York, between merchants, new terms in a written
confirmation do not become part of the parties’ agreement if they
materially alter the terms of the agreement . . . and it has been held that
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The first issue presented is whether or not a contract
exists between the parties and, if so, what are the terms of
the contract? Common sense tells us that if you pay money
and receive a product in return, a contract has been
created. The unique issue with the purchase of computers is
that there is no negotiation of the terms of the agreement.
The written “Agreement” arrives with the product and by
retaining the computer for 30 days, the consumer consents
to be bound by the terms of the entire writing. As cited
above, courts have held this procedure creates a binding
agreement between the parties. But in the words of Ira
Gershwin, “It ain’t necessarily so.”
Accepting these holdings as being applicable, if the
defendant, as a term and condition of filing a claim,
required the consumer to sing “O Sole Mio” in Yiddish
while standing on his or her head in Macy’s window, only
Mandy Patinkin would qualify to object to the receipt of
defective equipment. This cannot be so. What these
decisions must mean is that a contract has been formed
with the price, the equipment and time of delivery agreed
to, but almost nothing else. All other terms of the
“Agreement” proposed by the computer company must be
subject to interpretation by the courts as being additional
terms because, if not, they might conflict with state law or
be against public policy. . . .
....
. . .The Court, in Brower, applied the Marie Antoinette
“let them eat cake” defense when it determined that this is
not a “take it or leave it” situation and, therefore, not a
contract of adhesion because the consumer has 30 days to
an arbitration clause is presumptively a material alteration when
introduced as an additional term. . . If both parties are not merchants,
such as this case where there is a merchant-seller and consumerpurchaser, additional terms are to be construed to be proposals for
additions to the contract and therefore must be specifically agreed to by
the other party in order to be binding. . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
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reject the item and return the merchandise and has the
ability to purchase the equivalent equipment from another
vendor. Is this a real option or only a paper one?467
One must applaud the courage of the Licitra court in the face of
the Brower precedent. One can only wonder why other courts,
especially those which were not restricted by controlling precedent
as it was, could not also see and reject the nonsense of
Easterbrook’s “common sense” and his clear misapplication of the
law, or, if they saw it, why they lacked the will to stand against it.
That a number of courts have expressly embraced Easterbrook’s
rationale and his “terms later” rule is astounding in light of its utter
lack of legal, economic, or moral foundation.
V. BAD FRUIT—UCITA
Easterbrook’s ProCD opinion was the first judicial affirmation
of the “terms later” that was being vigorously pressed by industry
groups in the drafting process of UCC Article 2B468 and what
ultimately came to be the free-standing UCITA.469 ProCD, for the
first time, gave the appearance of legal legitimacy to the “terms
later” method of transacting business; and henceforth provided the
“legal” authority argument for its proponents in their continued
efforts to reflect that principle in UCC Article 2B and the
UCITA.470
467

Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The
Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683 (1999);
Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to Symposium on Proposed Revised Article 2,
54 SMU L. REV. 787 (2001).
469
Rusch, supra note 468, at 1686 n.10.
470
ProCD and Hill made their first appearance in the January 20, 1997
draft of UCC 2B, with the drafting committee’s approvingly referring to them in
Reporter’s note 2 to 2B’s Mass Market Licenses provision. Note 2 stated, in
pertinent part:
With respect to single form, shrink wrap cases, while the cases split, in
situations dealing with single form settings involving shrink wrap
licenses, no appellate case law rejects the contract-based enforceability
of the forms and recent cases generally support it. See Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 1997 WL 2809 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
468
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A. History
In spite of vigorous opposition from a host of groups, on July
29, 1999, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) for introduction to the state
legislatures.471 The project had begun in earnest in 1995 in
response to objections by the Business Software Alliance to the
inclusion of software under the larger project to revise Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.472 At that time the executive
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software
Link Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (Ariz. 1993).
The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Commercial Code
Article 2B, Jan. 20, 1997, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ulc_frame.htm (last visited November 13, 2003). The Reporter’s suggestion that
Arizona Retail is support for enforcing shrink-wrap terms not disclosed until
after purchase was erroneous. See supra notes 114-16.
471
See, e.g., Cem Kaner, Software Engineering and UCITA, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435, 440-44 (1999) (identifying various
groups in opposition to UCITA including forty-five state attorneys general, the
staff of the Federal Trade Commission, Society for Information Management,
retailers, fifty intellectual property law professors, the American Intellectual
Property Law Association, The Committee on Copyright and Literary Property,
the Communications and Media Law Committee, the Entertainment Law
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, libraries,
trade associations representing the press, the Association for Computing
Machinery, the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers (USA), the
American Society for Quality, the Independent Computer Consultants
Association, the Free Software Foundation and the Software Engineering
Institute.); David G. Mayhan & Patricia A. Fennelly, The Uniform Computer
Information Act: Ready Or Not, Here It Comes, 28-Dec. COLO. LAW. 63 (1999)
(recognizing the Motion Picture Association, the Recording Industry
Association of America and law professors of contracts and commercial law as
having spoken out in opposition to UCITA.); Joseph B. “Jobe” Tichy,
Comment, Computer Software Transactions in Washington State—What
Commercial Laws Can The State Provide For This Industry? Is UCITA The
Answer?, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 377, 385 (2001) (noting the Americans for Fair
Electronic Commerce Transactions also oppose UCITA on the basis of its unfair
nature towards consumers.).
472
Stephen Y. Chow, UCITA: A 1990’s Vision of E-Commerce, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 323, 324 (1999).

BERNMACRO2.DOC

774

4/23/2004 1:12 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

committee of NCCUSL spun off a separate UCC Article 2B
designed as the “licensing spoke” of a proposed “hub and spoke”
Article 2. 473
The American Law Institute was highly critical of proposed
Article 2B for its failure to require pre-transaction disclosure of
terms, even in Internet transactions where such disclosure could
easily be made.474 In 1999 the ALI Council Ad Hoc Committee on
UCC Article 2B stated that, “[t]he provisions on assent to posttransaction terms are inconsistent with sound contract policy,”475
and that “[t]here is no good reason in contracts formed over the
Internet why the terms could not be made available to the potential
licensee through links on the relevant website at the time of
contracting, rather than supplied later.”476 Lacking ALI support for
Article 2B, NCCUSL in 1999 adopted the Article 2B product as a
freestanding statute dealing with transactions in computer
information, in the form of UCITA.477 NCCUSL never presented
the proposed statute to the ALI for its final approval.478 Nor did it
ever receive final approval from the American Bar Association, its
final effort in that regard being abandoned in February of 2003.479
473

Id.
See Jean Braucher, Motion to Disapprove Proposed Final Drafts of
Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A, Presented to Members of the American
Law Institute 9 (May 1, 2003).
475
Id. (emphasis added).
476
Id.
477
Rusch, supra note 468, at 1686 n.10.
478
Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View From the Trenches,
52 HASTINGS L. J. 607, 611 (2001).
479
Press Release, Uniform Law Commissioners: UCITA Withdrawn From
ABA
Agenda
Without
Action
(February
10,
2003),
at
http://www.nccusl.org./nccusl/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=46.
In relevant part it stated:
A resolution concerning the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) which was before the American Bar
Association’s governing body, the House of Delegates, was withdrawn
today without consideration or substantive debate by the President of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL). K. King Burnett, NCCUSL President and the
organization’s representative to the House, withdrew the resolution
474
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B. UCITA: Assent Expanded
Sections 112 and 113 of the UCITA introduce an expanded
concept of “manifestation of assent” as a necessary predicate to
binding purchasers to terms not disclosed by sellers until after
sellers have received payment and the products have been
delivered. Section 112, entitled “Manifestation of Assent,”
provides that a person manifests assent by “acting with knowledge
of, or after having an opportunity to review” the record or term.480
Section 113, entitled “Opportunity to Review,” provides that a
person has the opportunity to review a record or term even if it is
“available for review only after a person becomes obligated to pay
or begins its performance” if he has a right to return the item if he
rejects the term. 481 Comment c. to section 113 states: “The right to
approving UCITA, citing requests by a number of ABA sections and
leaders to defer an extensive debate on the floor over the substantive
merits of the Uniform Act. “When it became evident that a clear
consensus on the act was unlikely to emerge, we were advised by a
number of ABA Section officers and other leaders that the members of
the House of Delegates would prefer not to take a formal position on
UCITA, for or against, at this time. We withdrew the act from
consideration in response to this advice.”
Id.
480

Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 112, at
http://www.law.upeen.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm(2002) [hereinafter UCITA]
(emphasis added). In pertinent part Section 112 provides:
(a) [How person manifests assent.] A person manifest assent to a record
or term if the person, acting with knowledge of, or after having an
opportunity to review the record or term or a copy of it . . . (2)
intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with reason to
know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer from the
conduct or statement that the person assents to the record or term . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
481
UCITA § 113 (emphasis added). In pertinent part Section 113 provides:
(a) [Manner of availability generally.] A person has an opportunity to
review a record or term only if it is made available in a manner that
ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit
review. . . . (c) [When right of return required.] If a record or term is
available for review only after a person becomes obligated to pay or
begins its performance, the person has an opportunity to review only if
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return creates a situation where meaningful assent can occur.”482
Section 202 of the UCITA, entitled “Formation in General,”
and its comment 4, embrace the layered or rolling contract concept
to bind purchasers to terms first disclosed only after payment for
and receipt of the product.483 Comment 4 states: “This subsection
lays a foundation for the layered contracting that typifies many
areas of commerce and is recognized in Uniform Commercial
Code Section 2-204 (1998 Official Text), as well as in the common
law and practice of most States.”484 This is an obvious reference to
Easterbrook’s ProCD opinion, the first to distort section 2-204 and
the common law in this fashion, and to its progeny, albeit without

it has a right to a return if it rejects the record. . . .
Id.
482

UCITA § 113, cmt. 2.
UCITA § 202. In pertinent part Section 202 (a) provides: “A contract
may be formed in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including offer and
acceptance, or conduct of both parties or operations of electronic agents which
recognize the existence of a contract.” Id. (emphasis added).
484
UCITA § 202 cmt. 4. That comment provides, in pertinent part:
This subsection lays a foundation for the layered contracting that
typifies many areas of commerce and is recognized in Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-204 (1998 Official Text), as well as in the
common law and practice of most States. This foundation is further
developed in Sections 208 [Adopting Terms of Records], 209 [MassMarket License], 304 [Continuing Contractual Terms], and 305 [Terms
to be Specified]. . . . Contract formation is often a process, rather than
a single event. A rule that a contract must arise at a single point in time
and that this single event defines all the terms of the contract is
inconsistent with commercial practice. Contracts are often formed over
time; terms are often developed during performance, rather than before
performance occurs. Often, parties expect to adopt records later and
that expectation itself is the agreement. Rather than modifying an
existing agreement, these terms are part of the agreement itself. . . .
During the time in which terms in a layered contract are developed or
to be proposed, it is not appropriate to the [sic] apply default rules of
this Act. . . .In layered contracting, the agreement is that there are no
terms on the undecided issues until they are made express by the
parties. Applying a default rule would be applying the rule despite
contrary agreement, rather than when no such agreement exists.
Id. (emphasis added).
483
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express citation in this comment.
The reference is explicit in comments to subsequent sections.
Section 208 of the UCITA, entitled “Adopting Terms of Records,”
provides in subsection (1) that a party “adopts the terms of a
record, including a standard form, as to the terms of the contract if
the party agrees to the record, such as by manifesting assent.”485
When linked with sections 112 and 113 regarding assent after one
has opportunity to review later supplied terms, section 208(1)
would appear sufficient to fully bind purchasers in settings like that
in ProCD. Lest there be any doubt, section 208(2), entitled “Later
terms,” is explicit on the matter, stating, “[t]he terms of a record
may be adopted after beginning performance or use if the parties
had reason to know” that other terms that could not have been
reviewed earlier would be provided later.486 Comment 3 to section
208 states that “subsection [2] reflects the reality of layered
contracting,” noting “many transactions involve a rolling or
layered process,” and expressly adopting the rule of ProCD and
one of its progeny.487 Comment 5 to section 208 is explicit that
“subsection [2] “applies in the mass market.”488
485

UCITA § 208(1) (emphasis added).
UCITA § 208(2). That subsection provides, in pertinent part:
[Later terms.] The terms of a record may be adopted after beginning
performance or use if the parties had reason to know that their
agreement would be represented in whole or part by a later record to be
agreed on and there would not be an opportunity to review the record
or a copy of it before performance or use begins. . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
487
UCITA § 208(2), cmt. 3 (emphasis added). Comment 3 provides:
3. Later Terms: Layered Contracting. Subsection (b) [sic] reflects the
reality of layered contracting. While some contracts are formed and
their terms defined at a single point in time, many transactions involve
a rolling or layered process. The commercial expectation is that terms
will follow or be developed after performance begins. This Act rejects
cases that narrowly treat contracting as a single event despite ordinary
practice. It adopts a rule in cases that recognize that contracts are often
formed over time. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, M.A.
Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp.
Id.
488
UCITA § 208(2) cmt. 3.
486
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Section 209 of the UCITA, entitled “Mass-Market License,”
provides that a party may adopt the terms of a mass-market license
by manifesting assent thereto “before or during the party’s initial
performance or use of or access to the information.”489 This, of
course, is the very setting presented in the typical shrink-wrap
transaction. Comment 5 to section 209 elaborates the point,
explicitly relying on ProCD and its progeny, stating with respect to
the effect of terms presented after initial agreement:
Mass-market licenses may be presented after initial
general agreement from the licensee. In some distribution
channels this allows a more efficient mode of contracting
between end users and remote parties; this is especially
important where the remote party controls copyright or
similar rights in the information. . . .
Most courts under current law enforce contract terms
that are presented and assented to after initial agreement
[citing Carnival Cruise Lines, ProCD, Hill v. Gateway,
Brower v. Gateway, Mortenson, and I. Lan Systems, and
parenthetically noting I. Lan’s observation that] “StepSaver once was the leading case on shrinkwrap agreements.
Today that distinction goes to . . . ProCD . . . . ‘Money
now, terms later’ is a practical way to form contracts,
especially with purchasers of software.”490
Section 304 of the UCITA, entitled “Continuing Contractual
Terms,” is another section resting on the foundation of layered
contracting. It presents the opportunity for a mass-market seller to
reserve the right to change terms of the contract in the future.491
489

UCITA § 209(a) (emphasis added). That section provides, in pertinent
part: “Adoption of the terms of a mass-market license under Section 208 is
effective only if the party agrees to the license, such as by manifesting assent,
before or during the party’s initial performance or use of or access to the
information.” Id.
490
UCITA § 209, cmt. 5. (emphasis added).
491
UCITA § 304. Section 304 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Terms of an agreement involving successive performances apply to
all performances, even if the terms are not displayed or otherwise
brought to the attention of a party with respect to each successive
performance, unless the terms are modified in accordance with this
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The seller could first present that reservation only after payment,
and it could be made effective by the “assent” permitted by
Sections 112 and 113. When the seller asserts this reserved right,
and presents a change in terms to the other party, the latter has no
right to reject the change and continue with the terms of the
original contract. Rather, the change, if proposed in good faith,
becomes part of the contract unless the one to whom it is proposed
can show that it “alters a material term” and that his determination
that it is unacceptable is made in good faith—in which case, the
party to whom the change is unacceptable can avoid it only by
terminating the contract as to future performances.
Section 305 of the UCITA, entitled “Terms to be Specified,” is
likewise founded on the layered contracting theory.492 Among
other things, it assures that an agreement such as one authorized by
section 304 reserving to one party the right to unilaterally change
the terms of the contract in the future will not cause the contract to
be invalid.493
C. Opposition to UCITA
UCITA and its predecessor, proposed UCC Article 2B, have
been vigorously opposed on a variety of grounds and by a host of
[Act] or the contract. (b) If a contract provides that terms may be
changed as to future performances by compliance with a described
procedure, a change proposed in good faith pursuant to that procedure
becomes part of the contract if the procedure: (1) reasonably notifies
the other party of the change; and (2) in a mass-market transaction,
permits the other party to terminate the contract as to future
performance if the change alters a material term and the party in good
faith determines that the modification is unacceptable.
Id.
492

See supra note 487.
UCITA § 305. Section 305 provides in pertinent part:
An agreement that is otherwise sufficiently definite to be a contract is
not invalid because it leaves particulars of performance to be specified
by one of the parties. If particulars of performance are to be specified
by a party, the following rules apply: (1) Specification must be made in
good faith and within limits set by commercial reasonableness.
493

Id.
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individuals and organizations.494 For example, thirteen attorneys
general and the Administrator of the Georgia Fair Business
Practices Act jointly registered their written opposition to
NCCUSL’s promulgating UCITA, noting that its rules “thwart the
common sense expectations of buyers and sellers in the real
world,” and reflect policy choices that “almost invariably favor a
relatively small number of vendors to the detriment of millions of
businesses and consumers who purchase computer software and
subscribe to internet services.”495 A group of forty-five law
professors also voiced their opposition in a letter to the President
of NCCUSL and its Commissioners on the eve of NCCUSL’s
promulgating the UCITA. The letter notes, among other things,
that “UCITA is out of step with modern commercial contract

494

See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA On The Road: What Lessons
Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 167, 206 (2001) (criticizing
UCITA’s authorization of anticompetitive terms preventing reverse
engineering); Braucher, supra note 5, at 1837-43, 1852-59 (criticizing delayed
disclosure of terms as deceptive acts and a violation of FTCA § 5); Chow, supra
note 472, at 324 (stating that UCITA is “stuck in the 1992-1995 model of
making terms available in the retail market only after a purchaser paid for the
product and opened the box holding the software”); James S. Heller, UCITA:
Still Crazy After All These Years, and Still Not Ready for Prime Time, 8 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 5, 56-58 (2001) (expressing concern over UCITA’s threat to fair
use of copyrighted material); Jeffrey A Modisett & Cindy M. Lott, Cyberlaw
and E-commerce: A State Attorney General’s Perspective, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
643, 651 (2000) (stating that UCITA “stacks the deck against consumers”);
Kaner, supra note 471, at 440-45 (criticizing UCITA as permitting publishers to
eliminate competition from used software by barring consumers from
transferring used copies of the software they buy); Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Spiders
and Crawlers and Bots, Oh My: Efficiency and Public Policy of Online
Contracts That Restrict Data Collection, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 45 (2002)
(criticizing UCITA’s treatment of preemption issue); Pratik A. Shah, Intellectual
Property: A. Copyright: 5. Preemption: a) Contract enforceability: The Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 92-96
(exploring consumer protection concerns).
495
Letter from the Attorneys General of Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington and the Administrator of the Georgia Fair
Business Practices Act to Gene Lebrun, President, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 23, 1999).
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law.”496
Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer
Reports magazine, was also among the many groups registering
opposition to the adoption of UCITA by NCCUSL. It noted,
among other things, that UCITA “is fundamentally unbalanced,” is
“riddled with loopholes favoring license drafters,” “interferes in a
wholesale way with all other applicable state statutes on four key
issues,” including consent and agreement, and “turns upside-down
the Conference’s long tradition of deferring to state consumer
protection law.”497
496

Letter from forty-five professors of contracts and commercial law in
Opposition to UCITA to President Gene Lebrun and Other Commissioners,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 16, 1999)
(emphasis added). The professors pertinently stated:
UCITA . . [makes] it very easy for a vendor to escape default rules
without meaningful assent by the other party. Although UCITA Section
112 defining “manifesting assent” is unclear, judging from the
Reporter’s Notes, the intent seems to be that a business organization’s
employee who opened a shrinkwrap package or clicked through terms
while installing software would “manifest assent” to the vendor’s
terms. . . . Even if a purchaser negotiated terms in advance of delivery,
it would have to be concerned that those terms might be changed by
shrinkwrap or clickwrap terms that came with the product.
....
In short, UCITA’s contract rules are not needed to protect software
makers against copying or to allow them to limit use in reasonable
ways. Indeed, UCITA’s contracting rules govern all terms, making it
easy for publishers to get all the form terms they desire, for example
excluding all warranties of quality, without meaningful assent by the
other party. They also protect software vendors from having to honor
oral agreements actually made. This one-sided approach even extends
to permitting vendors to use a term in shrinkwrap or clickwrap to give
themselves power to keep changing material terms unilaterally. UCITA
Section 304. This section misuses the terms “modified” and
“modification” to refer to unilaterally-dictated changes, rather than the
usual meaning of modification, a change agreed to by both parties.
Professor Perillo has it exactly right when he describes UCITA as a
“command and control” regime.
Id.
497

Letter from Gail Hillebrand, Senior Attorney at the West Coast
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A year and a half earlier, while UCITA was still in the UCC
Article 2B format process, the Subcommittee on Proposed UCC
Article 2B of the ABA Section on Science and Technology
expressed its opposition to the “terms later” approach of UCC
Article 2B, particularly in the context of mass-market licenses.498 It
noted that “[l]icensors frequently include provisions in mass
market licenses to impose restrictions or limitations which they
know would discourage sales if they were disclosed prior to
purchase,” and that “a statutory ‘right of return’ does not give
adequate protection to a licensee who has expended time and
effort to shop for and purchase a product in reliance on
promotional materials which conceal material aspects of the
product and the terms governing its use.”499 It concluded: “[i]n
sum, we believe that a statute that permits a licensor to eliminate
virtually all of its obligations and impose significant use
restrictions without effective advance disclosure only encourages
sharp practice and tends to reduce the customer confidence that is
essential to the functioning of a mass market.”500
D. UCITA “Terms Later” Contra Fundamental Principles of
Justice
UCITA also violates fundamental principles of justice.501 In
particular, it violates the tsedeq principle in that it replaces
common law and statutory law that protects reasonable
expectations with a rule that defeats reasonable expectations and
protects unreasonable ones. It thus does not constitute a righteous
moral standard. It also violates the mishpat principle of
evenhanded (impartial) treatment of all in that it is premised upon
favoritism of sellers over buyers in all transactions to which it
Regional Office of Consumers Union, to each Uniform Law Commissioner
(July 21, 1999). (emphasis added).
498
Letter from the Subcommittee on Proposed UCC Article 2B of the ABA
Section on Science and Technology to the Drafting Committee of UCC Article
2B (January 29, 1998).
499
Id.
500
Id.
501
Bern, supra note 247; see also supra text accompanying notes 340-45.
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applies, permitting sellers to dictate after the sale the terms on
which they will be bound, apparently upon the utilitarian
presumption that this will be best for society.
Fortunately, this abrogation of fundamental principles of
justice was ultimately thwarted. Although versions of UCITA
obtained quick passage in Maryland502 and Virginia,503 it could not
garner support from any other state legislature. Some states
responded with “bomb shelter” statutes,504 anti-UCITA statutes to
prevent UCITA from governing any computer information
transaction contract within their borders.505 Facing continued
overwhelming opposition even to its attempts to make UCITA
more palatable, NCCUSL discharged its standby committee of the
UCITA at its annual meeting on August 1, 2003.506 The press
release announcing the discharge of the standby committee,
continued: “We have determined to focus the Conference’s
energies on the items related to our larger agenda and not expend
any additional Conference energy or resources in having UCITA.”
With that, NCCUSL’s effort to promote its ill-conceived UCITA
thankfully came to an end but not until after it, and the powerful
industry lobby it had galvanized, had contaminated the Article 2
revision process.
VI. BAD FRUIT—PROPOSED ARTICLE 2 AMENDMENTS
Some of the proposed amendments to UCC Article 2 are yet
additional bad fruit from ProCD/Hill’s bad seed.507 In particular,
502

MD. CODE ANN., Maryland Uniform Computer Information Transfer
Act §22-211 (2002).
503
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-505.6 (Michie 2003).
504
IOWA CODE § 554D.104 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2002); W.
VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2003).
505
Brian D. McDonald, V. Business Law: B. Computer Information: a)
Contract Enforceability: The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 463 (2001). See also, David A. Szwak, Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act [U.C.I.T.A.]: The Consumer’s
Perspective, 63 LA. L. REV. 27, 29 (2002).
506
Press Release, U.C.I.T.A. Standby Committee is Discharged (Aug.1,
2003).
507
These Proposed Amendments to UCC Article 2 were approved by the
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the proposed amendments to sections 2-204, 2-211, and 2-207
sprout directly from it and the appearance of legal legitimacy the
decisions gave to business interests who pressed hard for
imposition of their will in the drafting process, as they had in the
drafting process of Article 2B and UCITA.508
A. Proposed Sections 2-204 and 2-211(4): Validating “Terms
Later” under the Guise of Adapting to Technological
Change
The proposed amendments to UCC section 2-204 adopt
ProCD’s conclusion that clicking through messages on a screen by
the purchaser of software in order to load or use that software is
agreement to whatever those messages state.509 Proposed comment
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its annual
meeting in August of 2002 and by the American Law Institute at its meeting on
May 13, 2003. The amendments referred to in this article are from the August
2002 Final Draft adopted by NCCUSL at its annual meeting in August 2002,
with the portions underlined in the notes infra indicating the changes proposed
to existing Article 2. They may be accessed online at The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts,
Official Site, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last visited
November 13, 2003).
508
See supra note 468 and accompanying text.
509
U.C.C. § 2-204 (2002) (Proposed Draft).
FORMATION IN GENERAL. (1) A contract for sale of goods may be
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including offer and
acceptance, conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a contract, the interaction of electronic agents, or the interaction of
an electronic agent and an individual. (2) An agreement sufficient to
constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of
its making is undetermined. (3) Even though one or more terms are left
open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis
for giving an appropriate remedy. (4) Except as otherwise provided in
Sections 2-211 through 2-213, the following rules apply:(a) A contract
may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents of the parties,
even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’
actions or the resulting terms and agreements. (b) A contract may be
formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual
acting on the individual’s own behalf or for another person. A contract
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5 makes explicit that subsection (4)(b) “substantiates an
anonymous click-through transaction.”510 It notes:
The requisite intent to contract by the individual is found
by the acts of the individual that the individual has reason
to know will be interpreted by the machine as allowing the
machine to complete the transaction or performance, or that
will be interpreted by the machine as signifying acceptance
on the part of the individual.511
Of course the machine that is likely to be interpreting the
keystrokes of the purchaser of the software is the purchaser’s own
computer. For purposes of “interpretive ability,” the owner’s
computer is deemed capable of interpreting his keystrokes in an
effort to load or to use the software he has already paid for as
meaning he accepts the new terms. Still, adding a new subsection
(4) to the proposed amended section 2-211 makes clear that his
computer is deemed to be not capable of interpreting any other
keystrokes he makes, such as “I R-E-J-E-C-T T-H-E-S-E N-E-W
T-E-R-M-S.”512
Perhaps in an effort to allay fears about the impact of amended
section 2-204, or perhaps to just strategically understate its impact,
the proposed comment notes that “[t]his intent is only found,
though, when the individual is free to refuse to take the actions that
the machine will interpret as acceptance or allowance to complete
is formed if the individual takes actions that the individual is free to
refuse to take or makes a statement that the individual has reason to
know will: (i) cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction or
performance; or (ii) indicate acceptance of an offer, regardless of other
expressions or actions by the individual to which the electronic agent
cannot react.
Id. (underlined material is proposed amended language).
510
U.C.C. § 2-204 prop. cmt. 5 (2002) (Proposed Draft).
511
Id.
512
U.C.C. § 2-211(4) (2002) (Proposed Draft). That section provides:
(4) A contract formed by the interaction of an individual and an
electronic agent under Section 2-204(4)(b) does not include terms
provided by the individual if the individual had reason to know that the
agent could not react to the terms as provided.
Id. (underlined material is proposed amended language).
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the transaction.”513 Then it gives the example of a common
Internet transaction where the seller presents the terms before the
purchaser or user has made any commitment at all,514 atypical of a
“terms later” setting such as ProCD or Mortenson. But subsection
4(b) also applies to validate, as did ProCD and its shrink-wrap case
law progeny, and as does UCITA, the click-on as assent in pure
“terms later” settings.515 In such settings, based on the relevant
economic considerations and considerations of human behavior
noted above, one must ask realistically how “free” is the individual
to refuse to take key stroke actions? “Free,” only if it means it is
costless to give up the deal he had already made, return the
software, and engage in a new search for a substitute.
B. Section 2-207: Legitimizing “Terms Later” Contracting
The Prefatory Note to the August 2001 proposed Amendments
to Article 2 signals in a not very subtle way the affirmation of
ProCD/Hill’s terms later rule in proposed changes to section 2207.516 It states, “section 2-207 is amended to state the terms of
contract formed in any manner, not just those as to which there is a
battle of the forms.”517 This supports Easterbrook’s ProCD/Hill
premise that the current section 2-207 was confined to battle of the
forms settings; a premise contrary to the clear language of current
section 2-207 and its comments, and contrary to the decisional and
scholarly commentary on the matter prior to Easterbrook’s ProCD
decision.518
513

§ 2-204 prop. cmt. 5.
THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UCC: AMENDMENTS TO UCC
ARTICLE 2SALES, § 2-204 prop. cmt. 5, 33 (American Law Inst. 2002).
515
Id. (providing that a purchaser advised that the transaction will be
completed by clicking “I agree” will be bound if purchaser had reason to know
that the click would be interpreted as acceptance of the terms).
516
Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales, Aug. 10-17, 2001, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
517
Id. (emphasis added).
518
THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UCC: AMENDMENTS TO UCC
ARTICLE 2SALES, § 2-207 prop. cmt. 3, 37 (American Law Inst. 2002).
514
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The Prefatory Note also understates the significance of the
decision to move some of the language of the current section 2207(1) up into a new section 2-206(c). Proposed section 2-206(c)
pertinently provides, “[a] definite and reasonable expression of
acceptance in a record operates as an acceptance even if it contains
terms additional to or different from the offer.”519 That language
appears in the current section 2-207(1)520 in conjunction with the
current section 2-207(2)521 and had a two-fold impact.
First, it constituted a rejection of the common law mirror image
rule. Second, it established the “first-shot” rule that favored the
offeror by giving full effect to that language so that a definite
expression of acceptance that contained terms different from or
additional to those in the offer did operate as an acceptance of the
terms of the offer.522 Current section 2-207(2) prescribes the effect
of proposals for additional terms, precluding imposition of such
terms on a consumer absent express agreement to them by the
consumer.523 It also precludes imposition of additional terms that
materially alter the contract already formed on the basis of the
offeror’s terms in the case of transactions between merchants. 524
Referring to the repositioning of the language from section 2207(1) to proposed section 2-206(c), the Prefatory Note states,
“[t]he formation rule—that ‘a definite and seasonable expression
of acceptance’ operates as an acceptance even though it does not
mirror the offer—is set forth as an amendment to the section
dealing with offer and acceptance generally.”525 But it leaves
unsaid that the proposed rewrite of section 2-207 radically
transforms the meaning of the repositioned language from its
normal legal meaning and that which it has under current section
519

U.C.C. § 2-206(3) (2002) (Proposed Draft).
U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1995).
521
See § 2-207(1)-(2).
522
See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, at § 3.21a.
523
See supra note 107 and accompanying text..
524
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
525
See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, 2001 Annual
Meeting Draft, Amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales,
Aug. 10, 2001, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ucc2/ucc0612.htm (last visited April 20, 2004).
520
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2-207. The proposed rewrite of section 2-207 effectively neuters
the normal legal effect of a definite expression of acceptance that
contains terms different from or additional to the terms of the offer.
Although the repositioned language still expressly states that such
expression of acceptance “operates as an acceptance,” proposed
section 2-207 does not recognize that such expression of
“acceptance” is an acceptance in the normal legal sense of the
exercise of a power that forms a contract on the basis of the terms
offered. Rather, an expression of “acceptance” may have no legal
significance beyond evidencing that the parties are in some sort of
a generic relationship sufficient to permit a court to treat it as a
contract for purposes of the court’s prescribing its terms under the
provisions of proposed section 2-207.
Proposed section 2-207 is indeed the card that trumps whatever
the reasonable belief of the offeror may be as to the terms of the
contract in instances where the offeree has made what appears to
be a definite expression of acceptance, albeit with different or
additional form terms.526 It also trumps whatever the reasonable
526

U.C.C. § 2-207 (2002) (Proposed Draft).
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. (2) The
additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them
has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received. (3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale
although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a
contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of
this Act. If (i) conduct by both parties recognizes the existence of a
contract although their records do not otherwise establish a contract, (ii)
a contract is formed by an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract
formed in any manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms
additional to or different from those in the contract being confirmed,
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belief of the offeror may be as to the terms of the contract in
instances where the offeree has made what appears to be an
unqualified acceptance but thereafter sends a writing with
additional or different terms. This is because proposed section 2207 makes no distinction among: (1) a contract established by
conduct although the records of the parties do not agree, (2) a
contract formed by an offer and acceptance, or (3) a contract
formed in any manner that is confirmed by a record that contains
terms additional to or different from those in the contract being
confirmed.527 All are treated on par and their terms are the:
(a) terms that appear in the records of both parties; (b)
terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties
agree; and (c) terms supplied or incorporated under any
provision of this Act.528
As proposed comment 3 makes clear, subsection (b) is the
blank check given to the court to enable it to exercise its “wise
discretion” in determining the terms to which the parties
“agree.”529 That comment is explicit that the agreement
contemplated by the revision is not limited to an express
agreement. It notes, in pertinent part:
By inviting a court to determine whether a party
“agrees” to the other party’s terms, the text recognizes the
enormous variety of circumstances that may be presented
to a court under this section, and the section gives the court
greater discretion to include or exclude certain terms than
original Section 2-207 did. In many cases mere
performance should not be construed to be agreement to
terms in another’s record by one that has sent or will send
its own record with additional or different terms. . . . By the
the terms of the contract, subject to Section 2-202, are: (a) terms that
appear in the records of both parties; (b) terms, whether in a record or
not, to which both parties agree; and (c) terms supplied or incorporated
under any provision of this Act.
Id. (strikethrough shows current text) (underlined shows proposed text).
527
Id. § 2-206(3) (Proposed Draft).
528
Id.
529
Id. § 2-207 prop. cmt. 3 (Proposed Draft).
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same reasoning performance after an original agreement
between the parties (orally, electronically or otherwise)
should not normally be construed to be agreement to terms
in the other’s record unless that record is part of the
original agreement.
....
In some cases a court might find nonverbal agreement to
additional or different terms that appear in only one
record.

....
. . . There is a limitless variety of verbal and nonverbal
behavior that may be claimed to be an agreement to
another’s record. The section leaves the interpretation of
that behavior to the wise discretion of the courts.530
Thus, if an offeror submits a written offer to which the offeree
responds with what appears to be a definite expression of
acceptance, but with different or additional terms, the “contract”
formed by such acceptance is not necessarily the one that the
offeror offered. It will be for the court in its “wise discretion” to
determine whether some nonverbal conduct by the offeror should
be deemed to be agreement by the offeror to such terms. The “first
shot” favored position of the offeror under current section 2-207 is
rejected by the language of the proposed revision of section 2-207,
a matter explicitly noted in proposed comment 2.531 As noted
above, it has been the “first shot” preference of current section 2207 (1), coupled with section 2-207(2), that, prior to the distortion
530

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 2-207 prop. cmt. 2 (Proposed Draft). In pertinent part, that
comment provides:
This section applies only when a contract has been formed under other
provisions of Article 2. This section functions solely to define the terms
of the contract. When forms are exchanged before or during
performance, the result from the application of this section differs from
the original Section 2-207 and the common law in that this section
gives no preference to the first or the last form; it applies the same test
to the terms in each.
Id. (emphasis added).
531
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of section 2-207 by Easterbrook’s ProCD opinion, had protected
such an offeror from imposition of adverse terms included in the
form acceptance.
Likewise, under the proposed revision of section 2-207, if an
offeror buyer makes an offer by telephone that the offeree seller
orally accepts without qualification in that same conversation, it is
apparent that such an offeror cannot be sure at that moment that a
contract has been formed, or, if it has been formed, on what
“terms.” These matters must await potential future conduct by the
seller. If the seller presents “terms later” in a subsequent writing,
perhaps those will be the terms of the contract. Comment 3 says
that “performance after an original agreement between the parties
(orally, electronically or otherwise) should not normally be
construed to be agreement to terms in the other’s record.”532
Translation: In some cases mere performance may be construed to
be agreement to terms in another’s record. After all, the comment
also recognizes “a limitless variety of verbal and nonverbal
behavior that may be claimed to be an agreement to another’s
record.”533 Therefore a buyer’s retention of goods in the face of a
seller’s “terms later” provision declaring the same to be acceptance
could be deemed to be behavior signifying agreement, if that
appeared appropriate in the wise discretion of the court.
Further, the appropriateness of such a determination is fortified
by proposed comment 5, which legitimizes Hill’s distortion of
current section 2-207 and common law principles to bind a buyer
to a seller’s “terms later” in such a setting.534 Proposed comment
532

Id. § 2-207 prop. cmt. 3 (Proposed Draft) (emphasis added).
Id.
534
U.C.C. § 2-207 prop. cmt. 5 (Proposed Draft).
The section omits any specific treatment of terms on or in the container
in which the goods are delivered. Amended Article 2 takes no position
on the question whether a court should follow the reasoning in Hill v.
Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (Section 2-207 does not
apply to these cases; the “rolling contract” is not made until acceptance
of the seller’s terms after the goods and terms are delivered) or the
contrary reasoning in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.1991) (contract is made at time of oral
or other bargain and “shrink wrap” terms or those in the container
become part of the contract only if they comply with provisions like
533
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5’s assertion that “[a]mended Article 2 takes no position with
respect to whether a court should follow the reasoning in Hill v.
Gateway 2000 . . . or the contrary reasoning in Step-Saver Data
Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology” is pure sophistry.535 For the
“reasoning” of Step-Saver rested squarely upon current section 2207’s “first shot” rule that favored the offeror, which proposed
section 2-207 expressly rejects; and upon section 2-207(2)’s
prescription with respect to the treatment of additional terms, the
very language that proposed section 2-207 eliminates. The
proposed revision and its comments cut away the entire basis for
Step-Saver’s “reasoning.” Nothing in the language of proposed
section 2-207 or its proposed comments supports the “reasoning”
of Step-Saver, but everything in them accommodates the
“reasoning” of Hill’s terms later “rolling contract” analysis. After
much initial resistance to the aberration of ProCD/Hill’s “terms
later” doctrine,536 the drafters of the revision ultimately caved in.537
Section 2-207).
Id.
535

Id.
Rusch, supra note 468, at 1683-90; Speidel, supra note 478, at 614-17.
See, e.g., March 21, 1997 Draft subsection (a) of Section 2-206, “Consumer
Contracts, Records,” available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_
frame.htm (providing: “[i]n a consumer contract, if a consumer agrees to a
record, any non-negotiated term that a reasonable consumer in a transaction of
this type would not reasonably expect to be in the record is excluded from the
contract, unless the consumer had knowledge of the term before agreeing to the
record”). Comment 1 to that draft section stated:
The question is when a consumer who agrees to a record, usually by
authentication or by conduct indicating assent to terms in the record,
[is] bound by the terms in the record? The answer in a consumer
contract under Section 2-206 is that the terms [sic] is excluded when a
term is not negotiated, a reasonable consumer in this type of transaction
would not expect it, and the consumer had no knowledge of the term
before the agreement. The ALI supported this principle by a 2 X 1
votes at the Annual Meeting in May, 1997.
Id. See also March 21, 1997 Draft comment 4 to Section 2-205 “Offer and
Acceptance in Formation of Contract,” available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (describing the ProCD and Hill cases and notes that
they “raise questions about the adequacy of the proposed contract formation
provisions,” one of which was “[d]oes Article 2 adequately neutralize the risk of
536
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Apparently for strategic reasons, they couched their capitulation in
terms designed to make it appear that they have merely raised
Hill’s pure distortion of the Code and common law principles to a
level of parity with decisions like Step-Saver that had accurately
applied them. Only the most naïve could believe the feigned
neutrality of the proposed revision on the issue of “terms later.”
C. Proposed Article 2’s Sanction of “Terms Later” Contra
Fundamental Principles of Justice
Proposed Article 2’s sanction of “terms later” violates
fundamental principles of justice.538 The click-through method of
assent to bind purchasers to “terms later” prescribed by sections 2204 and 2-211(4) mandates a fictitious assent, contrary to the
essence of justice based on truth. It violates the tsedeq principle in
that replaces a clear rule of law that protects reasonable
expectations with a rule that defeats reasonable expectations and
protects unreasonable expectations. It thus does not constitute a
righteous moral standard. It also violates the mishpat principle of
evenhanded (impartial) treatment of all in that it is premised on a
policy of favoritism toward sellers, permitting sellers to dictate
after the sale the terms on which they will be bound, apparently
upon the utilitarian presumption that this will be best for society.
The proposed revision of section 2-207 also violates three of
the four “Requisites for Law and Justice.”539 It violates the tsedeq
principle in two respects. First, it removes a clear rule of law that
guards against imposition of “terms later” and replaces it with a
non-rule. Second, it extends an invitation to courts to exercise their
“wise discretion” to state when and to what extent it deems parties
have agreed, and to even engage in multiple fictions for that
purpose. The first fiction is that no contract is formed when a
buyer orally orders goods and pays for them and the seller in
response orally agrees to ship the goods and/or actually ships them.
unfair surprise in these cases? If not, what revisions should be made?”). Id.
537
Speidel, supra note 478, at 617-20.
538
Bern, supra note 247 and accompanying text; see also supra text
accompanying notes 340-43.
539
Id.
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The second fiction is that the buyer’s continued retention of the
goods that he has bought and paid for constitutes an agreement to
disadvantageous terms in the shipping carton even if the buyer was
not aware of them.
It also violates the mishpat principle of evenhanded (impartial)
treatment of all in that it invites the courts to apply ProCD/Hill’s
“terms later” doctrine to openly favor sellers and what is desired
by them, upon the utilitarian presumption that this will be best for
society. That principle of evenhanded treatment of all, so deeply
embedded in American law and reflected in the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,540 is openly repudiated by Easterbrook with his
favor-the-sellers “terms later” rule of contract formation.
The proposed revision of section 2-207 also violates the
meshar principle. Because it disclaims any standard for
determining the legal status of “terms later” and invites courts to
engage in fictions in determining when and to what parties will be
deemed to have agreed, one can have no confidence that like
outcomes will occur in like cases. It all depends on the “wise
discretion” of the court, which may vary considerably from judge
to judge.
VII. PROPOSAL
Had the NCCUSL not abandoned its push to have UCITA
adopted, the first proposal of this paper would have been its defeat
in any state in which it had not been adopted and repeal in each of
the two states in which it had been. Now the proposal is more
limited—a call for the repeal of UCITA in Virginia and Maryland.
With respect to the proposed amendments to Article 2 of the
Code, prior to the aberration of ProCD/Hill no cases or
commentary had in any way suggested that UCC section 2-207
required anything less than actual, knowing agreement by
consumers to additional or different terms first proposed after a
contract had been formed. Nor had cases or commentary suggested
that section 2-207 gave too many rights to consumer buyers.
540

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Nothing prior to those cases suggested that, as far as consumer
transactions were concerned, section 2-207 was “broken.”
Certainly nothing in the cases or commentary had suggested that
section 2-204 was some kind of a roving wild card that trumped
the contract formation terms of section 2-206 or the objective
theory of contract law. It is remarkable, indeed, that these aberrant
cases should prompt any perception that the section needed to be
“fixed” in order to accommodate the aberration.
In the end, the proposed revision would “fix” what had not
been broken, and would embrace the aberration. The fix achieved
would have all of the appearances of a “fix” in its most unsavory
sense, exposing consumers to all of the abuse and opportunism
afforded sellers who can force adverse “terms later” upon them.
The Code is already tipped so heavily in favor of sellers with, for
example, section 2-719 that permits sellers to limit remedies and
preclude consequential damages.541 The proposed revisions permit
the imposition of those and other adverse terms secretly via “terms
later.” They would thus add one more heavy weight to the sellers’
side of the scale, and leave on the buyers’ side only the light
weight of the unpredictable unconscionability doctrine to police
against the statutorily sanctioned abuse.
For the reasons stated above, current sections 2-204, 2-206, and
2-207 should be left alone and their counterparts in the proposed
amendments should be rejected. Proposed section 2-211(4), which
has significance only as it facilitates imposition of terms later,
should also be rejected. Only by rejecting these proposed
amendments, which encourage sellers to withhold adverse terms
until after payment, can the legislatures keep consumers from
being subjected to calculating overreaching and abuse by sellers.
Only by rejecting these proposed amendments and expressly
repudiating the ProCD/Hill “terms later” doctrine as a distortion of
law contrary to public policy can state legislatures assure justice in
the contracting process.

541

U.C.C. § 2-719 (1995).
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CONCLUSION
Easterbrook’s pronouncements in ProCD and Hill are without
moral justification, his purported legal analysis is transparently
fallacious, and his purported economic analysis is patently
bogus—all demonstrating that his “terms later” rule is nothing
more and demonstrate that his “terms later” rule is nothing more
than the rank exercise of raw judicial power. As such, his
ProCD/Hill “terms later” rule is a classic example of legal realism
in operation and of the accuracy of the assessment of Critical Legal
Studies theorists that what courts engage in is the mere exercise of
power, not the application of law.542
That should come as no surprise because for some time now it
has been a part of the “ordinary religion” of the law school
classroom.543 And in more recent years it has come to be
understood by a greater share of the general population,544 the very
problem Roscoe Pound had identified over seventy-five years
ago.545 Though it is not a surprise, law reduced to nothing more
than power is a matter of no small import. Once law is severed
from its historic transcendent moorings and relegated to a
transparent exercise of power, it loses its authoritative force, and
the implications for instability of society are ominous. Why should
the public believe the decision-makers have made the right
decisions, or even that they have authority to do so? When law
loses its authoritative force, an accompanying disregard for what
masquerades as law is inevitable, as is a disdain for those who
purport to pronounce it. Thus the implications of law as naked
power so openly displayed in cases such as ProCD and Hill reach
well beyond contract law and the Commercial Code.

542

UNGER, supra note 177, at 169-81.
Cramton, supra note 368 and accompanying text. See also GERBER,
supra note 368.
544
BERMAN, supra note 247 and accompanying text.
545
POUND, supra note 248.
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